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It is the authors’ intention to argue that some forms of euthanasia, to be exact, passive nonvoluntary and in exceptionally rare cases indirect euthanasia are morally permissible. However it must be noted that due to the limit of words and more importantly the authors’ lack of experience surrounding euthanasia, the claim of permissibility reflects that of the authors’ recent course readings and my emergent experience thereof. In addition to this it must also be noted that euthanasia cannot be evaluated exclusively. That euthanasia unquestionably is connected with the very questions that endeavor to understand life and death. My arguments descend from articles written by authors such as; Rachel’s, Steinbock, Beauchamp and Foot.

It is essential that one defines euthanasia in terms of the �good of the subject’ or that �death is no evil to him’ . For if euthanasia was to mean simply �a quite and easy death’ or �the means of procuring this’ as the ancient Greeks supposed an ambiguity with awkward consequences results. Foot uses the example of a murderer, careful to drug his victim, claiming on apprehension, that his act was merely euthanasia. Euthanasia therefore must be a benefit to the subject. This point is imperative in understanding the permissibly of the two forms of euthanasia which I regard moral . Therefore euthanasia, in this essay, will be defined as bringing about the death (foreseeable or unforeseeable) of another with the intention of preventing needless suffering. Where suffering is unbearable physical pain associated with a terminally ill patient or a comatose person unable to regain consciousness.

The first form of euthanasia that I deem permissible is �passive nonvoluntary euthanasia’. Passive nonvoluntary euthanasia (henceforth simplified as passive euthanasia) occurs when a patient dies due to either, a medical profession not performing a certain action that would keep the patient alive, or abstaining from an action that is keeping the patient alive. An example of the earlier would be switching off life-support machines or disconnecting a feeding tube. And examples of the latter would include not carrying out life-extending operations or withholding life-extending drugs.

There are two reasons why I suppose this permissible. The first is beneficence due to the loss of autonomy. Autonomy is defined as the "the right of self government or personal freedom” . Here personal freedom is defined as the means to consciously and rationally attain a desired end. Personal freedom then is a prerequisite of the right of self government. Self government here is synonymous with вЂ?able to make choices’. Passive euthanasia allows patients to die when the process of death has already begun but cannot continue due to extraordinary means preventing this. Continuing a life in which a human being is present but a person is not, or to put that another way, when a person has lost his autonomy, his life is of no use to either himself, his family or society. The right thing to do in a situation such as this is to let the subject die. This may perhaps dismay the reader. However I believe this panic is due to how people define death. Death is viewed as a terrible thing because human life is intrinsically valuable. Whether this be due to a religious reason or otherwise. In addition to this most reasonable people enjoy life to some degree and don’t want to die. And if the person be religious, life and death are God's business with which we should not interfere. One can see then that if death is not a bad thing many of the objections to this form of euthanasia disappear.

The second reason why I consider passive nonvoluntary euthanasia morally permissible, results from the argument of Non-maleficence. This argument closely allies, though not quite the same, with that of the pervious argument, beneficence. The consequent of relying or extraordinary mean for survival results in the domino effect from the "prolongation of living into the prolongation of dying" . This again seems to derive from an intrinsic fear of death by dire definition. When we extend the process of death we are doing no good to the subject in question. To live as long as technology and modern medicine can keep us, even when we know that the chance of regaining consciousness is naught, to me is wrong if not unnatural. Death is inevitable. It is part or every life. And so it seems to me that if death comes knocking on your door and you open it, then decide to slam it shut (by means of life-support machines), death will always find another way to welcome itself home. Therefore it becomes more of an evil to prolong the inevitability of death. And morally acceptable to end life under such circumstances.

The other form of euthanasia that I judge morally permissible is that of indirect euthanasia. Indirect euthanasia is defined as providing treatment (usually to reduce pain) that has the side effect of speeding the patient's death. Since the primary intention is not to kill, this form is also morally permissible. It must be noted here that this particular form of euthanasia is morally permissible when that small percent of patients do not respond to palliative care. And only ever considered when consistent with the definition of euthanasia as defined above.

These arguments are by no means perfect. For that reason I will now turn the implications that arise from each. The most important objection to the argument of permissibility is that of the distinction between active and passive euthanasia. The objection is that there is no moral difference between killing someone and allowing someone to die. Rachels uses the following example. A child is taking a bath. When (a) his cousin Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns the child, and then arranges things as to look like an accident. And when (b) Jones who also stands to profit if anything should happen to his cousin,