Hobbes and Absolute Sovereignty

Introduction

A state is sovereign when its magistrate owes allegiance to no superior power, and he or she is supreme within the legal order of the state. It may be assumed that in every human society where there is a system of law there is also to be found, latent beneath the variety of political forms, in a democracy as much as in a absolute monarchy, a simple relationship between subjects rendering habitual obedience, and a sovereign who renders obedience to none. This vertical structure, of sovereign and subjects, according to this theory, is analogous to the backbone of a man. The structure constitutes an essential part of any human society which possesses a system of law, as the backbone comprises an essential part of the man.

Where this structure is present we may legitimately speak of human society, together with its sovereign, as a single independent state, and we may also speak of its law. Where this structure is absent we cannot legitimately apply those expressions, because the relation of the sovereign to the subjects constitutes, according to this theory, part of the very meaning of those expressions [2].

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Thomas Hobbes' theory of government

Hobbes expressed a clear personal confidence in his position as the 'author or originator of an authentic political science'. It was in De Cive, published in 1647, that he made a preliminary and tentative claim to have discovered a way of 'rationalising enquiry into political behaviour,; and that he had also created a 'new science' Ð'-- a science of politics [3]. Hobbes began his study of civil government by investigating its central subject, the human being as a natural and social animal, and then proceeded to define its origin, generation and form. It seemed to him that everything is to be understood by its constitutive causes. The mechanical analogy, contra the traditional organic and theological concepts of the state, became for Hobbes both apposite and inevitable. Civic conflict was leading to disaggregation of the contemporary 17th century English state, demonstrating to him that the sanctions which held it together were neither eternal nor 'natural.' [4, 5, 6].

Hobbes was primarily intent on the creation of an impartial, theoretical science of government, 'stressing the priority of truth above the delights of rhetoric or the utility of propaganda [6]. He focuses his attention on basic principles rather than changing institutions or forms of government. Leviathan can therefore be seen as a political creature or persona and that creature can exhibit aristocratic, republican, monarchical or, even, democratic features [8].

Thomas Hobbes and his denial of the doctrine of right reason.

Hobbes's first argument in favour of the doctrine of absolute sovereignty is essentially the argument against right reason ?described as the vision and the heart of Hobbes's moral and political philosophy [9]. His doctrine of absolute sovereignty is derived primarily from the negation of this doctrine, and almost everything that we can discover in his notion of sovereignty can be found in his negation of this argument. An argument that leads to his conclusion that it is essential for the sovereign to be absolute, and to possess effective enforcement or coercive powers.

Hobbes is principally concerned with the fundamental problem of human life in the commonwealth, and the manner in which conflict arises from those numerous, plans, projects and desires, which lead to the individuals action, and which are usually at variance, one with another. He sets out to establish that, if each individual were to be allowed the liberty to follow his own conscience, then in the presence of a diversity of such consciences, without constraint or discipline, peace and harmony in the commonwealth would be short lived, due to an all pervasive tendency to disagreement, and the concomitant danger of civil disobedience [10].

The problems, created by men living in a civil society, do not merely derive from conflicts of interest or the clash of passions but, according to Hobbes, derive, more fundamentally, from a diversity of consciences and the unrestrained exercise of individual judgement which, in effect, makes common action highly uncertain or virtually impossible. Where it is impossible to obtain a unanimity of wills and agreement, in which a common policy cannot be determined, then, Hobbes informs us, the artificial will or the artificial person is in need of creation and acceptance, because it is the sovereign power Ð'-- the artificial person Ð'-- that effectively constitutes the state.

This is a point of critical significance in Hobbes's political philosophy. He was primarily concerned with the problems of union and unity within the commonwealth, with the construction of such a unity, and the possibility of common action that is a product of that unity. The absence of unanimity in decision making, and unresolvable conflicts of interest, frustrate and militate against a natural unity and, therefore, in the event of open conflict, jeopardise the lives and the welfare of the subjects [11]. Within civil society common action becomes essential, despite individual projects and disagreements, if the subjects of that society are to enjoy a peaceful and harmonious common life. A civil society, or commonwealth, must have a clearly defined and unambiguous decision-making procedure, which can arrive at definite decisions, and then initiate common action Ð'-- despite a divergence of consciences and a lack of -unanimity. That is primarily the focal point of Hobbes's concern, and is central to his concept of sovereignty [12].

Those who are aggressively and belligerently dedicated to their own self-interest or self-preservation, may not necessarily constitute the principal threat to peace and harmony in the commonwealth. Those who are normally honest, intelligent and decent may represent an even greater threat to civil stability, because they believe they have right on their side and they may, therefore, be even more tenacious in fighting for what they want, and negating the legitimate demands of others. it is for this reason that the latter may be less inclined, than the former, to enter into a calculation of the costs and benefits of common action, because they believe that they occupy the moral high ground'. A position which their consciences will not allow them to surrender.

The latter often constitute a more serious threat, not because they are fundamentally nasty or brutish, but because they are certain that they