Kal 801

Flight Synopsis

Flight KAL 801 was scheduled to fly from Kimpo Airport in Seoul, Korea to A.B. Won Guam International Airport in Agana, Guam. The flight crew had met earlier to discuss the flight release, weather conditions and fill out all necessary paperwork. And on August 6th, 1997 at 9:27 PM the Boeing 747-300 departed Kimpo Airport for a three hour and fifty minute trip to Guam. The flight crew consisted of a captain, first officer and a flight engineer.

The captain had several flight hours as a pilot in the Korea Air Force until Korean Air hired him in 1987. Not only did he have many hours flying a 747, he received a flight safety award from the company president, three months prior to the crash. He also earned two excellent evaluations in the simulator proficiency checks and passed the company's mandatory Level three English test. In addition, the captain along with his first officer watched a video presentation based on the familiarization of the Guam Airport and studied approach charts several hours before the accident. (Krause, 2003)

The first officer had also served in the Korean Air Force before joining the ranks with Korean Air in 1994. Although he was only two years younger than the captain, he had a high number of flight hours as a 747 first officer. However, his performances in the simulator evaluations were slightly above average. One instructor noted that his "altitude management on nonprecision approach was somewhat less than desirable" and adding that he was "somewhat slow to carry out directions" (Krause, 2003)

The flight engineer was also a very distinguished pilot and was hired by KAL in 1979. Similar to the captain, he earned excellent ratings in his evaluations of crew management and simulator tests, and also passed the English proficiency exams. (Krause, 2003)

"...a weak low pressure trough is moving slowly [through] the Mariana Islands...resulting in gentle to moderate easterly winds and scattered showers. The effects of the upper level low far to the northeast have diminished during the past 12 hours or so. Light to moderate showers should be expected except for isolated afternoon thunderstorms due to solar heating", this was the weather report provided by the Guam Weather Station. However, at around 0122, the crew received a message via the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS), "...wind calm, visibility seven [clouds] one thousand six hundred scattered, two thousand five hundred scattered, temperature two seven [Celsius], dew point two four, altimeter niner eight six, runway six in use. NOTAMs [Notices to Airmen], runway six left ILS glideslope out of service until further notice...[emphasis added]." (Krause, 2003)

Accordingly noted by the received message, the glideslope for runway 6L was out of service, therefore a step-down approach had to be initiated. However, a discussion brewed about the working status of the mentioned glideslope. "Is the glideslope working? Glideslope? Yeah?" the flight engineer asked after seeing some movement by the glideslope needles. (Walters & Sumwalt III, 2000) This continued for several minutes among the crew until it was finally addressed as incorrect. The decent continued in the heavy rain as the captain positioned himself for the nonprecision approach. The plane kept on falling and at five hundred feet the Ground Proximity Warning System alerted the crew of their present position. The flight engineer replied with an astonished, "Eh?!" (Walters & Sumwalt III, 2000) The next remaining feet say the crew struggle to take affirmative actions thus, failing to execute a missed approach and slamming into Nimitz Hill, only three miles from the runway.

KAL 801 during rescue effort for survivors

SHELL Model

The SHELL model can be represented in five distinct ways. The interactions between Liveware-Liveware, Liveware-Environment, Liveware-Hardware and, Liveware-Software. These elements have to be smoothly synchronized in order to have a successful and safe flight, and any deviations from the standard norms may result in a crash or disaster.

For example, the interface between Liveware (flight crew) and the Environment of KAL 801 had several conflicting elements. Firstly, when the term Environment is used, it not only defines the physical external conditions, but also refers to the internal conditions of the cockpit, nature or economics of the organization (Korean Airlines) and also, Air Traffic Control (ATC).

The crew was expecting some rain showers along their flight path to the airport in Guam, as advertised before and during the flight. However, although they anticipated the disruptive weather, they could not have predicted that there would be little visibility while vectoring towards runway 6L. As a result, the investigators for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) confirmed that these heavy patches of rainfall might have played a significant role in the crash against the hillside.

In addition to the bad weather, the captain complained to his crew about their hectic flight schedule. "If this round trip is more than a nine-hour trip, we might get a little something...they [KAL] work us to maximum, up to maximum...Probably this way. Hotel expenses will be saved for cabin crews, and they maximize the flight hours. Anyway, they make us [B-747] classic guys work to maximum." (Walters & Sumwalt III, 2000) This disgruntled attitude coupled with the fact that he was somewhat fatigued surely had a negative impact while trying to maneuver the plane in low visibility weather.

Air Traffic Control also had some contributing factors towards the crash. They failed to relay important positional information to the crew while on the approach path and the tower did not inform the captain that he was "not in sight" when cleared to land. (Walters & Sumwalt III, 2000) Although viewed as minor errors by NTSB investigators, these "slips" by ATC had an impact on the landing of the plane and may have been the result of a fatigued tower employee, which possibly stemmed from the lack of efficient communication or, poor training of dispatchers.

The Liveware-Software relation also had discrepancies with negative impacts on the flight. Firstly, unlike the Airbus cockpit, Boeing aircraft

are not equipped with displayed checklists but the flight crew fills them out via paper binders. (Sexton, 1988) This leaves another window for human error, since these