Ethics of Prostitution

Probably no one in the English-speaking world is unaware that our Governor

has spoken out on subjects where lesser mortals, especially politicians,

have held their tongue. His opinions on the assassination of JFK appear

to be well-founded (November '99), however, and his views about the

religious right seem equally appropriate (Holiday '99). Perhaps his

proposals for the legalization of pot and prostitution also deserve some

second thoughts.

The strongest argument against prostitution, no doubt, is its alleged

immorality. If this means no more than that most people THINK

prostitution is immoral, that appears to be correct. But if this is taken

to mean prostitution actually IS immoral, then an argument is required.

Believing something doesn't make it true. That the Sun revolves around

the Earth, which is immovable, are examples of false beliefs that once

were widely held.

That an activity is illegal does not establish that it is immoral, any

more than than its legality establishes its morality. Ownership of

slaves, among the most immoral of all activities, was legal before the

passage of the 13th Amendment, but illegal thereafter, even though its

moral status did not change. What is legal can be ascertained from

statutes in books of law, while the morality of an action presupposes a

suitable standard.

There are many claimants to that role, including subjective theories,

family-value theories, religious-based theories, and culture-relative

theories, according to which actions are right when you (your family, your

religion, or your culture) approve of them. So if you (your family, your

religion, or your culture) approve of incest, cannibalism, or sacrificing

virgins to appease the gods, those actions cannot be immoral. They are

moral, necessarily!

All of these approaches make morality a matter of power, where right

reduces to might. If someone approves of killing, robbing, or raping you,

you have no basis to complain on the ground that those actions are

immoral, if subjectivism is correct. Similarly for family, religion, and

culture-based alternatives. Every person, every family, every religion,

and every culture is equal, regardless of their practices, if such

theories are true.

As James Rachels, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, has explained, on any

of these accounts, the very ideas of criticism, reform, or progress in

matters of morality no longer apply. If attitudes about right and wrong

differ or change, that is all there is to it, even when they concern your

life, liberty, or happiness. If some person, family, or group has the

power to impose their will upon you, these theories afford no grounds for

you to object.

Philosophers have therefore sought to establish some less-relative and

more-objective framework for understanding morality, including what are

known as consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories. According to

consequentialism, an action is RIGHT when it produces as much GOOD

(usually taken to be happiness) as any available alternative. But the

problem remains of deciding FOR WHOM that happiness ought to be produced.

According to Ethical Egoism, for example, an action is right if it brings

about as much happiness for you personally as any available alternative.

Consequences for others simply don't count. So Ted Bundy, John Gacy, and

Jeffrey Dahmer, for example, are home free--morally speaking--though few

juries would be likely to be impressed by the argument that killing gave

them more happiness than any available alternative.

According to Limited Utilitarianism, moreover, an action is right when it

brings about as much happiness for your group as any available

alternative. This is good news for The Third Reich, the Mafia, and

General Motors. If no available alternative would produce more happiness

for Nazis than territorial acquisition, military domination, and racial

extermination, then those qualify as moral actions, if Limited

Utilitarianism is correct.

Classic Utilitarianism, among consequentialist theories, is the only one

that dictates encompassing the effects actions have upon everyone rather

than some special class. But this virtue does not guarantee the right

result. If some social arrangement with a certain percentage of slaves,

say, 15%, would bring about greater happiness for the population as a

whole--because