Free Will: Problem and Solutions

Free Will: Problem and Solutions

The debate over the metaphysical problem of freedom is one of the oldest in philosophy. I believe that this problem can be reduced to one basic question: Do we have free will or are all of our actions determined? The answer to this question is relevant (and closely tied) to the concept of moral responsibility.

Firstly, when taking any position in the problem of free will, there are three statements that one must consider:

1. Our actions are causally determined.

2. If our actions are determined, then we cannot be morally responsible for them.

3. We have the freedom necessary to be morally responsible for our actions.

It is obvious that not all of these statements can coexist with each other. Any two of

them may be accepted, but the third must be rejected. Considering these three statements, there are three positions that one can take in the free will debate: determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Determinists accept statements 1 and 2, but reject statement 3. They agree with the thesis of universal causation, and hold that we are not morally responsible for our actions. Libertarianists accept statements 2 and 3 and reject statement 1. They argue that we do have metaphysical freedom, and while some events may be caused, not all of them are. Compatibilists accept statements 1 and 3 while rejecting statement 2. They say we are determined, but we are still free enough to be morally responsible for our actions.

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Being a compatibilist, W.T Stace believes in the existence of free will and in it's consistency with determinism. Stace begins by explaining that without the existence of free will, there could be no morality. Without any sense of morality, he continues, "no man could be held accountable for his actions" (p.481). Stace seems to find this lack of justification for punishment a very dangerous concept, and attempts to explain how the philosopher's improper definition of free will has forced it to become inconsistent with determinism.

Stace bases his argument on the idea that the entire dispute over the existence of free will is "due to nothing but a confusion over the meanings of words" (p.482). If someone were to believe that the word "man" referred to a five-legged animal and looking around observed no five-legged animals, he may feel confident in his denial of the existence of man (p.482). This, explains Stace, is common result when a term is given a definition that is not of common usage. In the same way, philosophers have given the term "free will" an improper definition, and then "finding that there is nothing in the world which matches their definition, have denied its existence" (p482). Stace feels that once the proper definition (or "common usage") is given to free will, it will be obvious that the question of determinism is completely irrelevant to the problem.

Through a series of ordinary conversations, Stace makes a good case for the existence of free will and it's irrelevance to determinism. In one example, he gives two dialogues between himself and a judge after being charged with theft. In the first situation, when the judge asks him if he had stolen the bread out of his own free will, he responds, "Yes. I stole it because I was hungry" (p.483). This appeals to common sense in showing that Stace had two options, to steal the bread or to stay hungry. By his own desires and motives he freely chose to steal, caused only by hunger. In the next similar situation, when the judge asks him if he had stolen the bread of his own free will he replies, "No. I stole it because my employer threatened to beat me if I did not" (p.483). This example shows that Stace was not able to exercise his free will considering the immediate causes of his actions were from external agents, which caused his actions to be unfree and not of his own will. Stace uses these two similar, but slightly differing, situations to prove that all actions, both those resulting from a man's own desires and those forced upon him are, nevertheless, the results of causes. "Therefore, the only reasonable view is that all human actions, both those which are freely done and those which are not, are wholly determined by causes" (p.484). Considering this, being undetermined by causes must be an incorrect definition of free willÐ'... proving the determinist wrong.

Having established the irrelevance between determinism and the existence of free will, Stace is able to examine the difference between free acts and unfree acts. He finds the obvious difference to be that "the free acts are all caused by desires or motives by some sort of internal psychological states of the agents mind, while unfree acts, on the other hand, are all caused by physical forces, or conditions, by some outside agent" (p.485). It is plain then to see that if we define free will as the ability to make one's own decisions based on personal desires, motives, wishes, thoughts, emotions, or impulses (as opposed to being acted upon by an outside source), free will must exist! And this definition, Stace suggests, is the common usage of the term "free will".

Stace draws his article to a close by concluding that since it appears that we do in fact act out of our own free will in many occasions, we must then be held morally responsible. He responds to opposing statements, which claim that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility, by referring to the act of punishment. Stace claims that punishment is an effective way of deterring a criminal from doing the same thing twice, and, at the same time, acts as an example which may keep others from ever committing that crime. Punishment is therefore used as a cause for the improvement of human behavior. "Thus we see that moral responsibility is not only consistent with determinism, but requires it. The assumption on which punishment is based is that human behavior is causally determined"