Free Will: Fact or Fiction?

The term free will is used commonly as a simple concept. However, as a philosophical term, free will has been, for centuries, an issue debated between the most renowned and respected philosophers. From a simplified, philosophical standpoint, free will is a capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. It is agreed by most philosophers that free will is also very closely connected to the notion of moral responsibility. Therefore, acting on free will is to satisfy the metaphysical requirement of being responsible for one's own actions. The significance of free will, however, is not only based on it's relationship with moral responsibility. It is a condition of one's accomplishments, of autonomy, of dignity and on the value we place on love and friendship.

Philosophers frequently distinguish between freedom of action and freedom of will due to the fact that our success in carrying out our actions is often dependent

completely or in part on factors that are beyond our control. Additionally, there are always constraints external from our power that limit our range of options for realistic undertaking. This means that there is a division between that which we may be willing to do and that which we are capable of doing. RenÐ"© Descartes is a prime example of the division between freedom of will and freedom of choice in his declaration that "the will is by nature so free that it can never be constrained" (Descartes: Passions of the Soul, I, art 41.) and therefore the constraints must be laid on the freedom of choice. This theory was continued through the prominent, philosophic academics Suarez and John Duns Scotus (Naturalism.org: 2002).

Currently though, the weight of philosophic thought leans towards the concept that we can conceive willings that are not free. The primary arguments that threaten the theory of our freedom of will are various potential determinisms: physical/causal, psychological, biological and theological. Although these are predominant arguments against free will, it must be recognized that there are as well, philosophers who also deny that free will exists from independent grounds, and those who accept the reality of free will but argue with our compatibility with it.

Philosopher Saul Smilansky is a prime example of one who argues that free will does not exist. He believes however, that the concept, the belief in free will is necessary for the support of morality, meaning and the worth of human beings (Honderich: 2001). Others do argue that should free will not exist, we would be better off both morally and existentially if we did not believe in a false concept of free will and that Smilansky's view could motivate systematic deception about our causal connection to nature, which is neither possible, necessary, nor desirable. Free will is not a necessary fiction, and making known the naturalistic truth about ourselves is a far better basis for human flourishing (Naturalism.org: 2002). Smilansky stated that:

The best way to understand the free will problem is as a conjunction of three lexically ordered questions. This should not be controversial:

i. The first question is whether there is libertarian free will, i.e. the libertarian Coherence/Existence Question. Libertarians think that there is libertarian free will, everyone else disagrees. This question is metaphysical, or ontological, or perhaps logical.

ii. The second question concerns the implications if there is no libertarian free will. It is traditionally called the Compatibility Question, namely, are moral responsibility and related notions compatible with determinism (or with the absence of libertarian free will irrespective of determinism)? Compatibilism and hard determinism are the opponents on the Compatibility Question. This question, in my opinion, is mostly ethical. The first radical proposal I offer, the Fundamental Dualism, is on this second, Compatibility Question

iii. The third question can be called the Consequences Question. It asks about the consequences of pessimistic answers to the first two questions - namely, that there is no libertarian free will, and that compatibilism is insufficient and hence we are in trouble. An example of a familiar position best understood to be an answer to this question is the reactive-naturalism of P. F. Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment'. The nature of this question is not clear. My second radical proposal, Illusionism on free will, is on this third, Consequences Question.

(Smilansky: 2002)

Incompatibilists (as opposed to compatibility) maintain that we exercise control over our own behaviour only if determinism is false. Determinism's truth would therefore preclude that of free will. Therefore it is difficult for incompatibilists to say what freedom of will itself requires besides the falsehood of determinism. But more than this, they require that there be indeterminism of a certain sort (e.g., with some events entirely uncaused, or nondeterministically caused, or caused by agents and not deterministically caused by events) and that this indeterminism be located in specific places (generally, in decisions and other actions). It is sometimes claimed (e.g., by Campbell (1957: 168-70) and O'Connor (1995: 196-97)) that our experience when we make decisions and act constitutes