China

The advent of China as a semi-superpower since the end of the Cold War has led to speculation of the U.S. role in East Asia. One such author that examines this new balance of power in the region is Thomas J. Christensen who offers recommendations towards finding a middle ground between a positive and zero-sum perspective in dealing with the rise of China. I hypothesize that Christensen’s neo-realist policy advisements are in fact fitting in seeking benefits from both perspectives. This paper will explain the outlooks of both positive and zero-sum perspectives, analyze Christensen’s recommendations to U.S. foreign policy, and will argue for the implementation of these prescriptions.

The positive-sum view as outlined by the author is concerned with the avoidance of military use and to resolve issues through less tension filled interactions, in an anarchic international system, an assumption that constructivists share. Positive-sum theorists may be labeled as either optimists or pessimists depending on their view of the nature of the security dilemma, a concept borrowed from the realist school of thought. Other beliefs that have been borrowed stem from liberal institutionalism where international institutions are used as a mediating agent. Some might be optimistic about international relations with the introduction of such institutions such as ASEAN and ARF, however precisely because of positive-sum concern with state interactions and perceptions, this may lead to a pessimistic outlook concerning the role of historical issues and nationalism. In fact, there are scholars who notice the surfacing of “anti-American sentiment” from China since the 1990’s. This is where the lines start to blur between a positive and a zero-sum prescription to a particular regional problem. The positivists might actually view the need of a foreign military presence in an unstable region as being essential to mediate conflict since it is the “least distrusted actor”. However, there exist other incentives in the resolution of conflicts in the form of economic “interdependence” and “transnational production”. Globalization has become a topic of interest regarding China’s foreign policy, some speculate for a more conventional China in the international arena. Positive-sum theorists point to the active role Beijing took in creating ASEAN plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea) in 1997, a time of financial turbulence for Asia. Thus, despite tension laden relationships between China and Japan, and China and Taiwan, in general positive-sum analysts view U.S. foreign policy towards China as a triumphant realization of making the “dragon emerge(d) and join(ed) the world” as stated by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. However, the positives viewed by the zero-sum perspective are assessed as negatives by the positive-sum group, and vice-versa. For example, Chinese conflicts with neighbouring countries provide the U.S. with the opportunity to mediate and to maintain a strong presence in the region. Thus, the likelihood of band-wagoning behaviour of weaker states decreases, walt from bookpg. 44. In such an international system, zero-sum thinkers are preoccupied with a “struggle for leadership” which envisions a future battle for dominancy in East Asia considering that China has dwindled the discrepancy between its power relative to the United States. Thus, the positive-sum appreciation of Chinese economic and political integration is the very source of zero-sum worries. Friedberg, a stark realist envisions a future where China will no longer be as sensitive to an American economic threat since Chinese exports to its’ region is much greater than that of the U.S. . A zero-sum perspective sees the negative out of a more economically interdependent relationship between East Asian states which they see as a potential for decreased trust and predictability in allies since they assume that bandwagoning with China in a Chinese-U.S. conflict is more likely because of their new closer economic relations. However, those who do not preoccupy themselves with the balance of power but rather the security dilemma, economic institutions like ASEAN may reduce the conflicts. Any relative Chinese gain against the U.S. is viewed negatively by the zero-sum perspective no matter the situation, like a possible “success in promoting North Korean denuclearization” for fear of status China might acquire. Ultimately, realists such as Grieco believe that an engagement strategy will only empower china and spur its determination. Briefly, a zero-sum approach may be explained by the prescription for “Col War-style containment” of China or something resembling it. Thus a return of the “realism” that Morgenthau called for to deal with the future of China.

Now we turn to Christensen’s prescriptions to U.S. foreign policy regarding China. The author advises that the U.S. needs to properly sustain its’ partnerships and affiliations in the region so as to achieve the best possible outcomes in both a positive-sum and a zero-sum outlook. For the first this entails China utilizing its fear of “US encirclement” and competition and applying such antagonist emotions towards forging regional links and interdependence ; for the second this would assure that the U.S. would keep its forces and its influence in the region, both of which will be instrumental if ever the situation arises where China will employ its’ newfound strengths into “regional political hegemony”. There is a real fear that China’s “charm offensive” runs the risk of slowly pushing the U.S. out of the region, thus possessing no role of persuasion. When it comes to matters that concern both the U.S. and China such as the nuclear plans of Iran, Christensen points out that it would be a wise move for the U.S. to welcome Chinese participation with itself and its’ allies. In fact, a prologue to the Washington October summit in 1997, where China sought to end “post-Tiananmen sanctions” , saw China ending its nuclear relationship with Iran as well as to generally take initiatives that would bring its’ nuclear policies more “in line with international norms”. Another advisement that the author offers is that while there may be some benefits to a cautious Japanese opinion of China, such as an increase in Japanese susceptibility towards more regional and global involvement, there are negatives of Sino-Japanese strain such as regional economic harm and cooperative breakdowns.