Is the Good Friday Agreement Fundamentally Flawed as a Counter Terrorist Strategy?

Is the Good Friday Peace Agreement Fundamentally Flawed as A Counter Terrorist Strategy?

Since it's birth on 10 April 1998, the Good Friday Agreement has been fraught with crisis after crisis. The executive was suspended in February 2000 then reinstated five months later. The main crux of these crises is a dispute over decommissioning of weapons. In Northern Ireland itself there has been no marked decrease in violence, it is just not reported on as much in the worlds press. In a rare feature story of recent times, one reads of young catholic children being among the victims of abuse from Protestants over territorial claims to area. Yet there are few reports of the continuing violence that occurs on a day-to-day basis.

In examining whether the peace agreement is flawed as a counter terrorist strategy one must consider a number of factors. What spirit the agreement is trying to convey is fundamental to the discussion. Then, who are the terrorists that it is attempting to counter, if at all? But first consideration will be given to other peace agreements that have succeeded.

Following 15 years of Civil war in Lebanon the T'aif Accord was drawn up outlining a new political and social consensus. The basis of this agreement was to form a power sharing government so that all communities may be represented in parliament. Unlike Northern Ireland the issues of decommissioning, ceasefires and dissolution of paramilitary forces were not featured during negotiations; only until the new government was formed were they tackled. Disarmament became the major problem with, on one side, Lebanese forces arguing that a more favourable communal balance had to be achieved, and, on the other, Hizballah claiming right to arm as a result of their liberation war with Israel. On a social level, however, progress was made with ten thousand Christians and Muslims being integrated into the Army and Police. Eventually partial voluntary decommissioning began with weapons being handed over to their origins, namely the armed forces, or exported to other conflicts.

The success of the T'aif Accord was to a genuine commitment to peace, highlighted by the fact that no third party organisation was required to oversee events; instead it was handled by the newly formed government.

In October 1992 the Mozambique government and Renamo, the Mozambican National Resistance, signed the General Peace Agreement in Rome after fifteen years of civil war. In this case a third party, the Italians, handled negotiations. The basis for this agreement was that the government would adopt a multi-party democratic system so that the Renamo who become a legitimate political party could reach power peacefully. Militarily, the security forces were restructured with limitations placed on the armed forces size, the dismantling of private and irregular troops and a restructuring of the police force.

The agreement was faced with a problem of mutual distrust and unwillingness to relinquish arms. The UN, in an effort to create trust continued with the demobilization of forces by creating assembly points for arms collection, however, it was not until one year later that arms began to appear. Along with the weapons amnesty came a program to reintegrate combatants into society. The UN efforts to facilitate this were education efforts ranging from literacy training to health issues such as AIDS.

On examining these situations one can see a number of criteria required for success of a conflict such as Northern Ireland, where decommissioning of arms becomes a principal issue.

A power sharing committee must be formed involving all parties involved in the conflict. This transforms the armed movements into legitimate political players.

Confidence-building measures must be put into place to reach a situation of mutual trust. This inevitably involves compromises from either side that can be difficult to swallow.

The issue of disarmament inevitably becomes the centre issue. This has to be integral to negotiations and once in place, executed properly and professionally. In most cases, handing over of arms is often seen as an admission of surrender. Relinquishing arms to a third, independent body alleviates this perception as well as removing political issues from the proceedings since the interests of this body lie in society as a whole, rather than one community. However, every conflict is unique so decommissioning must be tailored to individual needs whether that requires a third party or not.

Ex-combatants if they are to prosper in the new society must undergo retraining to aid their integration into society. This removes the need to resort to violence for personal gain.

It follows then that most importantly a firm commitment from either side to reach a state of non-violence is vital.

On examining the Good Friday peace agreement it becomes clear that it aims to provide for a power sharing government, enabling cross border organisations, namely the Unionists and Republicans, to collaborate on common interests such as environment, tourism, economy, and especially after 30 years of conflict, restructuring of the security services. This has resulted in suspected members of the IRA becoming legitimate politicians, minister for education in the case of Martin McGuinness, a bitter pill to swallow for his victims.

In an effort to aid mutual trust, confidence building measures are implemented principally through early release of so called Ð''political prisoners' and attempt to civilianise them back into society. One such example is that of Protestant Johnny Adair released under the agreement terms. He had already revoked his support for peace from his cell in the Maze. His license was soon revoked by Peter Mandelson and was subsequently arrested and returned to prison. Ð''The legislation enables me to act on the basis of my belief that he is about to commission acts of terrorism' this refers to a long running feud between the UDA/UFF and the UDA that escalated in violence and death, with Adair being the assumed instigator.

The intention of decommissioning by the IRA was to reassure unionists that they would not be residing in parliament with people who represent private armies outside of the agreement. In the Unionists view Ð''A peace process without decommissioning isn't worth a penny candle'. In this case a third body, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) under Canadian General John de Chastelain, was used to oversee the process of paramilitary arms being put Ð''Beyond use'. Furthermore former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari and Cyril Ramaphosa, former secretary-general of the African National Congress would undertake the task of