Methodist, Particularist, Skeptic

There are three arguments. That there can be no knowledge without method and no method without truth, and that all is circular and you can never know either.

The particularist would argue that there is NO possible way of having knowledge of a METHOD, itself, without first defining a pure knowledge, since the idea of method would be a derivative of a first, pure, knowledge. In other words, the idea of "method" isn't possible without an idea of knowledge. An example would be a table. I know this table is real, so, therefore, I have a method of knowing that this desk next to it, is real.

A Methodist would say that you cannot establish any kind of knowledge without first establishing a sound method of "knowing" that knowledge to be true. In other words, any idea of knowledge is not possible without first acquiring a pure "method" of truth gathering. An example would be a table again. I knock on the table. This is a method to decide whether this is a table or not. This verifies that the table is real. Therefore, I have a method to decide whether or not the table is real and then I have the knowledge that the table is real.

Both of these responses to the skeptical argument of the circular problem of criterion are flawed. The skeptical dilemma arises from the two positions, in the first place.

The skeptic realizes that both are still circular. Neither has made a reasonable and sound argument. Therefore, it assumes that neither are correct and that you just cannot know. In each of the examples there is a presupposition. In the particularist view, the supposition is that the table is real, it just is. In the Methodist view, senses lead to the belief that the table is real. But are either of these really true? This is where the skeptic comes into play. The skeptic view is that both of these examples have a presupposition which means that you have to believe in something without really knowing if it is true. A skeptic argues that both views, particularist and Methodist, are making assumptions. Therefore, you can never really know.

But what is it that makes the skeptic know that they are making an assumption? In other words, the skeptic is making a presupposition too. That the other views are making an assumption. A skeptic makes the assumption that both views are circular. On what authority does the skeptic claim that circular reasoning is wrong? In the end the skeptic becomes a particularist. The skeptic doesn't do anything different than the particularist and Methodist. All are making assumptions. A skeptic is only pointing out that the other two are making an assumption. He cannot say that they're wrong because he's making an assumption that circular reasoning is wrong. A skeptic only knows it's wrong if he has a method or knowledge of what's wrong.

One possible objection that IS feasible, is the idea that the terms "knowledge and method" are synonymous or equivocal.

In other words, the circularity of the two terms happens because the two terms are really a part of a congealment. The two terms, knowledge and method, are the same terms. Tearing them apart from each