Influences on Judicial Power

Influences on Judicial Power

Under Article III of the Constitution the judicial branch was established, but rather implicit in proportion to the other two branches of government. This ambiguity allocates various opportunities for interpretation of judicial power. In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton addresses the role of the judiciary branch within the federal government in regards to political immunity of judges through life tenure and contribution to checks and balances through power or judicial review. Chief Justice John Marshall, in his ruling of Marbury v. Madison, established the principle of judicial review advocated by Hamilton in the Federalist Papers. Originally designated as the weakest of the three branches in government by the framers of the Constitution, the Judiciary has accumulated an increase in political influence through judiciary review and has proven to be an essential institution in the separation of powers as well as an active participant in the system of checks and balances.

According to Hamilton in Federalist 78, the judicial branch has the least amount of power among the three branches of government. The Judiciary is "the weakest of the three departments of power, that it can never attack with success either of the other two" (Woll, 410). The enumerated powers of Congress include the authority to collect taxes, borrow money, regulate commerce, and pass federal law. These assigned powers permit Congress to control the economy and regulate the public by adopting legislations. The Executive branch has the power to enforce laws, negotiate treaties, and accept ambassadors. Possessing these powers along with being the Commander in Chief of the armed forces, the President is capable of leading the federal government through perils pertaining to the public. The Judiciary "has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever...It may truly be said to have neither FORCE NOR WILL, but merely judgment" (Woll, 410). The Judicial branch lacks the influential power possessed by Congress and the President in the federal government and is further limited by presidential appointment of justices and congressional decision to establish lower courts. The Supreme Courts' ability to pass judgment, however, gives significant power to the branch and is essential in the system of checks and balances. The judicial branch is provided with the power to resolve conflicts emerging between federal and state laws as well as between citizens of different states, but more importantly the power to decide constitutionality of laws. It is able to check the executive and legislative branch by declaring their actions unconstitutional and therefore null.

The Constitution provides judges with life tenure in order to protect the judicial branch from political pressures imposed by the public or the other branches of government. In Federalist 78, Hamilton states that the "independence of judges is equally requisite to guard the constitution and the rights of individuals" (Woll, 409). Unlimited terms of judges enable them to articulate impartial judgments despite popular politics. They are not at risk of losing their political position when ruling against the desires of powerful institutions. Immunity to political influence allocates court jurisdictions that are in the interest of justice and equality. The alternative of "periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary independence. If the power of making them was committed either to the executive or legislature, there would be danger of an improper compliance to the branch with possessed it" (Woll, 412). Limiting the term of judges would motivate their loyalty to the agency responsible for appointments in order to ensure future succession. Hamilton argues that the judicial branch is in "continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed or influenced by its coordinate branches; that, as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence as PERMANECNY IN OFFICE" (Woll, 410). Domination of the judicial branch by the executive or legislative branch undermines the essential structure of separated powers. Powers partitioned to the judiciary branch would be under the control and devoted to the benefit of the other two branches.

The prominent case of Marbury v. Madison established the principle of judicial review, implied by Hamilton when he stated in the Federalist Papers that, "No legislative act...contrary to the constitution can be valid" (Woll, 411). President John Adams appointed Marbury as justice of the peace during his infamous midnight appointment, which was a desperate effort on the part of the Federalist to fill judicial position before leaving office. Marbury's commission, however, was never delivered once Jefferson took office. James Madison, as new secretary of state, refused to comply with the Federalists' appointments and declined to deliver the commissions; therefore, compelling Marbury to file a case with the Supreme Court. Marbury demanded that Madison be forced to acknowledge the appointment and deliver the commission in compliance with the Judiciary Act of 1789, which permitted the court to issue a writ of mandamus to public officers and private persons.

Chief Justice John Marshall presided over the dispute and established the principle of judicial review that significantly increases the influence of judicial power. In deciding this case, Marshall encountered a considerable dilemma. If Marshall was to grant the writ of mandamus requested by Marbury under the Judiciary Act of 1789 then it is assumed that Madison would simply refuse