History of the Defense Intelligence Agency

History of the Defense Intelligence Agency

Bradley Barnes

SS 110: World History

Dr. Valerie Adams

April 18, 2005

History of the Defense Intelligence Agency

In the years following World War II, there were many turf battles fought between the intelligence agencies of the United States. The Central Intelligence Agency, which was created in 1947 with the passing of the National Security Act, won the initial battles. This agency had won both legislative status and budget authority and was to make recommendations for coordinating intelligence activities; and to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence (Laqueur, 17). The act was vague however, and the new agency quickly moved to the role of producer of intelligence and quickly grew in size(Laqueur, 17).

By 1953, while headed by Allen Dulles, the CIA reached its height of influence inside Washington. Dulles showed little interest in intelligence coordination, but was very close with President Eisenhower and with his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, he had great personal influence within the administration (Laqueur, 18).

Unfortunately, Dulles's final years as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) were strife with controversy. Overly pessimistic intelligence estimates gave way to controversy concerning the missile gap between the USSR and America. Another intelligence disaster was the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. This operation further damaged the CIA's reputation and led to Dulles's dismissal as DCI (Laqueur, 18).

These intelligence failures caused President Eisenhower to be dissatisfied with the intelligence he was receiving from the community. A new solution was needed and Eisenhower moved to create a Joint Study Group to "determine better ways of effectively organizing the nation's military intelligence activities" (Raman).

This group recommended the creation of a single source to manage and coordinate all intelligence expenditure, production, analysis, assessment and dissemination functions within the Department of Defense (DOD). This agency would be responsible to the Secretary of Defense, and meet the intelligence needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and military units fielded worldwide (Raman).

Eisenhower's term as President ended before the group's recommendations could be implemented, however the banner was carried by the next administration. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense under President John F. Kennedy, accepted the group's recommendation and created the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (DNSA). McNamara had many reasons for accepting the groups recommendations. First among them was the differing assessments of the missile gap by each of the services intelligence agencies. Another reason was McNamara's cost-conscious attitude. He wanted to merge the intelligence directorates of the different services to avoid a multiplicity of intelligence agencies in the Pentagon (Raman). He also wanted the Director of the DIA to report directly to him (Raman).

There was strong resistance to the new agency from the armed forces, and in the end, McNamara had to agree to the continued existence of the intelligence directorates of the services (Raman). There was also resistance to the direct reporting and it was ultimately decided that the director would report to the Secretary of Defense through

the Chairman, JCS (Raman).

Official Creation of the DIA

In the midst of Cold War escalation over the building of the Berlin Wall, the Defense Intelligence Agency became operational on October 1st, 1961 (DIA). The DIA was chartered to become the Nation's primary producer of foreign military intelligence (DIA). Air Force Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, an office with close ties to McNamara, was selected to become the Agencies first director. He was chosen by McNamara over a year earlier to become the Inspector General of the Air Force and was twice chosen by McNamara to head special investigations of suspected security violations (NY Times).

In order to avoid harming the overall effectiveness of the current defense intelligence apparatus, General Carroll ordered a time-phased transferring of the services' intelligence functions and resources (DIA). The new organization would not have a great deal of time to become organized. Within a year after its formation, the DIA would face its first major challenge.

The Early Years

In 1962, the Soviet Union deployed offensive nuclear weapons to the island of Cuba, only 90 miles from the coast of Florida. The DIA would receive its first major success during this time. On October 14th, a U-2 spy plane under Air Force command provided the photographic evidence of this buildup. In the period following, the intelligence community stepped up its collection using A-7 Reconnaissance aircraft and the DIA was essential in the analysis of this imagery intelligence (DIA). Publicly, the agency was gaining notoriety. In February of 1963, John Hughes of the DIA briefed the Cuban situation to America on national television (DIA).

Because the decision was made early that the services would be able to maintain their intelligence functions, there was much opposition to the very existence of the DIA from the services. The Vietnam War would highlight the weaknesses associated with intelligence duplication. This duplication confused British official in Vietnam and they noted that "there were more than a dozen American intelligence services camped out around the outskirts of Saigon and their competition was hard fought and bitter" (Aldrich, 13). This competition hindered the DIA's ability to produce accurate, timely intelligence to policy makers.

The DIA's analysis did continue during this decade. During the 1960's the agency focused its efforts on China's detonation of an atomic bomb and the start of their cultural revolution (DIA). Elsewhere, the DIA analyzed intelligence from Africa, Kashmir, Cyprus, the six-day war between Egypt and Israel, and the soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (DIA). An additional duty for the DIA was also gained during this time. Defense Attaches,