What Is Berkeley's Immaterialism? What Are Its Problems?

Berkeley's Immaterialism or 'idealism' can be examined by first looking at his aims in creating this theory of metaphysics, then by proceeding through the arguments, and finally finding and investigating any problems that may arise. The primary aim of Berkley is to discover a way in which metaphysics can be explained in such a way as to be consistent with the views of a 'plain man'. The main way in which he does this is to deny the idea of 'abstraction', which he feels is distasteful to the 'plain man'. In doing so, however, Berkeley's immaterialism creates a world that is arguably very different to the ordinary, 'vulgar' views of the 'plain man'. The result of immaterialism is that the idea of 'matter' and the external physical world is denied, and our entire worldly experience exists only within our mind. Also, the most famous result of Berkeley's philosophy is the conclusion that 'to be is to be perceived'. The way in which Berkley arrives at this is shown below, and any problems that are found are dealt with as they arise.

Berkeley starts his philosophy with an examination of the senses. He argues that the only things we can be aware of, are 'sensible objects', those objects which can be immediately perceived by the senses. This means that when one looks at a blue chair, then what is perceived is the blue light striking the eye in a certain pattern. Assuming for the moment that there is a material external world, the sense-object that we perceive, is not the extended, solid, blue chair. The structure of this external chair has no 'blueness', the blueness is a state of the consciousness which has been caused by the mind's perception of the chair. Berkeley concludes that the 'proper objects' of the senses can only be of the mind, with no exceptions. Following from this, if the 'sensible objects' that we perceive are of the mind, then we can not claim that there is an external world.

It can be seen that this argument is not a disproof of the external world of matter, it simply claims that the hypothesis of a material world is not reasonably grounded on anything knowable. Berkeley, however, does go on to attempt to actually disprove the material world, by investigating the idea of 'matter', and finding that it is not possible for matter, as it is commonly known, to cause sensation. As matter is fixed, passive, and not 'immediately sensible' - it has already been discovered that 'immediately sensible' things are the 'proper objects' of the senses, and only exist in the mind - and it is inconsistent for a fixed, passive unknowable thing to create ideas in the mind, then matter does not exist as we know it. Berkeley would state it in such a way as to define matter as we know it unperceivable, and for matter to exist is not consistent with the existence/perception conclusion mentioned above.

After he concludes that matter does not exist - we exist in a universe of spirit - we are left to investigate the problem of ideas, and their relation to the mind. To begin with, it must be stressed that by the term idea, Berkeley is not referring to an abstract idea, such as a 'form' or 'essence'. This type of idea cannot exist with in Berkeley's universe, as it is impossible to form such ideas. For example, an abstract idea or 'form' of the table before me is based upon many different sensory impressions, which are somehow distilled and refined to create a supposedly accurate 'idea' of the true nature of the table. In Berkeley's world, there is no way to distinguish between the different views of the table, in order to decide the true nature of the table; Berkeley claims the true nature of the table is the sense-data which is perceived by the mind. This move by Berkeley has important consequences, as by removing abstract ideas, a question arises in how we can make sense of the world around us - if all we have for ideas are fleeting, and non-permanent, how is it that we can have knowledge that seems connected or continuous. This problem is answered at a later point in the essay, when the concepts of the role of God and causation are examined.

Much has been discussed about the relationship between the mind and ideas in Berkeley's philosophy. In his writing, Berkeley states both that the mind and its ideas are distinct, and that the perceiving of and idea is indistinct from the idea perceived. Commentators have found that it is possible to find a contradiction in these two statements, as for both to be consistent, it must be agreed that the mind does not perceive ideas. This, however, is absurd, and so it is the other two statements that must somehow be reconciled in order for Berkeley's philosophy to stand. The difficulty in doing this stems from the fact that the perceiving of an idea is an act of the mind, and in order for the two statements to be compatible then it must be agreed that and act of the mind is distinct from the mind itself. In order to do this, the 'distinctness' that Berkeley claims is between the mind and its ideas is of the rather weak form, such as a swimmer is 'distinct' from his breaststroke. The first of the two statements above, therefore, must be read in a weaker sense than is immediately obvious.

Another question that is raised by Berkeley's concept of ideas is the question of whether or not it is possible for two people (or minds) to have the same idea. As Berkeley claims that all our ideas are the sensory perceptions, and it is impossible for two people to have the same set of sensory perceptions, then it is equally impossible for two minds to have the same idea. This seems to be difficult, as it is seeming to imply that two people sitting on opposite side of a room see different chairs, although there is only