The Desire Satisfaction Theory of Wellbeing Is Implausible.

The desire satisfaction theory is one of the leading theories of wellbeing. I will briefly outline the desire satisfaction theory, referred to as desire satisfactionism, and explain why it might appear more attractive than other competing theories. I will then outline several objections and the responses to these objections. I will argue that the theory is not plausible, as even fully informed and rational people can desire things which will not make their life go well for them, and things other than the satisfaction of our desires contribute to our wellbeing.

The purpose of a theory of wellbeing is to give an explanation of what contributes to the best possible life for the person who lives it, or what is intrinsically valuable for a person in their lifetime. The desire satisfaction theory claims that ‘what is good in itself for people… is their getting what they want, or the fulfilment of their desires, and what is bad in itself for them is their not getting what they want, or the frustration of their desires' (Heathwood, 2015. p 135). The main contending theories are hedonism and objective list theories. Hedonism claims that what makes a life go well for the person who lives it is the highest balance of pleasure over pain, and objective list theories offer lists of objective goods which make a life go well for the person who lives it, such as achievement and knowledge. Desire satisfactionism is a subjective theory, based on attitudes towards a state of affairs in the world. As a result of the combination of mental states as well as states of the world, desire satisfactionism avoids the implications of Nozick’s experience machine, which is troublesome for hedonism as a mental-state theory.

One appealing feature of the theory is its appeal to internalism about wellbeing, the notion that what makes a life go well for the person who lives it is in some way connected to the things they find attractive (Railton, 1986 p. 9). This allows for the notion that certain states of affairs are good for the lives of some people but not good for others, but there might be certain states of affairs which are valuable for everyone. Because the theory allows for the notion that there are certain goods that are valuable to all without limiting or prescribing certain goods at the cost of personal autonomy, desire satisfactionism is more appealing to modern liberal thinkers than objective list theories.

However, some of our desires might be harmful to ourselves. For example, a heroin addict may desire to take heroin. Most people would be inclined to state that the satisfaction of this desire will not make their life go well for them, suggesting a flaw within desire satisfaction. The desire satisfactionist could respond to this objection by explicating the requirement that the desire holder is informed and rational. The desire satisfactionist could argue that an informed and rational person would either eliminate this desire, or would have a stronger desire not to take heroin and to improve their life, and would choose to satisfy the latter desire instead.

The shift to the notion that wellbeing consists in the satisfaction of a desires a person would have if they were informed and rational could be interpreted as requiring too much of people, and lose its explanatory link to human behaviour as people are arguably not always informed and rational. However, rationality can be understood as consistency within desires and therefore rationality is not an unachievable requirement. The requirement that a person is informed only requires that a person is aware of the true nature of the state of affairs which they desire. This is to avoid the claim that the fulfilment of misinformed desires is good for a person. For example, a person might take a holiday to Iceland, expecting it to be full of ice and snow, and be disappointed with what they find. This addition means that desire satisfactionism is not logically committed to saying that going to Iceland is good for this person even though it is disappointing because their preconception was misinformed. Desire satisfactionism is thus able to respond to the above objections without requiring too much of people.

However, objections have been made against this stronger version of desire satisfactionism. Sumner offers a strong argument that the prospectivity and intentionality of desires is responsible for the inadequacy of desire satisfactionism as a theory of wellbeing. Sumner argues that desires are intentional in that they are ‘directed on objects whose existence they do not logically guarantee’ (1996, p.125). Because of the intentionality and prospectivity of desires, Sumner argues that there are two distinct types of desire of which do not make a life go well for the person who lives it. These are ‘desires whose objects prove disappointing in the actual experience of them and desires whose objects never enter our experience at all’ (Sumner, 1996 p.132).  

 Sumner (1996 p.129) gives the example of the latter type of desire; the desire for the recovery of an ill person with whom one later loses contact. Desire satisfaction theory seems committed to the implausible claim that the occurrence of a state of affairs in which the person recovers will be good for the person who desired their recovery, even if they are unaware that of their recovery. An even more problematic case of this is the posthumous fulfilment of desires. Many people wish for states of affairs which cannot happen in their lifetime, such as to be remembered fondly by their peers. Desire satisfaction theory seems committed to the claim that this posthumously makes an individual’s life go better, which is implausible. This problem is caused by the intentionality of desires.