In Response to Daniel Dennett's "where Am I?"

One potential worry that one might have upon reading Daniel Dennett's "Where Am I?," is about the complications that might arise from Dennett categorizing his brain, who he calls Yorick, and his body, who he calls Hamlet, as two distinct entities. One may contend that the brain and the body are in fact only one entity, connected much in the same way that other people's brains and bodies seem to be connectedÐ'--however that may beÐ'--with the exception of an unusually large temporal gap between Dennett's brain and Dennett's body in this case. Unfortunately, however, this worry is ultimately unclear and incoherent, but if expressed in different terms, it is possible to make sense of the underlying idea . In this paper, I will describe this worry, explain why it falls short, and then re-formulate it in clearer terms in the hope of capturing and clarifying what the underlying intuitions actually are. Furthermore, I will present and respond to a worry that may be brought against this reformulated position.

In his extended thought experiment, Dennett imagines that, as part of a government assignment, he is to undergo a surgical operation that will separate his brain from his body. After undergoing and waking up from this hypothetical operation, he is escorted to his brain, which has been placed inside of a large vat. Upon viewing his brain inside the vat, he wonders why his thoughts seem to be originating from his body, although, he explains, "being a physicalistÐ'...I believed unswervingly that the tokening of my thoughts was occurring somewhere in my brain" (Reason and Responsibility, 13th edition, 380). Thus, he wonders why he believes that he is staring at his own brain instead of believing that he is "suspended in a bubbling fluid, being stared at by his own eyes" (ibid, 379).

In order to shed some light on the issue, Dennett believes that it is necessary to start "naming things" (ibid, 380). He writes: "Ð''Yorick," I said aloud to my brain, Ð''you are my brain. The rest of my body, seated in this chair, I dub Ð''Hamlet.' So here we all are: Yorick's my brain, Hamlet's my body, and I am Dennett. Now, where am I?'"

It is here that one may believe that Dennett makes a mistake by categorizing his brain and his body as two distinct entities. After all, he claims that his brain, after surgery, will be "kept in a safe place where it could execute its normal control functions by elaborate radio links" (ibid, 379). In other words, these radio links are intended to take the place of normal neurological pathways such that "no information would be lost, all the connectivity would be preserved" (ibid, 379). Thus, after surgery, while there does exist a great temporal gap between his brain and his body, the relevant connection between the two does not appear to be much different than the connection between the brain and the body of someone with a "normal" temporal gap. And since the connection is still, in essence, the same regardless of however peculiar Dennett's case may be, it could be concluded that Dennett is no more entitled to name and categorize his body and his brain as distinct entities than anyone else.

Thus, one may further conclude that the only difference between a "normal" individual and Dennett's hypothetical case is the great temporal gap that exists between the brain and the body in Dennett's case. A difference that one may believe does not have clear philosophical implications. Therefore, it can be suggested that Dennett, in setting up his scenario in this way, does not contribute much more insight into the Ð''self'-phenomenon than many others, at least initially.

Unfortunately, as presented, it is ultimately unclear exactly just what this worry is driving at. This is because there really is no problem with conceptually distinguishing between a brain