Locke

atures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body had any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.

* * *

Sec. 39. And thus, without supposing any private Dominion, and property in Adam, over all the World, exclusive of other Men, which can no way be proved, nor any ones Property be made out [i.e., traced in lines of inheritance and descent] from it [Locke spent all of the First Treatise refuting such a claim made by Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha]; but supposing the World given as it was to the Children of Men in common, we see how labour could make Men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for their private uses; wherein there could be no doubt of Right, no room for quarrel.

Sec. 40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may ap