Mead: The I and The Me

Ð'ÐŽÐ'§Mead was to claim that Ð'ÐŽÐ'Ґhuman behaviour could not be reduced to biological or physiological statesÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦. Evaluate this claim with reference to MeadÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦s concepts of the Ð'ÐŽÐ'ҐIÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦ and the Ð'ÐŽÐ'ҐmeÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦.Ð'ÐŽÐ'Ё

This essay aims to evaluate the claim made by George Herbert Mead, that Ð'ÐŽÐ'Ґhuman behaviour could not be reduced to biological or physiological states. I will make this evaluation using meadÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦s concepts of the Ð'ÐŽÐ'ҐÐ'ÐŽÐ'ҐIÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦Ð'ÐŽÐ'¦ and the Ð'ÐŽÐ'ҐÐ'ÐŽÐ'ҐmeÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦Ð'ÐŽÐ'¦. I will begin the essay by writing an overview of Meads works, citing the influences of his sociology, moving on to explicitly denote his notion of Ð'ÐŽÐ'§social behaviourismÐ'ÐŽÐ'Ё and the emphasis of the self and the mind within his works.

George Herbert Mead (1863 Ð'ÐŽV 1931), a pragmatist philosopher, sociologist and social psychologist, steeped in the Chicago school of sociology, with his influence today recognised as Ð'ÐŽÐ'§symbolic interactionismÐ'ÐŽÐ'Ё. Mead called his approach "social behaviourism." Drawing on Dewey and Charles Cooley, Mead stressed "the conscious mind and the self-awareness and self-regulation of social actors" (i.e., the individual who performs an action). Mead saw the Self as emerging from the social interaction of humans in which the individual takes on the role of the "other" and internalises the attitudes he perceives in both real and imagined others. The interaction of an individualÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦s self-conception ("I") and the generalized, perceived view that others have of the individual ("Me") is central to MeadÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦s sociological viewpoint. Mead asserted that by continually "reflecting on ourselves as others see us we become competent in the production and display of social symbols" (Jary, 1996, P402). Mead also believed that, while human nature is part of evolution and nature, the "importance of language and symbolic communication as an aspect of this evolution is such as to free human action from natural determinismÐ'ÐŽÐ'Ё .

Taking a step back now I will look explicitly at Meads concept of the Ð'ÐŽÐ'§IÐ'ÐŽÐ'Ё and the Ð'ÐŽÐ'§meÐ'ÐŽÐ'Ё. Mead drew greatly upon CooleyÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦s idea of a Ð'ÐŽÐ'ҐÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦looking glass selfÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦Ð'ÐŽÐ'¦, in his explanation of how a Ð'ÐŽÐ'ҐÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦selfÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦Ð'ÐŽÐ'¦ emerges through social interactions of the actor, in as mead put it taking the role of the other, which combines the attitudes of real and imagined others (Jary, 1996, P402). Mead stated that the Ð'ÐŽÐ'ҐÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦IÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦Ð'ÐŽÐ'¦ as in myself as I am, is continually involved in interaction with the Ð'ÐŽÐ'ҐÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦meÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦Ð'ÐŽÐ'¦, myself as others see me. Mead tried to clarify his views of the social foundation of the self and his concomitant belief that "the self does not consist simply in the bare organization of social attitudes," by introducing the distinction between the "I" and the "me." Both "I" and "me" necessarily relate to social experience. But the "I" is "the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the "me" is the organized set of attitudes of others which one assumes. The attitudes of the others constitute the organized 'me,' and then one reacts toward that as an 'I'." As a "me" the person is aware of himself as an object. He reacts or responds to himself in terms of the attitudes others have toward him. His self- appraisal is the result of what he assumes to be the appraisal by others. The "me" is the self as conceived and apprehended in terms of the point of view of significant others and of the community at large. It reflects the laws and the mores, the organized codes and expectations of the community. The "I," in contradistinction, is "the answer which the individual makes to the attitude which others take toward him when he assumes an attitude toward them, it gives the sense of freedom, of initiative." What appears in consciousness is always the self as an object, as a "me," but the "me" is not conceivable without an "I" as a unique subject for which the "me" can be an object. The "I" and the "me" are not identical, for the "I" "is something that is never entirely calculable, it is always something different from what the situation itself calls for" (Jary, 1996, P672 and 584) .

From this account of MeadÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦s Ð'ÐŽÐ'ҐÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦IÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦Ð'ÐŽÐ'¦ and Ð'ÐŽÐ'ҐÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦MeÐ'ÐŽÐ'¦Ð'ÐŽÐ'¦, we can see a distinct shift from notions of psychological behaviourism, who advocate a great deal of emphasis of the innate nature of the individual, supporting the natural, biological and physiological. As with all symbolic interactionist sociology, emphasis is placed upon the social interactions actors have with each other, explained as Ð'ÐŽÐ'§human beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings that things have for themÐ'ÐŽKthese meanings arise out of social interactionÐ'ÐŽÐ'Ё (Jary, 1996, P672). To Mead, without symbols