Holocaust Case

This research project will investigate the reasons why the gas chambers and railroads at Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp was not strategically targeted by the American armed forces in an specific attempt to end the genocide committed by the Nazis, and whether it would have succeeded. The main time period of focus will be the year 1944, although the Holocaust was very much underway by this time, evidence suggests that this was the time when a sustained bombing mission on Auschwitz was strategically possible due to the capture of Northern Italy and the stationing of the 15th U.S. Air Force at the Foggia airbase. This essay will attempt to challenge a widely held historical narrative that the Allied forces did all they could to prevent the mass genocide committed by the Nazis by defeating them in war and liberating death camps such as Auschwitz-Birkenau and Bergen-Belsen. While this project will investigate whether it was strategically possible for the Allied forces to bomb Auschwitz and whether this would have prevented the Nazi genocide, slowed it down or sped it up or merely changed its nature, it will also consider issues that prevented a more comprehensive attempt at rescuing large numbers of European Jews. Historians have argued that America and Britain did not want large numbers of refugees entering their countries or their territories (Palestine in the case of the British) and that existing anti-semitic attitudes within these countries prevented any genuine, sustained attempt at rescuing large numbers of Jews from Nazi control. It is important to highlight whether these factors affected the decision not to bomb the gas chambers at Auschwitz, if this was indeed possible.

The fact that the gas chambers and railroads leading to the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp were not specifically targeted by Allied forces during the Second World War has become a topic of intense debate among historians and world leaders ever since. While new evidence suggests that Franklin D. Roosevelt clearly had no intention of bombing Auschwitz , more contemporary leaders have expressed regret that this was not done , indicating that it may have been a realistic target for American forces. Before highlighting any pre-existing reasons for a lack of action regarding rescue plans, for example anti-semitism or immigration policies, it is important to understand whether it would have been possible for the U.S military to bomb the gas chambers and railroads at Auschwitz and if it was, whether this would have prevented or disrupted the Holocaust.

By early 1944, American intelligence had received information on the genocide being committed at Auschwitz from various sources, none more disturbing and informative than The Auschwitz Protocols. As more and more people around the world learned about what was happening at Auschwitz, Jewish and other groups requested that the American military bomb specific railroads leading to the death camp as well as the gas chambers and crematoria. A telegram from Switzerland to the Agudas Israel World Organisations in New York on June 12th 1944 stated that "We have asked, in the American and British Legations for the bombardment of the given rail-hub points (Kashau-Pressov) but so far without results. The whole relief action, commissars, pity, etc., are useless unless decisive steps are being undertaken" . It can be seen from this that there were requests from various groups to bomb specific railroad points into Auschwitz in order to prevent the transport and extermination of Hungarian Jews. Wyman argues that the American government rejected these requests because while they claimed that bombing Auschwitz would have used military resources that were required elsewhere, the American War Department had already decided that rescue was not part of its mission. An internal memorandum written in February 1944 confirmed this: "We must constantly bear in mind, however, that the most effective relief which can be given victims of enemy persecution is to insure the speedy defeat of the Axis" . Despite pressure from Jewish groups to bomb certain railroads leading into Auschwitz, in particular the Kashau-Pressov railroad, the Americans resisted. Rubinstein argues that this was the correct decision as the destruction of this rail link "would have had absolutely no effect upon any deportation of Jews to Auschwitz from any part of Europe" . It can be seen from this that the intelligence used by Jewish organisations and the War Refugee Board to put pressure on the American government to bomb specific railroads in order to prevent or limit the transportation of Jews may have been wrong or at least misinterpreted. Aronson argues that to seriously disrupt the transportation of Jews to the death camps a sustained bombing effort was required. Rubinstein also argues that the network of railroads leading to Auschwitz was complex enough to mean that if one railroad was bombed, there would always have been another way to transport the Jews .

Map of the Railroads leading to Auschwitz

It can be seen that while the bombing of the K-P railroad may have led to a brief disruption of the transportation of Jews to Auschwitz, it would not have made a great enough impact. It would not have prevented the liquidation of the last Polish ghetto in Lodz, and the transportation of 70,000 Jews to Auschwitz. It also would not have disrupted the final deportations from France and Italy. It can be argued that the successful bombing of one railroad may have led to other bombing missions of other transportation lines however it is significant that no such requests were made. Aronson writes that the disruption of transportation lines needed a sustained effort however "the real intelligence, which showed hard and convincing evidence as to the havoc brought upon the Germans by concentrated bombing of transportation targets, was hardly used by the Allied air 'barons'" . It is evident that a sustained attack of the railroads leading to Auschwitz may have disrupted its operations however it could be argued that the intelligence gathered was not utilised by the U.S. Air Force or in fact that there simply was not enough information.

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Aerial Photograph of Auschwitz I Main Camp taken during World War Two by U.S Forces.

This photograph taken on April 4th 1944 clearly shows the main camp at Auschwitz Birkenau. While these photographs were not developed from their negative form until 1978 and "there is no evidence to suggest these photographs were seen by anybody before 1978, let alone trained photointelligence officers during the war" , they do suggest that had bombing campaign against Auschwitz been implemented there would have been sufficient