Political Reform

It was predicted that economic liberalization is the first step towards political reform and hence to democratization. The fact that all the rich countries in the world are somehow democratic is to be taken as evidence to the validity of this predicament. The process works as follows: economic growth leads to urbanization and improvements in technology and infrastructure. These improvements facilitate communication and recruitment by new political groups. Growth also tends to lead to increased investment in education, which benefits the opposition by producing intellectual and sophisticated individuals from which it can recruit supporters. To remain secure, autocrats must raise the costs of political coordination among the opposition without also raising the costs of economic coordination too dramatically; since this could hinder economic growth and threaten the stability of the regime itself. The question is how autocrats managed to weaken the link between economic development and the path to political reform.

Oppressive regimes have discovered that they can suppress opposition activity without totally undermining economic growth by carefully rationing a particular subset to public goods, goods that are critical to political coordination but less important to economic cooperation. By restricting these goods, autocrats have insulated themselves from the political liberalization that economic growth promotes. Some of these restrictions could be internet-related activities, banning books on certain issues, altering facts in history curriculum books in schools and controlling the media coverage.

Historically, oppressive governments, seeking to banish those pushing for democratic change, have suppressed the provision of public goods, undermining their economies in the process. This was the dominant pattern in Asia and Africa until the 1980s, and it remains the case in many of the developing states in these two continents. Recently however, governments have discovered that by focusing their restrictions on coordination goods only, they can continue to provide those other services necessary for economic progress while minimizing the pressure for political change that such progress typically promotes.

Without a doubt, the availability of most public goods has at least some impact on the ability of opposition groups to organize and coordinate. But four types of goods play a fundamental role in such activities. These include political rights, more general human rights, press freedom, and accessible higher education.

Political rights include the right to vote and the rights to organize and demonstrate peacefully. And although political rights limit the state intervention rather than require state action, they do need the government to initiate some vital steps to enforce them, especially when they involve minority groups voicing opinions that are unpopular with the majority. As for more general human rights, these include freedom from arbitrary arrest and the related protection of the nondiscrimination based on religion, race, ethnicity and sex. A diverse and largely unregulated press and other forms of media is also vital to effective political opposition, since it enables the dissemination of information that can bring diverse groups together among common interests. Like political rights, the right to a free press is a largely negative one, since it generally requires the government not to interfere. It also requires affirmative steps however, such as granting licenses to radio and television frequencies, guaranteeing public access their id those and other media, and translating official documents into regional languages. Finally, access to higher education and training is essential if people hope to develop the skills to associate and develop a political presence. Advanced education also helps the creation of a large number of potential opposition leaders, thereby increasing the supply of rivals to the incumbent government.

The Middle East, a place that once was so progressive, alive and exotic, now has deteriorated. When the people thought that toppling the Ottoman Empire would bring redemption to this region, they were wrong... it was the very beginning of the crisis. The time when the Arabs began to search for their identity, or force themselves to fall under the slogans of Arab Nationalism and Islam was when they forgot about their growth, and evolution.

One cannot be ambiguous and say that there is a sort of consistency in the Arab politial progress. There is an ever-changing trend of policy mixes; at one point democratic practices and reform initiatives would be witnessed but for the most part, tyranny and arbitration would take part in the Arabs every day life. To apply all this to Sudanese politics, the first step is to ask: why Sudan has the capability to feed over a hundred million people, yet there are famine and malnutrition cases. Sudan is not just a regular tribal country, it holds within its borders over six hundred tribes. It is easy to talk about two different Sudans, the North which looks towards the Middle East and the South which looks towards Africa. The general reason behind the deterioration in Sudan, and like everywhere else in the Middle East, is the search for identity. In a specific view on Sudan, one would find factors like slavery, ethnicity, and the arabization and islamization of non Arabs and non-Muslims especially in the south. In some countries the governmental approaches vary from a regime to another for example, Sudan under Sadiq al Mahdi was a functioning parliamentary democracy, although it suffered from more than its share of inconsistencies, such as the appointment of leaders based on religious sects and a low national literacy rate. This democracy was also more chaotic than reputable Western European systems on which it was supposedly imitating. Nevertheless, Sudan enjoyed the most authentic, vibrant democracy in existence at the time (1986-9) in the region. Free and honest elections in 1986 had brought about a ruling coalition of parties supported by a high majority of the electorate. This shows the difference between Sudan in 1986 and the decline in the progress of Sudan today. Neither the Sadiq democracy nor the 1989 Revolution of National Salvation came out with a positive result. The Sadiq democracy was a rerun of two former failed democratic periods, just like Omar al Bashir's coup portrayed itself as saving Sudan from the incompetent, corrupt politicians. Another problem is in Sudan's enduring poverty and its rich undeveloped resources in agriculture, animal herds, petroleum and other minerals. It had very few roads; people were vulnerable to popular rage over shortages. Necessities like bread, sugar and other essentials were in short supply. Petroleum was sometimes unavailable; cars formed very long lines at