Compare and Contrast Two Historians’ Perspectives on the Causes of the Chinese Revolution. Explain Why There Are Differences in Interpretation

Compare and contrast two historians’ perspectives on the causes of the Chinese revolution. Explain why there are differences in interpretation.

Both historians Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, through their publication Mao: The Unknown Story, as well as Jonathan Fenby, through his book The Penguin History of Modern China, value the inadequacy of the Nationalist army as a key factor for their defeat in the civil war, and consequently the resulting Chinese revolution. Chang and Halliday claim that Nationalist forces were “constantly short on food” when fighting in the civil war, citing evidence from a veteran who recalled how some soldiers even turned to “eating their leather belts and shoe soles” to avoid starvation (Chang et al, Pg. 384, 2007). Similarly, Fenby suggests that although the Nationalists had a three to one numerical advantage over the Communists (Fenby, Pg. 334, 2008), “most soldiers were… miserably treated” and as such their army’s were “plagued by inefficiency” (Fenby, Pg. 334, 2008). Crucially, Fenby illustrates the crippling effects which these conditions had on the Nationalist’s army, noting “up to half of all new recruits were reckoned to have perished or deserted” (Fenby, Pg. 334, 2008). Chiang and Halliday also argue that the Nationalist’s civil war efforts were significantly hindered by Communist penetration, so much so that Chiang Kai-Shek himself was forced to confess to Stalin of “a large number of well-placed [Communist] moles” (Chang et al, Pg. 392, 2007). Fenby confirms this contention, agreeing that the Communists had highly placed agents in key Nationalist positions such as “assistant chief of staff” and “head of the War Planning Board” (Fenby, Pg. 334, 2008). The historians differ however, when attributing credit to the Communist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for their efforts in the civil war. Whilst Fenby balances the ineptness of Nationalists with both the “speed and mobility” of the PLA (Fenby, Pg. 341, 2008), as well as their superior strategies, such as the “wear-and-tear tactics” utilised by Mao (Fenby, Pg. 338, 2008), Chang and Halliday instead suggest that they did not deserve any special admiration for defeating the “starving ghosts” of the Goumindang (Chang et al, Pg. 384, 2007). Nevertheless, although Chang and Halliday refuse to adorn Mao and his army with the praise offered contrastingly by Short, these historians still strongly concur that the Nationalists were an inept opposition throughout the civil war. Excellent

Despite such similarities, these historians offer significantly contrasting perspectives in their reasoning for the Communists success in gaining the backing of the Chinese people, a crucial step in legitimising the revolution and avoiding it from becoming a short-lived coup. Fenby argues that Mao found mass support in a population disillusioned by the Nationalists, who’s “regime... failed to offer anything new once the War with Japan was over” (Fenby, Pg. 334, 2008). He asserts that the Nationalist’s hyperinflation “undermined everyday life and ruined tens of millions” (Fenby, Pg. 334, 2008), drawing from fellow historian Michael Lynch who noted that “in 1940, 100 yuan bought a pig;… in 1945, a fish;… and in 1947, one-third of a box of matches”(Fenby, Pg. 335, 2008). Fenby also blames the Nationalist’s nepotism and corruption present at “every level of society” for creating mass unemployment and civilian unrest, depicted by the 4,200 strikes which occurred in Shanghai in 1946 (Fenby, Pg. 335, 2008). However, Chang and Halliday provide no mention this hyperinflation and corruption, as well as and its crippling effects on Nationalists support. Rather, they content that public acceptance of the Communists regime was merely forced by Mao’s coercion and terrorisation of Chinese society. They believe that Mao “knew his power did not depend on popularity”, and instead “let terror sink deep into everyone’s hearts” (Chang et al, Pg. 389, 2007) in order to bring about “total, unquestioning conformity” (Chang et al, Pg. 388, 2007). To convey this apparent ruthlessness of Mao, Chang and Halliday frequently draw upon the “misnomer land reforms” in which the Party ordered its cadres “to encourage violence” (Chang et al, Pg. 385, 2007), citing one woman official who witnessed a rally where “four people were hanging in a row by their wrists”, watched by “every man, woman, … [and] child” of the Communist-held village (Chang et al, Pg. 385, 2007). Contrastingly, Fenby makes little mention of Mao’s cold-heartedness, instead emphasising the violence displayed by the Nationalist’s as additional source of Communist support. He describes how landlords used Nationalist troops to “punish peasants who tried to resist their exactions”, drawing from American journalist Jack Belden who reported seeing “two dozen bodies being dug out of a pit where they had been buried alive” (Fenby, Pg. 334, 2008). Chiang and Halliday strongly contend this however, claiming that Nationalist killings were merely “a