McTaggart's Impressive, but Imperfect Argumet

McTaggart takes a bold step in trying to disprove the existence of a phenomenon as taken for granted and unquestioned as breathing when he tackles the issue of time. If for no other reason, this quest is extremely daring in its scope, because he chooses to question an entity whose reality has probably never crossed most people's minds.

McTaggart's goal in his paper is, on a large scale, to prove that time does not exist. We will, however, be tackling the aspect of time known as the A-Series in this essay. His entire argument rests on his ability to prove this A-Series is unreal. The A-Series is the "tense" component of time that we perceive. When we refer to happenings in our lives, they occur in the past, present or future tense. Which tense a given event commands depends on its relation to a moving "now." As we move through life, things in the future move ever closer to the present and after an event occurs it is forever moving further and further into the past thanks to the forward-moving "now." McTaggart's goal is to prove the logical difficulties that the concept of the moving "now's" existence calls to mind, and it is these difficulties that ultimately lead McTaggart to rule out time's existence.

McTaggart's first step in proving his point is to highlight the incompatibility of the respective tenses of past, present and future. The incompatibility lies in the fact that no event can possess all of these properties at once. At first glance this may seem like an obvious and meaningless thing to say, because no one would argue that anything represents all these qualities at one time. Instead, most would be inclined to point out that an occasion holds all three of these qualities at three different points in time. McTaggart has no problem with this claim and goes so far as to label each period during which something has each of these qualities as T1, T2, and T3. When something exists at a certain moment in the future, that moment is T1. This strategy is applied to the event at the moment it enters the present; it is here that it is known as T2. And when the happening is located at a moment in the future, it is referred to as T3. Again, objectors to the theory that the A-Series is unreal would feel like they still have the upper hand; fully agreeing with McTaggart's logic, but this is where McTaggart makes their point. He points out that each of these points, T1, T2, and T3, are singular points in and of themselves. Also, since all three of these points move from the future to the past, each individual point in time contains all three tenses. The opposing argument posed is that they possess all these characteristics at different times, just like the original event. If we use T1 as our example and say that it is located at time T4 in the future, time T5 in the present and time T6 in the past, it seems like McTaggart's argument has been defeated. Obviously, McTaggart's opposition makes a valid argument, but this solution provides for three new problems. How can one account for T4, T5, and T6 each have the qualities of past, present and future? As one can see the only solution to this original question will be more problems. As one quandary is explained, new ones arise, thereby failing to really explain anything. McTaggart labels this method of explanation as a vicious regress and views it as inadequate in solving the problem. Using such a vicious regress, McTaggart claims, creates an incoherent argument and cannot be taken as a satisfactory explanation for the problem at hand. There is no arguing with the fact that McTaggart has a beautifully laid out argument, and his argument is logical in all of its facets, and if nothing else the statement he makes is extraordinarily ambitious. However, I have a problem accepting the success of McTaggart's argument. Although there are no holes in his logic, I don't agree with his conclusion. For me, there is a certain amount of mystery in our world that we are not capable of explaining or rationalizing. Whether it be