Iraq - Military Campaign

Abstract 1

1. Introduction 2

2. Past experience 2

3. Diplomatic problems 2

4. Concept of Operation 3

5. The campaign 3

5.1. Air power 4

5.2. Ground operations and special forces 5

5.3. Iraqi strategy and tactics 5

6. Intelligence 6

7. Psychological operations 6

8. Public relations 6

9. Technology 6

10. Casualties 7

11. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 7

12. Conclusion 7

13. References: 8

14. Glossary of terms 9

1. warfare 9

2. vanguard 10

3. breach 11

4. sortie 12

5. enclave 13

6. domain 14

7. envisage 15

8. resistance 16

9. paramilitary 17

10. campaign 18

Abstract

This article draws together early military implications of a campaign where intensive operations lasted just about a month. The deeper insights will need much more time for the post operations reports to be written, detailed battle evaluations to be made, and the key decision-makers to record their thoughts. As far as is possible, the article deals with the purely military characteristics of the operation. The promise of a decade of development of high technology air power was expected by some to show a new way of fighting wars. The evidence from the campaign appears to give a more mixed message. Certainly, a higher percentage of air weapons was guided in this conflict than in any previous war. Strategic intelligence appears to have been less accurate than had been expected.

The unexpected initial resistance by Iraqi forces, followed by later surrender, required flexible coalition operations. The vision of the use of chemical and biological weapons proved groundless. The efficiency of special operations will be one area for deeper revision. The media policy will need reviewing for future operations. At this stage, the article does no more than record the sequence of events, make broad judgements about the strategic and tactical approaches of both the Coalition and Iraqi forces, and highlights areas where further investigation may be useful to draw firmer conclusions.

1. Introduction

On 20th March 2003 US president George W. Bush launched a military campaign against Iraq. Its codename was Operation Iraqi Freedom. It has different names in other coalition countries, but one common denominator – it still doesn’t have a formal conclusion. Although the end of major military operations was declared on May 1st 2003, it is clearly obvious now one year later that Bush’s speech on a deck of aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln was overhasty. The so-called coalition is now facing strong resistance from guerrilla fighters, the casualties on both sides are increasing dramatically and the end of the war seems hidden far in the future.

This article will cover more or less only military angle of the operation, the political and diplomatic aspects will be included only when required.

2. Past experience

In last 15 years, military tacticians have shifted the weight of military operations from traditional ground warfare to extensive use of air power. That happened mainly because of technological improvements, but also because of new public comprehension of war. If people were ready to accept millions of casualties in WW1, hundred thousands of casualties in WW2, the modern society is ready to accept only individual losses.

That became very apparently in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The 34 nations coalition built up large ground and air forces which, under UN authorization, were attacking Iraqi defensive positions for weeks before any ground operation even started. Once ground operations were set in motion, it took only 100 hours to drive Iraqis out of Kuwait. The coalition suffered 340 deaths, but a quarter was caused by friendly fire.

Same pattern was deployed in 1999 when NATO initiated air campaign against Serbs in Kosovo to prevent ethnic cleansing. Two and a half months or air raids were so effective that ground operations weren’t even necessary.

Last larger Iraqi pre-war air operations were mounted against Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Because majority of raids were initiated from aircraft carriers in Indian Ocean, they were less intensive, but nonetheless equal effective.

3. Diplomatic problems

As mentioned before, the first war against Iraq in 1990 was going ahead under authorization of United Nations and it was a joined venture of 34 countries. Second Iraqi war on the other hand was undertaken without UN authorization. The list of coalition supporters given by the White House listed 44 countries, including superpowers like Marshal Islands, Micronesia and Singapore.

Although US were able to carry out 2003 Iraqi war on their own, that would be much easily achieved if they had a local mounting bases. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia offered one, Qatar hosted Central Command Headquarters, but Turkey caused a major upset in US plans because it declined to provide another mounting base on their territory.

4. Concept of Operation

The detailed concept for the military campaign was still not released to public, but judging by the events in Iraq, it did require heavy modification. The heart of the preliminary plan was the “shock and awe” concept.

The basic concept probably required synchronized aerial across-the-board attacks against Iraqi troops, infrastructure and military and communication centres. Ground troops were supposed to make a swift move against softened Iraqi defenders and wipe them out. Without surprise, the main goal of quick advance in Iraqi mainland was to secure oil facilities against destruction. The emphasis in the initial