Business Law

Business Law Ð'- 2301

Choice Case 1

Citation:

TOWN OF CASTLE ROCK, COLORADO v. GONZALES, individually and a next best friend of her deceased minor children, GONZALES et al. No. 04-278, U.S. Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit, June 2005

Facts:

Respondent filed this suit under 42 U. S. C. Ð'§1983 alleging that petitioner violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when its police officers, acting pursuant to official policy or custom, failed to respond to her repeated reports over several hours that her estranged husband had taken their three children in violation of her restraining order against him. The police did not act on Respondents reports and the husband ultimately opened fire on the police station and murdered all three children. The District Court granted the town's motion to dismiss, but an en banc majority of the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that respondent had alleged a cognizable procedural due process claim because a Colorado statute established the state legislature's clear intent to require police to enforce retraining orders, and thus its intent that the order's recipient have an entitlement to its enforcement.

Issue:

Whether, as a matter of Colorado law, an individual who has obtained a state-law restraining order has a constitutionally protected property interest in having the police enforce the restraining order when they have probable cause to believe it has been violated.

Rules:

1. A benefit is not a protected entitlement if officials have discretion to grant or deny it. See, e.g., Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U. S. 454, 462-463.

2. Colorado law has not created a personal entitlement to enforcement of restraining orders. It does not appear that state law truly made such enforcement mandatory. A well-established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes. Cf. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S. 41, 47, n. 2, 62, n. 32

3. A benefit's indirect nature was fatal to a due process claim in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U. S. 773, 787. Here, as there, "[t]he simple distinction between government action that directly affects a citizen's legal rights ... and action that is directed against a third party and affects the citizen only ... incidentally, provides a sufficient answer to" cases finding government-provided services to be entitlements. Id., at 788. Pp. 17-19.

4. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that a State shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Amdt. 14, Ð'§1. In 42 U. S. C. Ð'§1983

5. "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire" and "more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972).

6. Our cases recognize that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion. See, e.g., Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U. S. 454, 462-463 (1989).

7. "Although the underlying substantive interest is created by 'an independent source such as state law,' federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause." Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 9 (1978)

8. "(a) Whenever a restraining order is issued, the protected person shall be provided with a copy of such order. A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order."(b) A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person when the peace officer has information amounting to probable cause. "(c) In making the probable cause determination described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (3), a peace officer shall assume that the information received from the registry is accurate. A peace officer shall enforce a valid restraining order whether or not there is a record of the restraining order in the registry." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ð'§18-6-803.5(3) (Lexis 1999)

9. Colorado statute which has long told municipal chiefs of police that they "shall pursue and arrest any person fleeing from justice in any part of the state" and that they "shall apprehend any person in the act of committing any offense ... and, forthwith and without any warrant, bring such person before a ... competent authority for examination and trial." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ð'§31-4-112 (Lexis 2004).

10. "When a peace officer determines that there is probable cause to believe that a crime or offense involving domestic violence ... has been committed, the officer shall, without undue delay, arrest the person suspected of its commission ...". Colo. Rev. Stat. Ð'§18-6-803.6(1) (Lexis 1999)

11. "There will be situations when no arrest is possible, such as when the alleged abuser is not in the home." Donaldson, 65 Wash. App., at 674, 831 P. 2d, at 1105

12. Such indeterminacy is not the hallmark of a duty that is mandatory. Nor can someone be safely deemed "entitled" to something when the identity of the alleged entitlement is vague. See Roth, 408 U. S., at 577

13. "The simple distinction between government action that directly affects a citizen's legal rights ... and action that is directed against a third party and affects the citizen only indirectly or incidentally, provides a sufficient answer to" respondent's reliance on cases that found government-provided services to be entitlements. Id., at 788. The O'Bannon Court expressly noted, ibid., that the distinction between direct and indirect benefits distinguished Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1 (1978)

14. These considerations argue against inferring any guarantee of a level of protection or safety that could be understood as the object of a "legitimate claim of entitlement," Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972)

15. "Process