Justice Vs Charity

Justice versus Charity

Generally speaking there is a moral distinction between an act and an omission. In dealing with euthanasia, it is rational to think that the active euthanasia is further morally wrong than passive euthanasia. One would never be able to create a morally absolute rule that could address all life and death situations. Conversely, what if it is in one's most immediate interest to be relieved of their life, but they choose not to do so? Finally, how is one supposed to know whether a person wishes to live or die if that person can't communicate that thought? Using the ideals of morality and modern ethical questions, certain struggles in the field of euthanasia arise: active versus passive euthanasia, and the questions of how to deal with involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia. Rachels sets out to contend that we are only able to answer these questions if we analyze the importance of two major factors concerning life: justice and charity.

The moral distinction between an act and an omission becomes somewhat fuzzy when the intent of the person performing the act or omission is benevolent. Rachels uses the example that a man has terminal cancer and is suffering; his treatment will not cure him nor alleviate his pain. If the medication continued it would prolong the patient's life minimally. So the patient chooses to have his treatment withheld so he may die more quickly. We understand that this is passive euthanasia by withholding helping matters. What doctor's use to justify this passive euthanasia is that extending the life prolongs pain where the patient will die inevitably. When a family member would view this situation, he would find that compared to active euthanasia, passive euthanasia prolongs the suffering of the patient. Rachels proves that active euthanasia is not justified through this example, but does prove it is morally preferable.

The objection to this claim is that when you passively euthanize somebody you are not killing the person, but when you actively euthanize somebody, you are killing the person and this is more wrong than letting somebody die. There is little, if any, intrinsic moral distinction between an act and an omission when the intent of the person performing the act or omission is evil. Let us use the following example just for understanding moral grounds. In one instance, a man pushes a woman into a river and kills her and in another instance, the man knows that the woman is going to be pushed into the river and chooses not to do anything to prevent the death when he easily can. In one case he accomplished having the woman killed through an act. In the other case he accomplished having the woman killed through an omission. Only in a court of law would a distinction be made and that distinction would be a matter of the quantity of years behind bars. Thus, there is no intrinsic moral difference between the act of killing and the act of omitting.

In cases of voluntary euthanasia, if it can be determined that the person dying genuinely wishes to die, then moral distinctions are blurred. It would not be objectionable if you acted (give an overdosing injection) or omitted (with held life sustaining medicine) so long as the person dying experienced no pain or suffering up until his death. Furthermore, justice does not condemn this type of euthanasia. Rationally, however, if the situation allowed, most people would prefer an omission, i.e., passive euthanasia to bring about the result of death. This is the basis for which the American Medical Association believes in passive euthanasia, because of their rationality. As we learned earlier, if passive euthanasia is acceptable at times, we must accept that active euthanasia is allowable at times as well.

In matters of involuntary euthanasia and non-voluntary euthanasia moral distinctions between an act and an omission are still gray. Before you can discuss the moral distinctions of an act or an omission as they apply to involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, one must first determine if one has the moral right to end that person in question's life. These situations bring to light the concepts of justice and charity whereby, with the exception of extreme cases, justice will outweigh charity. If a person, though suffering mightily, does not waive his right to life then justice holds that killing them through an act or omission would infringe that right even though charity begs us to do so.

With involuntary euthanasia the situation involves a person who suffers terribly, but does not want to die. Again, justice says we must not interfere through an act or omission with that person's right to life even if our motive would be charitable. However, as in the rare situation illustrated by Foot's example of the soldier being left to die, but for whatever reason does not want to be euthanized by his own men to prevent the enemy from finishing him off in a tortuous manner; charity does not oblige us to do anything for the soldier to allow him to sustain his life any longer.

The non-voluntary euthanasia deals with cases in which the patient is suffering a great deal but is incapable of expressing their pain for whatever reason. Assuming also that there is no hope for improvement, killing this