Steroids

Twenty years ago, when I was a competing professional athlete, I spoke publicly of the frustration of feeling pressured to use anabolic steroids. I felt pressured to compete in an environment where I and many others believed there was an unbridled problem. I mentioned the prevalence of use in adolescents and commented on the training advantage using these drugs gave competitors. At that time, NFL management denied the extent of the problem and little was done. The NFL, to its credit, in 1987 started its non-punitive testing program and proclaimed it was considering random testing.

In 1988, in a Sports Illustrated commentary, I predicted the failure of random testing, citing obvious loopholes, and questioned the overall concern of the fans. I solicited the ire of some in the sports media when I suggested medical supervision as an alternative to faulty drug testing. However, you can't monitor a drug problem medically that society wants to pretend doesn't exist.

Another issue I wanted to bring forward was urging people to keep the health effects of these drugs in perspective, as well as the sports world's tendency to define this as primarily a public relations issue. I still wonder why some of the reporting of my situation either ignored or minimized some of my known lifestyle heart risk factors (alcohol abuse, for example) in preference to highlighting steroids. Happily, the severity of my health issues and my former addictions are a thing of the past.

In the wake of the BALCO scandal and the revelations in Major League Baseball, do any of these issues ring familiar? None of the BALCO athletes (clients of the Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative) have ever flunked a drug test. Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig is citing drops in numbers of positive tests in "announced" testing as reasons for optimism.

After 20 years of researching this issue, I have earned my pessimism. Has he earned his optimism?

For those paying attention at all, the BALCO investigation has reinforced the reality that athletes are using undetectable drugs. Perhaps the optimism in testing is because there is no plan B and Selig is tired of the drug allegations.

In 1989, the NFL initiated random testing. This was a smart move for two reasons. First, it showed media and the public that they implemented the strongest policy that technology and the law would allow.

Second, it was prior to impending legislation (the 1990 Steroid Anti-Trafficking Act) that re-classified anabolic steroids under Schedule III of the Controlled Substance Act. This law made using anabolic steroids for anything other than their legitimate medical uses a violation of the law.

Where Major League Baseball made its major error was that its steroid situation surfaced after the changing of the law. To add insult to injury, because of both financial resurgence and a strong union, its leaders dragged their feet in instituting public relations drug testing.

But I really don't believe that baseball's drug problem is any more severe than the other major sports -- just under more scrutiny.

With my 1991 book "False Glory: Steelers and Steroids," I attempted to show that the performance-enhancing drug situation in sports was as institutional as it was individual. I was only partially