British Balancing Act

British Balancing Act

INTRODUCTION

It is my belief that states do, in fact, balance the international system according to emerging threats to their power. This is greatly exemplified through the ever-fluctuating foreign policies of Britain around the turn of the century, after having maintained a comfortable isolationist policy for so long was forcedÐ'--due to new rises in power from France, Russia, and GermanyÐ'--to pursue alignment with other Great Powers to balance system to her own favor.

Through my analysis I will visit the historical evidence that backs my claim that states (specifically Great Britain) seek on maintain their own security by attempting to manipulate the system in a balanced manner to their own favor. In his book, The End of Isolation, George Monger details the empirical evidence to this claim and I draw a great deal of examples from this source. Because his work is so highly factual, it is ideal for understanding Great Britain's transition from a state fully isolated from the rest of the world to one very much entrenched in the alliance system as a means of protecting her own security due to the rise in power of other Great Powers in Europe.

Another highly respected and notarized scholar whose work I will draw my analysis from is John Mearsheimer who wrote The Tragedy of Great Power Politics in which he lays out the theory that Great Powers are always seeking out opportunities to assert their own power at the expense of their rivals to achieve hegemony. Mearsheimer views the security and power of a state as relative to that of other states within a system such that the increase of one state's power and security would come at the decrease of another state's power and security.

Mearsheimer's views focus more on power and security, however I feel that the best argument to explain British foreign policy in the period surrounding 1900 comes from that of Stephen M. Walt in his book, The Origins of Alliances, whose neorealist approach focuses on the actual threats perceived by a country from other powers. "I suggest that states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone. Although the distribution of power is an extremely important factor, the level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions."

The way in which Britain deals with other great European powers of Russia, Germany, and France indicates just how great their concern with balancing threat to power is. Around the turn of the century, Britain waivers for quite a while, balancing between alignment with France (while hoping for a Russian settlement) and with Germany because of the instability of the system. It takes Britain's careful assessment of the balance of power and understanding whom exactly she could trust to delve fully into a commitment of alignment with any power. However, Britain has no real loyalty to any country except Britain. Her foreign policy reflects only what is in her best interest at the given point in history and has no bearing on her concern for the interests of other states.

"SPLENDID ISOLATION"

It was largely the philosophy and beliefs of Lord Salisbury that throughout the mid-nineteenth century, Britain's navy might and physical separation from continental Europe allowed her a situation in which she could go it alone and could afford a policy of isolation from European matters. Because of this, British did not intervene neither in the Austro-Prussian War of 1886 nor the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, which ended in German unification. At this point, the British, with the support of Salisbury felt no need to intervene in these matters because there was already an established balance of power in Europe and seemingly no sign of a potential for a rising hegemon in the continent. There was no perceived threat to Britain at this time which, per theory of Walt, explains why Britain would pursue an isolationist policy with regard to continental Europe.

INITIAL THREAT OF RUSSIA

Following the Boxer Rebellion, the Russian Empire was left with occupation of Manchuria in China in 1902. This was in direct conflict with British interests in the region as they had received concessions from China in 1897 for "a favorable rectification of the frontier between China and British Burma and the right to extend into China a railway they proposed to build in Burma." Russia had in its sights the building of a Trans-Siberian Railway, which would run all the way across Manchuria as well as control all other railways in northern China and Manchuria. This potential for economic and strategic gain for Russia was seen as a direct threat to the power and security of Britain.

Since it was in Britain's interest to continue her strength in East Asia, she was forced to seek alignment with other powers in order to balance the growing threat of Russia in the area. The direct translation of imperial power into European power was all too well known to Britain who was then forced to pursue balancing strategies. The first of these attempts at balancing of Russian power in East Asia was that of Germany. "Since Britain found herself in tactical opposition to France and Russia, then, as Chamberlain declared in another speech in 1899, Ð''the natural alliance is between ourselves and the great German Empire.'" The British were desperate to seek another source of strength to counter that of Russia and hoped that an Anglo-German alliance could be formed to the effect which Germany would support Britain against Russia in the region. Germany was very precautious and slow to align herself with Britain, however Britain was so in need of aid that she agreed to the Yangtze Agreement on October 16, 1900, which "called for the maintenance of the open door in all Chinese territory as far as contracting parties could exercise influence." This "bare bones" agreement, which Britain was so eager to form, shows just how serious their fear of Russian increase in power was at this time. However, ultimately this agreement didn't even accomplish for the British the main goal of its negotiation. The German chancellor, BÐ"јlow declared just five months later that the agreement would not apply to Manchuria, thus essentially voiding its necessity and purpose for the British cause of balancing Russian power in the region.

This would not be the end of British