Is She an Accomplice?

Questions Presented 1. Whether a person in Alaska can be charged as an accomplice to an unintentional crime, when Alaskan courts required that one must have the specific intent to promote or facilitate the offense? 2. Whether the mother was the legal cause of her children's death, when she permitted the father to take the children in his car when he was drunk? Statement of the Case The appellant, Elaine Benis, was indicted in the County of Norchester, on one count of manslaughter, pursuant to A.S. §11.41.120. (R. at 1.) She was also indicted for one count of accessory to manslaughter, pursuant to A.S. §11.41.120 and A.S. §11.16.110. (R. at 1). After the presentation of the prosecution's case, the defense moved to dismiss on the grounds that the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Benis was reckless. (R. at 9). This motion was denied. At the conclusion of its case, the defense moved for a directed verdict, stating that the prosecution failed to show that Mrs. Benis recklessly caused the death of her children. (R. at 12). This motion was denied and the judge informed the counselors that he would charge the jury in accordance with the state's proposed charge. (R. at 13). The defense strongly objected and renewed its motion for a directed verdict, submitting that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Mrs. Benis was the cause of her children's death, since Mr. Peterman's actions clearly were the only cause of their death and that it is logically impossible for any jury to find someone guilty as an accomplice to an unintended crime. (R. at 13). The trial judge denied the motion. (R. at 13). Mrs. Benis was convicted and appealed to the Court of Appeals of the State of Alaska. (R. at 15). At issue in the appeal was whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law, (1) in instructing the jury on the charge of accessory to manslaughter and (2) in denying Mrs. Benis's post trial motion for a directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction as a principal. (R. at 16). The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that one can be an accomplice to reckless manslaughter even though it is a not a specific intent crime. (R. at 17). The court based its decision on holdings from other jurisdictions and rejected the Alaskan doctrine that one cannot be an accomplice to a crime when he acts recklessly. (R. at 17). Furthermore, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of Mrs. Benis as principal because her act was the legal cause of death. (R. at 17). Mrs. Benis now appeals to the Supreme Court of Alaska. This appeal is limited to the issue of whether being an accessory to manslaughter is a crime under Alaska law and whether there was sufficient evidence that Mrs. Benis's act caused the death of her two daughters. (R. at 19). The defense appeals on the grounds that the law of Alaska does not permit an instruction that one can be an accomplice to an unintentional crime when they did not have the specific intent to promote or facilitate the offense and that Mrs. Benis's act was not the proximate cause of her two children's death. On Sunday, October 10, 1999, Jay Peterman came to his wife's house, Mrs. Benis, because he is allowed to see his children, pursuant to a temporary separation agreement. (R. at 16). Mrs. Benis testified that her husband's eyes were red and that he appeared tipsy, "...but he drove up to the house, so I thought he was O.K." (R. at 11). However, when the prosecution asked Mrs. Benis if she knew that Mr. Peterman was drunk at the time he picked up the girls, she emphatically replied "No". (R. at 12). Furthermore, expert testimony from the Medical Examiner reveals that even though someone has a blood alcohol level of 0.14, it is not absolutely certain that the person appears intoxicated to the outside world. (R. at 7). Mr. Peterman had a breath-analyzing device installed in his car because of past drunk driving incidents. (R. at 16). This device is designed to keep a drunken driver from starting a car. The system requires a driver to breathe into a device and register a clean breath before the ignition unlocks. The driver is also subject to rolling retests during the trip to make sure the driver is alcohol free. If alcohol is registered, the vehicle's horn honks nonstop until the vehicle is stopped. (R. at 16). Testimony from Maggie O'Connell indicates that Mr. Peterman had his daughter Sarah blow into the tube for him before the car drove off. (R. at 2). Mrs. Benis testified that she did not see the car drive away. (R. at 11). That was the last time she saw her children alive. At about 2:00 p.m. on that Sunday, Peterman drove his car into oncoming traffic, killing himself and both of Mrs. Benis's daughters. (R. at 16). Analysis I. ALASKA LAW REGARDING ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY IS CLEAR AND ONLY ALLOWS FOR ONE INTERPRETATION: ONE MUST SPECIFICALLY INTEND TO PROMOTE OR FACILITATE THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE. When this court is reviewing a matter of law it adopts a rule that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy. See American Computer Institute v. State, Nos. S-8664, S-8694, 5235, 2000 WL 146847 (Alaska 2000). This court's interpretation of accomplice liability has been able to stand the test of time because its decisions have been based on common law, case precedent and statutory interpretation. The early definition of accomplice liability required one to have knowledge and specific intent to aid, abet or participate in a criminal act. This court was able to establish a mens rea requirement for an accomplice because the criminal law was codified from common law. For 17 years this court held that one has to have knowledge and specific intent in order to be an accomplice to a crime. After the legislature revised the criminal code in Alaska the strong presumption from statutory interpretation, legislative history and case law is that they wanted to codify prior case law and common law. Also, the legislature had no intention of adopting the Model Penal Code's approach to accomplice liability. It is the legislature's power not the judiciary's to change law. The society in Alaska would be the one most devastated if the Appeals Court's decision is upheld. Every man and woman would have to walk a so-called straight line. In the long-run everyday behavior would be criminalized. A. This court has consistently held that one has to have the knowledge and the specific intent to be convicted as an accomplice to a crime. This court's interpretation of accomplice liability has been able to stand the test of time because its decisions have been based on common law, case precedent and statutory interpretation. In Mahle v. State, 371 P.2d 21 (Alaska 1962), this court had its first chance to define who was an accomplice,