Japanese Internment

The decision to imprison Japanese Americans was a popular one in 1942. It was supported not only by the government, but it was also called for by the press and the people. In the wake of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, Japan was the enemy. Many Americans believed that people of Japanese Ancestry were potential spies and saboteurs, intent on helping their mother country to win World War II. "The Japanese race is an enemy race," General John DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command wrote in February 1942. "And while many second and third generation Japanese born in the United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized,' the racial strains are undiluted" (quoted in Smith, 1995: 83).

On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Executive Order 9066. The Order declared that "the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national defense material, national defense premises, and national defense utilities." In pursuit of this goal, the Secretary of War, or the military commander whom he might designate, was authorized "to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he...may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary...or the Military Commander may impose in his discretion." The Secretary was also authorized "to provide for residents of any such areas who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary...until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order" (see Appendix 1).

Though the Order seems to be in violation of the Constitution at the time, the Supreme Court upheld it because of "military necessity." "There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some [Japanese Americans], the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot - by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight - now say that at that time these actions were unjustified," stated Justice Hugo Black on December 18, 1944 (quoted in Irons, 1989: 83).

The War Department oversaw the removal of people of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast based upon wartime military necessity. Shortly after the passage of Executive Order 9066, General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation 1, which created Military Areas 1 and 2. Military Area 1 covered the western portion of Washington, Oregon, California, and the southern half of Arizona. Military Area 2 consisted of portions of all those states that were not in Area 1. In these areas, all enemy aliens included Japanese, German, and Italian aliens as well as American citizens of Japanese decent. The government moved to take full control of an evacuation and relocation program. The Wartime Civil Control Authority (WCCA) was created as a part of the Western Defense Command to oversee the evacuation and relocation program. From the very beginning, the evacuation and relation program was orchestrated by the military to justify their need for national security. Although all enemy aliens were said to be suspect, it was the Japanese, both alien and citizen, who were singled out for removal (Ng, 2002: 21-22).

Among the Japanese American community, DeWitt's announcement was met with disbelief. The orders were seen as a betrayal and a violation of rights, particularly by the Nisei, second generation Japanese Americans. They had been model citizens and had given the government no reason to believe that they would take part in sabotage or undercover activities, the injustice of the situation infuriating. Saburo Kido, the president of the JACL, stated, "Never in the thousands of years of human history has a group of citizens been branded on so wholesale a scale as being treacherous to the land in which they live. We question the motives and patriotism of men and leaders who intentionally fan racial animosity and hatred" (quoted in Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 27).

Veterans of World War I, such as Joe Kurihara, were especially outraged since they had already proven their loyalty by fighting for their country. "Having had absolute confidence in Democracy, I could not believe my very eyes...America, the standard bearer of Democracy, had committed the most heinous crime in its history." And when Secretary of War Stimson made an attempt to justify Roosevelt's actions by citing not only military necessity but also concerns for the safety of the Japanese American community, many Nisei scoffed. "The government could have easily declared Martial Law to protect us," Kurihara pointed out (quoted in Yancey, 2001: 35).

Despite their outrage, few Japanese Americans actively resisted. Although some protested, signed petitions, and attended meetings, these groups were not well organized and had little power to resist a presidential decree.

By June 1942 residents were being transferred into permanent WRA relocation centers throughout the West. Everyone was relieved to find that these camps were not brutal concentration camps like those established by the Nazis in Europe, but they were prisons nevertheless - stark, restrictive, and uncomfortable. Living conditions were generally better in the camps than in the assembly centers. Buildings were new, and there were more space on the grounds so residents could get away from their ever-present neighbors. Nevertheless, conditions were still difficult and frustrating. Bathrooms, laundries, and dining halls were communal. Barracks were hot in summer and cold in winter. Space was at a premium; most apartments were about twenty feet by twenty feet square. Each was heated by a small oil-burning stove, and none had running water. The only furniture provided was a bed and two blankets per person. Residents were shown a pile of straw and had to stuff their own mattress ticking before they could sleep. Residents were used to such challenges by now, however. As one WRA report stated, "The great majority of center residents were psychologically bruised, badly puzzled and frequently apathetic group of people. But during their stay at the centers they...tried to achieve some semblance of order and dignity in their broken lives" (quoted in Yancey, 2001:50-51).

Although negative attitudes remained, a greater number of people worked for increased tolerance and acceptance. Two of the most influential men to speak out on behalf of Japanese Americans were Dillon Myer and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. In March 1943 Mayer wrote to Secretary of War Stimson recommending that the order that kept the Japanese off the West Coast be relaxed. "After many