Aristotle on Bravery and Friendship

Bravery

Aristotle raises the concept of bravery in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, and he defines bravery, as possessed by an individual, to be the capacity to be unperturbed, as far as a human being can possibly remain unperturbed. The brave person may fear any sort of thing, be it something too frightening for the general populace, or perhaps something much less frightening, but he will stand firm against these frightening things in the right manner, according to reason, for the sake of all that is fine and good. To the brave person, bravery is fine and noble, thus the end that it aims at is also fine, since every action is defined by its end. In this particular instance of bravery, the fine is the end that virtue aims at.

The virtue that Aristotle extols is an excellence of the self, or a disposition to do what is right at the right time with knowledge of the particulars of a situation. As such, bravery is construed as a virtue in different situations, but these other sorts of things may differ from true bravery. There is the bravery of citizens to consider; citizens who stand firm against dangers, aiming to achieve honors without garnering reproach or penalty. In this case, the virtue achieved by desiring to act for what is fine, specifically honor, makes this type of bravery closer to true bravery. There is also bravery via the spirit: humans who act on spirited eagerness to face danger as they intend to act towards the fine, or virtuously so. However, spirit on its own must be accompanied by rational decision and a goal, in order to comprise genuine bravery as a virtue.

Virtue is further defined as a state that has achieved a mean, relative to the avoidance of extremes in our particular situation, be it deficiency or excess. The doctrine of "the mean" requires humans to utilize our perception in judging the particulars and ascertaining the states of deficiency or excess. In the case of bravery, since it is a virtue, the aim is to avoid the extremes of rashness as an excess, and cowardice as a deficiency of bravery, and in achieving such aims, bravery satisfies the doctrine of the mean. Bravery thus becomes a mean about what inspires confidence, and about what is frightening under differing conditions; the mean is achieved for the sake of the fine, and anything outside of the mean is shameful.

The emotions or feelings that characterize bravery follow the mean as above, and it encompasses less about the feelings of confidence at the mean, and more about the feelings of fear at the extremes Ð'- that is, cowardice and rashness. Bravery does not constitute fearlessness via rashness, or a tendency to act boldly without due consideration. It is appropriate to feel some fear for appropriate circumstances, such as a bad reputation, with respect to the right and fine. However, the brave person must not feel an excess of fear either when faced with the most frightening conditions, such as the prospect of death, for bravery is only truly called so when the brave person is intrepid in facing death for the finest reasons.

Aristotle's analysis of bravery underlines the importance of the mean in ascertaining the virtue and therefore bravery of an individual. He accurately discounts the incorrect interpretations of bravery with five examples of improperly classified "bravery." However, I feel that Aristotle's definitions of bravery relate to static instances or situations; if a man of bravery were to succumb once to cowardice with respect to a dangerous situation, would he be perceived as cowardly and thus no longer virtuous, in spite of his virtuous disposition when facing death in previous circumstances? For example, a firefighter may not feel an excess of fear in the face of an inferno, but when experiencing a new type of danger, such as cancer in his old age, he would not possess experience with the particulars of this situation, and might feel disposed to fear instead.

Additionally, Aristotle considers the bravery of a soul only with respect to the individual. However, the brave and thus virtuous man must have friends, and considers his friends as he considers himself. If the friend (A) of such a virtuous man (B) is put in danger and requires help from B, one would expect in an ideal situation for both virtuous men to feel confidence and not be disposed towards either extreme of rashness or cowardice. However, depending on the circumstances, although B would wish for good things to prevail and relieve A of the danger, as he would do for himself, B may be prone to cowardice out of the fear of losing his friend. Hence, additional limitations to virtue are illustrated with the considerations to the static or non-static circumstances a brave person is placed in, as well as whether the brave person must consider external individuals, such as his friends, in aiming for the mean of confidence.

Friendship

The topic of friendship becomes involved in an ethical discussion because ultimately, the subject of ethics regards the excellence of our own human habits, being a good person, and achieving the greatest good of happiness. Aristotle indicates in Book IX that friendships, seemingly being the greatest external good, are an integral component of virtue, and thus without friends, one cannot become completely virtuous, which in turn makes it impossible to achieve the aim of happiness.

Aristotle starts his definition of friendship with its necessary connection to virtue, and the binding property of friendship that pervades human life, and ties together families and communities. Friendship involves reciprocity and mutuality between the involved parties, thus ruling out friendships with inanimate objects or animals that cannot return our goodwill or wishes. There are three different types of friendship: friendships based on utility, friendships based on pleasure, and friendships based on virtue.

Friendships formed for the sake of utility or pleasures are easy to form, as they rely on real, tangible reciprocity between parties. However, they break off quickly, should the utility or pleasantness of any party in the friendship be depleted or exhausted. Though they seek to spend their days together, these friendships lack intimacy and depth; friendships of utility ask only for the utility you command, and not the