Disparate Impact/disparate Treatment Case Study

Disparate Impact/Disparate Treatment Case Study

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Disparate Impact/Disparate Treatment Case Study

Disparate treatment occurs when a protected class member is treated differently from others, whether or not there is discriminatory intent; whereas disparate impact occurs when employment decisions work to the disadvantage of all of the protected class members whether or not there is discriminatory intent. The EEO Title VII prohibits employers from treating employees differently because of their membership in a protected class. Likewise, Title VII prohibits the employer from using a facially neutral employment practice that has an unjustified adverse impact on all members of a protected class. Legal guidelines designed to identify disparate treatment/impact are, at best, vague (Hr Guide, 2005).

Cases originally filed as disparate treatment often become disparate impact cases by way of appeal after appeal. The disparate treatment case of Raytheon Company v. Hernandez is a good illustration of the aforementioned fact. Joel Hernandez worked for Raytheon (and its predecessor company) for 25 years until he tested positive for cocaine use. His drug use violated company workplace conduct rules, so the company gave him the option to resign or be involuntarily terminated. Hernandez resigned, and the company put a note in his personnel file, which stated that he quit in lieu of being fired for misconduct. Two years later, Hernandez reapplied to be rehired by Raytheon. He claimed to be rehabilitated. Raytheon, however, had a "no rehire" policy for former employees who had been terminated for workplace misconduct.

After Mr. Hernandez was rejected for rehire, he contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to claim he had been discriminated against in violation of the American Disabilities Act (ADA). After an investigation by EEOC, Mr. Hernandez filed suit in District Court against Raytheon citing disparate treatment. He claimed the company denied his application for rehire because Raytheon Company regarded him as a drug addict and/or because of his prior record of drug addiction. Raytheon wanted Hernandez' claim dismissed through summary judgment, by claiming its policy was not discriminatory because it applied to all former employees terminated for misconduct.

In return Mr. Hernandez offered the alternative argument that even if Raytheon's no-rehire policy was facially neutral and did not violate the ADA in a disparate treatment case, the policy had a disparate impact on rehabilitated drug users. The District Court granted Raytheon's motion for summary judgment on the disparate treatment claim and refused to acknowledge his disparate impact argument because it had not been brought up in a timely manner in the proceedings. Mr. Hernandez then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which agreed with the Circuit Court regarding the disparate impact appeal not being raised in a timely manner. However the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, holding that Raytheon's otherwise lawful no-rehire policy was insufficient to deny Hernandez' application because the policy had a disparate impact on recovering drug addicts under ADA.

The case was then granted review by the United States Supreme Court (U.S. No. 02-749, December 2, 2003). The specific question, which was never answered, was whether the ADA confers preferential rehire right on disabled employees who were legally terminated for violating their employer's workplace conduct rules. Instead, the Supreme Court determined the Ninth Circuit had improperly applied a disparate impact analysis to a disparate treatment claim. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings with instructions to apply the correct legal analysis. The Supreme Court reached its unanimous decision by noting the analytical differences between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims under ADA. In addition, the Supreme Court determined that "(Raytheon's) no-rehire policy is a quintessential legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to rehire an employee who was terminated for violating workplace conduct rules. If (Raytheon) did indeed apply a neutral, generally applicable no-rehire policy in rejecting (Hernandez') application, (Raytheon's) decision not to re-hire (Hernandez) can, in no way, be said to have been motivated by (Hernandez') disability." In comparison, if Hernandez had claimed disparate impact in a timely fashion, Raytheon would have had to communicate some "business necessity" for its no-rehire policy (Scalia & Buddendeck, 2004).

It is necessary to understand that a claim of unlawful discrimination under the ADA can be predicated on either of two theories of liability to fully understand the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's decision. The first theory of liability is one of "disparate treatment", which centers on a claim that "a disabled individual has been intentionally singled out and treated less favorably than other similarly situated persons because of that individual's disability". Disparate treatment claims require proof of deliberate discrimination. The second theory of liability is based on the claim of "disparate impact" which challenges practices, which are neutral and fair on the surface, but have a discriminatory impact on disabled persons in their application.

The decision held that an employer's no-hire policy constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason under the ADA for refusing to rehire a former employee, as long as the policy is applied equally to all rehire applicants previously terminated for misconduct. However, most legal experts agree that the decision didn't answer whether ADA confers preferential rehire rights on disabled employees lawfully terminated for violating workplace conduct rules. Employers and other observers had hoped for additional guidance regarding the tension between neutral employment policies and ADA's reasonable accommodation requirements.

The disparate impact case of Alexander v. Sandoval (99-190) 532 U.S. 275 (2001) 197 F.3d 484, reversed) was originally filed in the state of Alabama before it reached the United States Supreme Court. The Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department) is subject