Culture Clash: Integrating Air National Guard and Reserve into the Total Force

I. Introduction

For years, talk of the Total Force, comprised of the Active Duty (AD) force and the Air Reserve Components (ARCs), has dominated the thinking of senior leaders in the Air Force. Air Force doctrine states that all three components; AD, United States Air Force Reserve (USAFR) and Air National Guard (ANG); must act in concert in order to bring the full might of the United States Air Force to bear. This combined effort has met with great success, but has not been accomplished without overcomingÐ'--or at least working aroundÐ'--significant challenges. One ongoing challenge to effective integration of the components remains the fundamental differences in culture between the AD force and the "part-time" Air Warriors.

Since the events of September 11, 2001, our nation has been at war. This continuing conflict affects many organizations, not only within the military. Very few of those organizations outside the military, however, require their personnel to actively defend our way of life.

This active participation on the part of all components in all services does not come easily or free. Every day, Soldiers and Marines are dying on our battlegrounds. Sailors and Airmen are putting their lives at risk to ensure that as many of our own come home alive as possible. These risks are not assumed lightly and incur a heavy, cumulative cost. These cumulative costs are not monetary per se, but include such intangibles as fatigue, individual disgruntled feelings and an overall reduction in combat effectiveness.

The oftentimes very regular and very long deployments away from loved ones weigh heavily on individuals as they make decisions on whether or not to stay in the military after their service commitments expire. High salaries in the civilian sector lure many of our best and brightest away at an alarming rate. Frequent force restructuring and personnel drawdowns have reduced end strengths, forcing those remaining behind to do more with less.

According to National Guard Bureau Chief, Lt. Gen Steven Blum, "the National Guard is no longer a strategic reserve [forceÐ'...but] an operational force abroad, as well as the first DoD response to events here in the homeland." Burdens previously heaped on the active force are increasingly farmed out to the ARCs who are experiencing the same retainment issues as the active component. In order to ensure mission accomplishment, those remaining in the Air Force, both active and in the ARCs, must work together more closely and more efficiently than ever.

Structurally, the ARCs and the active duty force are equivalent groups. Both are formally designed around a specific structure in a hierarchical, command-driven format. In the past, and to an extent, today, the ARC members work directly for the AD force only when fully mobilized. Under conditions less than total mobilization, the component commander would retain administrative control over his or her assigned personnel, but may or may not have direct oversight of the individual airman's day-to-day execution of assigned duties. In such cases, the individual mobilization augmentee (IMA) or guardsman would enter the work centers of the AD force and execute the unit's mission side-by-side with his or her active duty counterparts. The intent is to provide ongoing training for the ARC member to take over for the AD member when he or she deploys to combat.

The close-quarters nature of doing business in this way has many advantages. Often, the Reserve and ANG units are filled with individuals that have been on active duty and know and understand the rationale behind the way the AD component does business. They bring strong work ethics and broad experiences to bear on complex problems, bringing more to the fight than the active component would alone.

They also bring with them different attitudes about military bearing and professional relationships that are colored by the nature of a "part-time" military environment. In situations where the military unit commander may work for one of his or her non-commissioned officers during the week, the ARC members must carefully balance their military relationships with their civilian relationshipsÐ'--relationships that are reinforced 90% more frequently than the time spent during weekend drills. This different culture permeates the ARC organizations and affects not only their relationships with their active duty counterparts, but has to potential to drive a wedge between AD members.

II. Defining and differentiating the professional and part-time cultures

In any group, individuals will organize themselves. Some people are naturally more aggressive than others; some are more reserved. Some are very good at following instructions while others are born leaders. Before long, people find their roles and act within them.

In a military organization, the positional authority of an individual is well established by distinct rules. Lines of control exist connecting every member in the unit from the lowest airman to the unit commander, from the commander to his or her superiors all the way up to the President of the United States. This chain of command is critical for military organizations where the disciplined following of orders is a necessity to ensure proper mission execution in dangerous and sometimes deadly situations.

These chains of command are clearly defined and contribute to the overall cohesiveness of the military units. In his book, Organizational Behavior, Stephen Robbins describes three structural variables concerning individual roles within groups: Role Identity, Role Perception, and Role Expectations. Military members are trained from their first days in the service to identify with their individual role. Training and military life experiences are designed to support and reinforce the expected behavior for a given role. Ultimately, since all members go through this same process, a common understanding and expectation of behaviors is established. These three variables are intricately bound together and directly tied to the hierarchical structure of the modern military force. This shared understanding of each individual's role creates a culture that permeates every unit. The keystone of this culture is respect, a respect made possible through trust.

In discussing trust, Mr. Robbins defines trust as a positive expectation that another will notÐ'--through words, actions, or decisionsÐ'--act opportunistically. Further, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2909, Professional and Unprofessional Relationships states: Professional relationships are those that contribute to the effective operation of the Air Force. The AFI goes on to say that relationships