A Collapsed Transition: Democratization in Burundi

Landlocked in the heart of Africa with a population of just over eight million and a Gross Domestic Product of USD 700 , Burundi differentiates itself as a unique outlier among case studies of African democratic experiments. Its first attempt at a democratic transition in 1993 spiraled into a decade long bloodbath, though this latest stretch of warfare continues a history defined by cyclical violence. Often omitted from the history books, what Stephen Weissman calls “the first clear genocide since the Holocaust” ravaged this small central African state in 1972 вЂ" one of four uprising-and-repression cycles since Burundi’s independence. Delving into Burundi’s colonial history is critically important to understanding its failed democratic transition; it illuminates the precipitating causes that one may site as not conducive to democracy such as the structural factors of ethnic stratification and economic underdevelopment. However, as important as such factors were, structural determinism gives way to institutional factors: the history of Burundi’s military rule and its powerful corporate interests that it sought to protect. This, with the exploitative leveraging of structural factors, sealed Burundi’s fate.

Late in 1988, consistent with the wave of democratization that had begun sweeping through the African continent, Burundi President Pierre Buyoya initiated a top-down liberalization scheme, in the form of constitutional reform (including legal multi-party competition), вЂ?national unity’ measures, and relaxed restrictions on free speech. Scholars such as Floribert Ngaruko and Janvier Nkurunziza point toward precise self-interest motivations for Buyoya’s decision to take liberalization steps: “an increase in inflation…[and] the exhaustion of international reserves and monetary devaluations threatened those who relied on imports the most.” Those who purchased imports were the wealthier political elites. Taking notice from other countries across the continent, Buyoya initiated a liberalization plan anticipating that international revenue flows would follow. As Peter Schraeder would initially classify Burundi’s case, Buyoya illustrated вЂ?guided democratization,’ or an elite-constructed transition process, in contrast to the bottom-up movements that defined most successful transitions across Africa. In direct contrast to another francophone state, CÐ"Ò'te d'Ivoire, whose democratic transition swept through in less than six months in response to civilian-based, bottom-up pressures, Burundi’s gradual liberalization lasted nearly five years.

Nonetheless, Buyoya paved a smooth transition to presidential and parliamentary multi-party elections deemed free and fair internationally. First, as minimal corruption among elites in power is a critical component of a democratic experiment, a вЂ?free and fair’ stamp of approval is perhaps the most significantly positive indicator of success. Second, only one oppositional party, Frodebu, emerged as the front-runner, creating a profoundly cohesive oppositional movement; throughout Africa, “cohesive opposition movements commonly went on to win founding elections” in contrast to fragmented oppositions which commonly lost “even where elections were held.” Burundi’s case falls under the former, again crossing another necessary threshold. Third, opposition leader Melchior Ndadaye of Frodebu defeated Buyoya by a landslide, and simultaneously took a large majority in the parliament. Buyoya conceded defeat peacefully, and as the “disposition of the losers toward the outcome of founding elections is crucial to democratization,” this marks yet another positive stage of the transition. Fourth, and perhaps most remarkably, Burundi boasted the highest voter turnout rate of all of Africa’s founding elections with 97.3% of its eligible voting population participating on election day. Finally, Buyoya launched unique initiatives relevant to the stratified ethnic landscape of Burundi, crafting committees of вЂ?national unity’ to ensure peaceful relations between Tutsis (minority) and Hutus (majority) throughout the process. As defined by Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, “a democratic transition occurs when a new government is installed following a competitive election, freely and fairly conducted, in which all participants accept the election results.” By all accounts, Burundi had, initially, completed a largely successful democratic election. For the first time in Burundi’s post-colonial history, the Hutu, specifically, were “given to believe that they would soon control their political destinies, only to be robbed of this opportunity on October 21st.” A faction within the all-Tutsi army assassinated the newly elected president, the speaker, and deputy-speaker of the National Assembly, effectively overthrowing the government within four months of the elections. The country collapsed into civil war, claiming up to 200,000 lives throughout the following decade.

Analyzing the attempted democratic transition via the traditional measures of necessary and sufficient conditions as presented above leaves one perplexed as to the gross failure that resulted. There existed comprehensive power-sharing agreements, as exemplified by Buyoya’s committees of вЂ?national unity’ composed equally of Hutu and Tutsi, a cohesive and unified opposition, an unusually high degree of elite cooperation, free and fair elections, and remarkably high voter participation. Rene Lemarchand praised the process, stating that “[a]s in South Africa, the Burundi transition, extending over a five-year period (1988 вЂ" 93), introduced a climate of tolerance and openness totally unknown during the previous 23 years of dictatorship, culminating with an electoral campaign relatively free of ethnic references. вЂ?Exemplary’ is how international observers described the transition.” Burundi, however, did not follow in South Africa’s path. As Bratton and Van de Walle warn, “[a]bove and beyond the military as an institutional pillar of the old regime…the actions of military officers with political objectives constituted an unpredictable wild card in the game of regime transition.”

An institutional examination of Burundi’s military establishment and its central role throughout the country’s history sheds light on the transition’s ultimate bloody failure.