Locke and the Rights of Children

Locke firmly denies Filmer's theory that it is morally

permissible for parents to treat their children however they please:

"They who allege the Practice of Mankind, for exposing or selling

their Children, as a Proof of their Power over them, are with Sir Rob.

happy Arguers, and cannot but recommend their Opinion by founding it

on the most shameful Action, and most unnatural Murder, humane Nature

is capable of." (First Treatise, sec.56) Rather, Locke argues that

children have the same moral rights as any other person, though the

child's inadequate mental faculties make it permissible for his

parents to rule over him to a limited degree. "Thus we are born Free,

as we are born Rational; not that we have actually the Exercise of

either: Age that brings one, brings with it the other too." (Second

Treatise, sec.61) On top of this, he affirms a postive,

non-contractual duty of parents to provide for their offspring: "But

to supply the Defects of this imperfect State, till the Improvement of

Growth and Age hath removed them, Adam and Eve, and after them all

Parents were, by the Law of Nature, under an obligation to preserve,

nourish, and educate the Children, they had begotten." (Second

Treatise, sec.56) Apparently, then, Locke believes that parents may

overrule bad choices that their children might make, including

self-regarding actions. Leaving aside Locke's duty of self-

preservation, his theory permits adults to do as they wish with their

own bodies. But this is not the case for children, because their lack

of reason prevents them from making sensible choices. To permit a

willful child from taking serious risks to his health or safety even

if he wants to is permissible on this theory. Parents (and other

adults as well) also seem to have a duty to refrain from taking

advantage of the child's weak rational faculties to exploit or abuse

him. On top of this, Locke affirms that parents have enforceable

obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate their children; not

because they consented to do so, but because they have a natural duty

to do so. 2. The Problem of Positive Parental Duties The first

difficulty with Locke's theory of childrens' rights is that the

positive duty of parents to raise their children seems inconsistent

with his overall approach. If, as Locke tells us, "Reason teaches all

mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and

independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health,

Liberty, or Possessions." (Second Treatise, sec.6), it is difficult to

see why it is permissible to coerce parents to provide for their

offspring. In general, in Locke's scheme one acquires additional

obligations only by consent. Even marriage he assimilates into a

contract model: "Conjugal Society is made by a voluntary Compact

between Man and Woman " (Second Treatise, sec.78) We should note that

in section 42 of the First Treatise, Locke affirms that the radically

destitute have a positive right to charity. "As Justice gives every

Man a Title to the product of his honest industry so Charity gives

every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him

from extream want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise." But

this hardly rules out relying on voluntary charity if it is sufficient

to care for all those in "extream want." Quite possibly, this right

would never have a chance to be exercised in a reasonably prosperous

society, since need would be minimal and voluntary help abundant.

Moreover, it is hardly clear that the duty to provide for the

extremely needy rests only on some sub- group of the population. This

passage seems to make it a universal duty of all of society's

better-off members. For these two reasons, then, it would seem hard to

ground positive parental duties on the child's right to charity. For

if the number of children with unwilling parents is sufficiently tiny,

and the society in which they are born sufficiently rich, the

preconditions for exercising the right do not exist. Moreover, there

is no reason for parents, much less the parents of a particular child,

to have a duty to that child; more plausibly, all able-bodied members

of society are equally obliged to fulfill this duty. Nor would it work

to say that parental obligation is derived from the right of

restitution for harm, which Locke explains a criminal owes to his

victim: "he who hath received