Famine, Affluence Morality

In "Famine, Affluence, and Morality",[7] one of Singer's best-known philosophical essays, he argues that the injustice of some people living in abundance while others starve is morally indefensible. Singer proposes that anyone able to help the poor should donate part of their income to aid poverty and similar efforts. Singer reasons that, when one is already living comfortably, a further purchase to increase comfort will lack the same moral importance as saving another person's life. Singer himself donates 20% of his salary to Oxfam and UNICEF. In "Rich and Poor", the version of the aforementioned article that appears in the second edition of Practical Ethics,[8] his main argument is presented as follows: If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of comparable significance, we ought to do it; absolute poverty is bad; there is some poverty we can prevent without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance; therefore we ought to prevent some absolute poverty.

( Above is from Wikepedia)

Now, how does this relate to giving money overseas? My argument has two steps. The

first is to show that the Singerian position needs the "strong" version of Singer's Principle, which

involves comparisons of value. Recall that the "strong" version requires that one help if by

helping one does not sacrifice anything of comparable moral significance, while the "moderate"

version requires that one help if by helping one does not sacrifice anything morally significant.

The subtle change in wording makes for a substantial change in meaning. But the "moderate"

version is insufficient because its operative notionÐ'--"morally significant"Ð'--is too vague,

allowing for too broad a range of interpretation. People will have sharply different views about

what level of sacrifice begins to be "morally significant," and until one can locate a specific,

concrete criterion, one would have to live with some people not giving any money to overseas

relief agencies because they think that anythingÐ'--even $1Ð'--is morally significant. So if one

wants to motivate real change in people's behavior, one will have to resort to and adopt the

"strong" version of the Principle after all.28

One might think that the "strong" version of the Principle provides the necessary

objective criterion, namely, comparable moral significance. The second part of my argument is

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now to suggest that Pond Cases provide support for Overseas Aid Cases via the "strong"

Principle only by relying on an interpersonal comparison of value that the above discussion

shows to be incoherent. For it relies on the reader's being moved by this rhetorical question: is

that trinket you are about to spend money on worth more to you than, say, getting a meal is

worth to a hungry Bengali? The intended implication is, of course, clear. But no such direct

comparison can be made, and the Singerian argument trades on a crucial ambiguity. What the

Singerian wants the reader to ask himself is whether, if the reader were in the Bengali's shoes,

the reader would want some other wealthy person to buy another trinket or pay the same amount

to feed him. Again the answer is obvious. This kind of comparison of cases