Religion and History

Caroline Rogers

Contemporary Civilization

Professor Kitcher

May 9, 2000

Religion and History

Sigmund Freud and Friedrich Nietzsche both develop the idea that history is important to the understanding of human nature through their examinations of modern civilization and religion’s fundamental role in it. Though the term “history” is somewhat vague with many possible connotations, Freud and Nietzsche both attempt to discuss the notion as it applies to their conceptions of present-day society. Nietzsche feels very strongly about the fact that opinions are simply individual perspectives; this immediately foreshadows the great ambiguity in his work, The Genealogy of Morals. He thoroughly examines the development of mankind throughout history and seems to believe that it plays an important part in understanding people as they exist today вЂ" especially in the realm of religion. For Nietzsche, civilization’s downfalls appear to be largely due to the dissolution of mankind’s ability to act according to his natural characteristics and instincts. “This instinct for freedom forcibly made latent вЂ" we have seen it already вЂ" this instinct for freedom pushed back and repressed, incarcerated within and finally able to discharge and vent itself only on itself: that, and that alone, is what the bad conscience is in its beginnings.” (523) These restrictions were primarily upheld by religious forces.

Freud spends the majority of his writings exploring mankind’s natural or original state and how the creation of modern society has limited people from being able to express their inherent desires and wishes, which has resulted in the unfortunate discontents he feels people now have with civilization. Like Nietzsche, Freud feels that an in-depth examination of mankind’s history is capable of revealing why people act as they do in modern society and what purpose religion has in determining their behavior. Though both thinkers held a great many ideas in common, it is much more difficult to accurately pinpoint Nietzsche’s exact sentiments. What is clear, however, is that both men agree that one of religion’s most primary roles is to give mankind a reason for its existence in an era when people are constantly questioning the purpose of everything they encounter, especially themselves.

Nietzsche holds that people are inclined to be cruel due to their destructive and violent tendencies. “To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more: this is a hard saying but an ancient, mighty, human, all-too-human principle.” (503) He explores the idea that throughout the pre-history of mankind, which I understand to be prior to civilization, when one person caused harm to someone else they were more than likely to be punished by the offended party. However, the difference between those times and now is that people did not think of their punishing at that time as something that involved moral notions. The concept of “guilt” was not yet a part of their schemas. Once society was established, people were still inclined to incur punishment and experienced great joy out of watching others suffer. Society brought with it the notion of promise-making and keeping, which, according to Nietzsche, was largely responsible for the formation of memory as well as “the moral conceptual world of “guilt,” “conscience,” “duty,” “sacredness of duty.” (501) People needed to be able to remember their various promises in order to keep them. It was established soon after that pain was the only way to ensure that people did not forget what they needed to remember. Therefore, if one did not remember a promise, they were subject to being punished, which would aid them in remembering things the next time. He says that “the actual effect of punishment must beyond question be sought above all in a heightening of prudence, in an extending of the memory, in a will henceforth to go to work more cautiously, mistrustfully, secretly.” (519) This correlation between punishment and memory later developed into the notion of a “bad conscience” because mankind was not able to act according to his cruel instincts. “Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction вЂ" all this turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the “bad conscience.” (521) He became a “sick animal” as his destructive instincts were forced inward on himself.

Nietzsche examines the role of the Greek and other ancient gods and sees that these gods were held largely responsible for anything considered remotely evil. Nietzsche says “these Greeks used their gods precisely so as to ward off the “bad conscience,” so as to be able to rejoice in their freedom of soul вЂ" the very opposite of the use to which Christianity put its God.” (530) He seems to think that people had not yet curbed their destructive tendencies, but that society had already started to impose certain morals into the fabric of people’s lives, which caused them to seek out a means of justification for their actions.

The development of Christendom, however, brought about numerous changes. Out of the original promise-making habits of debtors and creditors developed an insatiable feeling of indebtedness to their ancestral gods and “the advent of the Christian God, as the maximum god attained so far, was therefore accompanied by the maximum feeling of guilty indebtedness on earth.” (526) He says that God is the source of ultimate punishment. Nietzsche appears to say that the instincts mankind has to be cruel and inflict punishment had to be conquered because they were not acceptable in a society that said these things were immoral. After years and years of being forced to withhold his animal instincts from surfacing in public mankind has now associated “God” with the complete opposite of these tendencies. Therefore, mankind “has seized upon the presupposition of religion so as to drive his self-torture to its most gruesome pitch of severity and rigor. He apprehends in “God” the ultimate antithesis of his own ineluctable animal instincts; he reinterprets these animal instincts themselves as a form of guilt