Chinese Cultural Revolution

Prologue

The Cultural Revolution began quietly. On November 11, 1965, a Shanghai daily newspaper published a review of a four-year old play, Hai Jui Dismissed From Office. The review stated that the play's author, Peking Deputy Mayor Wu Han, had written an anti-socialist document calling for the destruction of socialism in China. That same day, Red Flag published an attack on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and revisionism within the CCP. The article charged that some leading CCP members had given in to pressure for a capitalist restoration and had begun preparing a counter-revolution. Within six months, senior leaders who had joined the Party in the 1920s and 1930s had fallen into disgrace. Within a year, student radicals had paralyzed the CCP. By the summer of 1967, China was on the verge of a civil war. This study grew out of the need to explain the short-term causes of the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, most analyses of the Cultural Revolution focused on the general, long-term question: Why did Mao launch the Cultural Revolution? Although many answers vary, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution to prevent a "capitalist restoration" in China and eradicate what he believed to be the early signs of ideological collapse within the CCP. (Wedeman.)

Looking Back

The origins of the Cultural Revolution can be found in the gradual escalation of political tensions within the Chinese Communist Party. Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, stresses within the CCP mounted as Mao became alienated from other members of leadership. Some of these dated back to the early days of the revolutionary struggle. Chu Te, the founder of the Red Army, and Mao had been at odds since 1929 and Premier Chou En-lai and Mao had argued off and on. Regional and political backgrounds also divided the party. Most of the old guard; Mao, Chou, Chu Te, Party General Secretary Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Minister of Defense Lin Piao; came from the southern paramilitary wing of the party. Party Vice-Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i and Peking Mayor P'eng Chen, on the other hand, rose through the northern political machine. These long-standing divisions made the CCP a divided party and prevented the establishment of an internal power structure. More specific conflicts emerged during the mid-1950s. The process of political consolidation and the need to create a functioning system of government caused serious internal problems. When the Kuomintang disintegrated in 1948-1949, the CCP moved from its original rural environment into the cities for the first time. The party was unprepared to move to urban areas as well as the nation as a whole. It had little experience with the politically sophisticated urban middle classes. Its peasant population often had never been to the cities and found them foreign. More importantly, the rough ex-peasants found they lacked the education and skills of the urban professionals and were far less qualified for jobs within the rapidly expanding government. Skills that they had developed during the war suddenly become worthless. The ability to sabotage Kuomintang supply lines, for example, did not translate into the ability to run a railroad. These problems, along with many others within the Chinese regime, were just some of the causes of the Revolution, but foreign intervention also played its role. (essaybank.co.uk, Wedeman)

The Debate

The most immediate issue confronting the Chinese leadership in the spring of 1965 was growing American involvement in the Vietnam conflict. For China, as for the U.S., Vietnam was the "wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time." China could hardly oppose the efforts of the Vietnamese communists to rid themselves of imperialist rule; on the other hand, there was a danger that the Indochina war could escalate into a Sino-American conflict if the United States attacked North Vietnam. If that happened, the Chinese believed there would be two possible results. Either the threat of having to fight a war with 600 million Chinese would be enough to discourage the United States from invading territory in or neighboring to China, or discouraging would fail and China would have to fight a conventional war with an economic giant. War meant closer ties between China and the Soviet Union. To engage in a conventional conflict, China needed to upgrade its military capabilities and only the Soviet Union could provide the necessary weapons. But, given China's experience in the Korean War, military aid would be provided at a financial and political price. (Dittmer, Schoenhals.)

The Soviets Make Their Move

While the Chinese were preoccupied with the danger of a Sino-American confrontation over Vietnam, the Soviets were moving quickly to contain and isolate China internationally. In a series of moves on China's geographic and diplomatic flanks, the Soviets destroyed a number of friendships the Chinese had carefully created during the early 1960s, leaving China with few foreign supporters. Within the communist bloc, the Soviet Union enjoyed the advantage from the start because of its military and economic power. Few Eastern European states or parties could side with China against the Soviet Union. In Asia the situation was different. China, because of its location, was in a position to influence the Asian communist states. As a result, Sino-Soviet competition took place throughout Asia during the early 1960s. By the mid1960s China appeared to have come out on top. In April and May 1965, however, the Soviet Union rapidly improved its relations with Mongolia and North Korea and Chinese influence in those two countries declined drastically. Moreover, the Chinese suffered additional setbacks in the Afro-Asian world later in the summer. The Afro-Asian world, composed primarily of former colonies, had been the scene of increasingly fierce Sino-Soviet competition in the early 1960s. As the colonies gained independence, both the Chinese and the Soviets hoped to increase their influence at the expense of the West and after 1958, each other. During the summer of 1965 the level of competition rose dramatically. By September, China and the Soviet Union had reached the brink of an all-out conflict.

(Jong-won Kim, Schoenhals.)

The 2nd Debate

At the beginning of September 1965, the Chinese leadership confronted three major foreign policy problems: the partially resolved question of how to respond to the growing American commitment to the Vietnam conflict; the loss of influence in North Asia, the Middle East, and Africa; and increased Soviet hostility. In mid-month, Pakistan's defeat in its war with India further complicated the situation. Despite months of debate,