A Reconciliation of Self and State in Hobbes' Leviathan

Ross Strain

Kinlaw

A Reconciliation of Self and State in Hobbes' Leviathan

In the Leviathan, Hobbes argues for a social contract that involves rule by a sovereign, or monarch, that is instituted by the people. During his discourse Hobbes makes the claim that people are naturally inclined to pursue self interest, while at the same time positing that these very people have a responsibility to the sovereign that rules them. The apparent problem is immediately perceived by the reader Ð'- in order to fulfill their responsibility to a sovereign, must they not deny the pursuit of self-interest and replace it with the pursuit of the sovereign's interest? Surely Hobbes is not suggesting that man deny his true natureÐ'... is he? Upon further examination of the text the reader discovers that indeed Hobbes does allow for a people to fulfill the interests of the sovereign without denying what he has professed to be human nature. However, we jump too far ahead, in order to understand the compatibility of these two seemingly irreconcilable sentiments one must start from the very beginning of the text.

Hobbes opens in an attempt to analyze society with a series of definitions, beginning with Man and the Senses. He speaks of man's perception in a series of events that leads to his definition of imagination as being "nothing but decaying sense," and is the same as memory. He treats dreams and speech in much the same way in order to support his claim about the necessity of definitions to reach an understanding. This is the first point in Leviathan that the reader is explicitly shown by the author that he is attempting to reduce "human nature" into a series of undeniable truths. Hobbes is apparently working with the theory that if one can define humanity in terms that nobody can dispute, then surely one can do the same with a social contract. Even Hobbes' definitions of the Passions are very unemotional, cut and dry performances. He proposes that the words good, evil, and contemptible are always used "with relation to the person that useth them," so it is indeed possible to define the terms axiomatically.

Through chapter XIII of part one the reader has followed Hobbes' extrapolating definitions to his proposal that man's natural state is being at constant war with every other man. This is the point where Hobbes begins to preemptively reconcile the apparent incompatibility of the individual's self-interest with the sovereign's. For Hobbes there are three ultimate causes for the conflict in this base state of nature, including competition, a lack of confidence, and a quest for glory: "the first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation." After explaining the reasons that this warring state exists, he goes on to lay out the laws of human nature by which this state is repressed. The first law of nature that Hobbes presents however seems to reinforce the idea that a warring state is the only possible state by proclaiming "that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war." Basically, he is positing that, yeah, everyone wants peace, but if you cannot have it take it. This is certainly not the step that many people would expect Hobbes to take next, and I had to read and re-read this section looking for a more non-aggressive route to peace. It turns out that this search was in vain, because even though the first law claims that "every man has a right to everything, even to one another's body," the second law of nature is where Hobbes really promotes the advantages of peace. His second law includes "that a man be willing, when others are so tooÐ'... to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself." This is a concrete point where Hobbes allows for the pursuit of individual's self-interest to be sacrificed for a state of peace when dealing with a conglomeration of people.

This second law of nature is Hobbes' introduction of contracts or covenants into the interaction of humans as a functioning society. The implementations of these contracts are what Hobbes refers to as the third law of nature, and in summary he states that not adhering to the previously outlined laws is what is known as injustice, and everything else is just. These laws are the presupposition of Hobbes' model of a commonwealth, the purpose of which is laid out very succinctly in the opening paragraph of part two of Leviathan. It is stated here that man, in order to preserve his own well-being, naturally abhors war, but without a fear of retribution any man will unavoidably violate Hobbes' natural laws. Hobbes does not deny that the natural laws are contrary to the natural passions, but promotes this schism as a rationale for the commonwealth. Although man admittedly pursues self-interest, it has now been established that what best embraces this self-interest is a peaceful state as opposed to a warring one. Therefore in order for a peaceful state to exist man's natural passions must succumb to the natural laws, and as Hobbes so delicately puts it "covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all." Without being afraid of punishment for breaking these laws, surely man's passions will get the best of him.

It is in a similar way that Hobbes relates a unit as small as one single family to that of an entire city, because security does not come from the numbers of the group, but by comparison of the