Functionalism

Functionalism is defined as philosophical view of mind according to which mental processes are characterized in terms of their abstract functional (opr computational) relationships to one another, and to sensory inputs and motor outputs. More generally, functionalism states that mental states just are the causal role between inputs and outputs. Take for example the mental state of being tired:

Input --------> Mental state ---------> Output

Ð'* A day at the gym Ð'* Tired Ð'* Yawning and

Ð'* 2 hours of sleep the previous stretching

Ð'* No morning coffee Ð'* Sleeping

Ð'* Grumpiness

As shown above, the mental state of being tired is the throughput for the given input and yields the given output. While the above list would need to be expanded, the general idea is evident. Being tired just is spending a day at the gym, only getting 2 hours of sleep the night before, not having one's morning coffee and then yawning and stretching, being grumpy, and actually sleeping as a result. A mind experiences the mental state of being tired when it displays the typical causes and effects a mind typically does when tired.

The functionalist states that all various forms of inputs and outputs are explainable through the physical sciences and thus the functionalist is a materialist as if both the inputs and outputs are physical, the throughput between them must also be physical. Going one step further, the functionalist defines a mental state as being the physical, causal role between inputs and outputs gives way to one of functionalisms strongest points; multiple realizability. The ability to generalize ideas and make them applicable to other things gives an idea a much weightier feel. We can imagine a person being in tired. We can also imagine a dog being tired. If mental states were defined simply by our neural chemistry standards, the dog could not be said to be "tired" as the dog does not demonstrate the same happenings internally that a human might, but to say a dog could not feel tired seems wrong. However, if given minimal sleep and after a full day of playing, a dog will exhibit similar behaviors (i.e. yawning, sleeping) indicative of being tired. Because the functionalist defines mental states by typical causes and effects, he is allowed to say the dog is in pain.

Because the multiple realizablitly characteristic of functionalism happens to be one of its strongest characteristics, it would seem to be a good place to attack the argument. Based upon the above and Leibniz's law, one could argue:

1) Mental states are functional states.

2) My dog and I are in the same functional states (same inputs and

outputs).

3) Therefore, my dog and I are in the same mental states.

A pretty straight forward example and one that provides support for functionalism's multiple realizabiltity aspect. But imagine a two people speaking in Chinese together. Person 1 asks person 2 what he did last night (input). Person 2 thinks about it (mental state/throughput) and then responds (output). More questions are asked and responses are given. Now take the time to imagine a person who knows no Chinese in a room. With him in this room is a rule book that contains every conceivable response to any question to another person standing outside of the room. Both the rule book and the person on the outside are in Chinese. When asked what he did last night, the man in the room responds in Chinese after looking it up in his rule book. Again he's asked a question and again he answers. The person on the outside of the room is asking questions (input) and the person on the inside with the rule book is answering them correctly (output) as if