An Army at Dawn

Atkinson, Rick. An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, Volume 1 of the "Liberation Trilogy." New York: Henry Holt, 2002.

The 2003 Pulitzer Prize for History praised Rick Atkinson's An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, Volume 1 of the "Liberation Trilogy": as a "monumental history of the overshadowed combat in North Africa during World War II that brings soldiers, generals, and bloody battles alive through masterful storytelling." It does that - and more - as it takes readers battle by battle through the U. S. and British campaign in North Africa, from Operation TORCH, the amphibious invasion of French Morocco and Algeria on November 8, 1942, to the hard-won victory in Tunisia on May 13, 1943, in a way that appeals to novices, pleases history buffs, and satisfies serious historians.

Atkinson argues that the North African campaign was a "pivot point in American history, the place where the United States began to act like a great power - militarily, diplomatically, strategically, and tactically" (3). More importantly, he believes that World War II was the "greatest story of the twentieth century, like all great stories, it was bottomless, [and that] no comprehensive understanding of the victory of May 1945 is possible without understanding the earlier campaigns in Africa and Italy" (655). He supports this argument well in over 500 pages of material.

The prologue provides excellent background information leading up to the launch of the North African campaign, describing in juicy detail the Allied debate between a campaign in North Africa and a cross-channel invasion, presenting the idea that fighting in North Africa was really fighting for British imperial interests instead of getting the U.S. closer to Berlin and then to Tokyo. Critics saw it as a distraction and a delay of the crucial, eventual cross-channel invasion. Atkinson supports the British push for North Africa by showing throughout the book that the U.S. was not prepared (in any way) for the cross-channel invasion and that the North Africa campaign actually saved the Allies from a catastrophe that would have resulted from a premature cross-channel push, assuring us that "France would have been a poor place to be lousy in" (540).

And lousy we were, but not in France. Atkinson's repeated and frequent emphasis and examples of inexperience and lack of adequate preparation clearly show that North Africa served as a rehearsal and a chance to learn many valuable lessons that would prevent disaster and complete failure in the cross-channel invasion, proving the soundness in the decision to delay that campaign and go to North Africa.

Among the many things that this book does, most of them quite well, are the descriptions of the players involved - major and minor, generals and soldiers. He offers insightful vignettes of politicians and generals (Allied and Axis), including personalities, interpersonal relationships, rivalries, and conflicts that influence outcomes along the way. More interesting in some ways, perhaps because they are often overlooked, are the common soldiers. American soldiers may have arrived in Morocco thinking that they were fighting someone else's war, but by the time they reached Tunisia in May of 1943, the war was personal. Atkinson shows their progression from naпve confidence and bravado after a few light skirmishes with a few half-hearted French, to agony and suffering in battle after hard battle against the Germans and the Italians, and finally to hardened, killing-mad, fighting soldiers. They had learned what all soldiers must learn: war is hell. They also learned how to fight in multi-national groups. British