Appeasement in the 1930s

Appeasement may be regarded as a philosophy of the maintenance of peace; in political terms it refers to policy of conciliation with a potential aggressor, often with implications of sacrifice of principles (Oxford Dictionary). The policy of appeasement is one in which both Britain and France and many other nations took towards Nazi Germany and its expansionist aims during the late 1930s, it is one of the most controversial and criticized foreign policies in history (Gelernter D 2002:22). This paper argues that the appeasement policy was for most nations around the world in the 1930s a less challenging way to deal with the problem of Hitler. Nowadays it is a common view that if Britain and France would have taken a harder line against the Nazis then Hitler's aggressive policy would not have remained unchecked and German expansionism may not have endangered the anti Nazi nation states of Europe and beyond. This essay will also explore the view that appeasement was necessary for many different countries at the time, as a way of buying time for rearmament, so that they would be able to oppose militarily Nazi Germany. The appeasement policy reflected the general consensus of people who where opposed to going to war again so soon when they still were feeling the devastating effects of the World War One (WW1). In regards to whether appeasement in the 1930s was defensible we have to look at the justifications for the policy of appeasement. We ultimately have to understand if it was a bid to reach a peaceful understanding with Germany or nations looking after their own interests. An important matter to note is that the major powers were anxious to stop any German influence over Eastern Europe at any cost (Day D 2003:8-10).

The term appeasement is used to describe the response of Western European governments, mainly Britain and France, to the expansionist activities of Germany under Hitler and to some extent Italy under Mussolini in the 1930s (The Roots of European Appeasement, Gelernter D 2002:24). Their attitude was to give them what they wanted to prevent a war in Central Europe. The events that occurred in WW1 had generated a great fear of war in the general populous and there was no hurry in their minds to repeat the horror once more. Consequently the major powers of the 1930s strove to prevent further breakout of war through whatever means deemed necessary at the time. WW1 was to be the �war to end all wars’ and appeasement was seen as a way to maximize the chances of peace. The British government believed in appeasement till the day there was no other solution than to go to war on Germany.

Appeasement was described by the writing of the realist Morgenthau as a “corrupted policy of compromise, made erroneously by mistaking a policy of imperialism for a policy of the status quo” (Morgenthau cited in Dimuccio R.B.A. 1998:247)

An interesting aspect of the appeasement policy is that it met the aggressor’s demands without asking for reciprocal advantages. This basic part of the policy involved agreeing to what the aggressor nation wanted, this case being Germany, without asking for anything back. The appeasing nations would provide help in whatever way

they deemed they could without necessarily expecting any concessions. What is to be questioned is why the leaders of these appeasing nations would implement such and unfair and non-demanding policy.

In the case of Britain the situation was quite complicated. Many critics saw the policy as merely reflective of a weak leader of a nation that allowed itself to lose its position of political, economic and military pre-eminence in Europe. If we look at Britain in the 1930s the diversity of public sentiment and a lack of consensus among British citizens could have been the reasoning behind the policy of appeasement. First of all there was strong Nazi party influence as evidenced by the Parliamentary Peace Aims Group who pressed the government to seek out the possibilities of a negotiated peace. The Parliamentary Pease Aims Group also encouraged the fear of war and anti-Communism. The further reasons for the push for appeasement was that the British people had feelings that the events happening in Europe were not Britain’s business, further some people agreed that Germany’s treatment in regards to the Treaty of Versailles was unfair and finally the people just wanted peace (The Fall of France, Jackson J, 2003:203).

The citizens of France were war-weary and were unwilling to face this risk of war again, so the policy of appeasement was pursued. The French government was also unwilling to make a clear choice about appeasement and even declared a general mobilization in 1938 in response to the Czech crisis, but backed down at the last moment and accepted Hitler’s proposals at Munich rather than risk a war. After Munich the voices of French Parliament all shouted for France to be firm and by the spring of 1939 the government clearly identified with a policy of resistance to further German Expansion (The Fall of France, Jackson J, 2003:119).

Appeasement in the general perspective could also be viewed at the “cooperation of adversaries or aggressors within the context of a normative environment” (cited in Dimuccio R.B.A. 1998:251) What this general view of appeasement is trying show is that in this situation appeasement of an aggressor nation would motivate the aggressor nation to reward the appeasing nations. It was the assumption of the appeasers that the proper incentives and initiatives could lead to the rectification of incentives and initiative that could in turn reduce global tensions. It also was a belief by leading decision makers that appeasement would effectively constrain the behaviour of an aggressor, and of course that assumption was proven wrong. (The Roots of European Appeasement, Gelernter D 2002:25)

The conception of appeasement was essentially a strategy of conflict avoidance. Decision makers rationalized the policy because they believed that optimally the benefits would outweigh the negative implications. The failing of appeasement in the 1930s was seen to be an encouragement for further “recalcitrance on the part of the aggressor states” (cited in Dimuccio R.B.A. 1998:252) and also as a reward for their aggressive behaviour.

There are a lot of negative views attached to the policy of appeasement, there are also supporters of the view that the policy of appeasement was entirely defensible, particularly in Britain, as a necessity to buy some time because the British defense was severely depleted and were inadequate to go to war. In defense of appeasement it has always been used as an instrument of international diplomacy