The Failure of the League

The Failure of the League

The Failure of the League of Nations to keep the peace can be attributed to many things. Some of the fault lay in the Covenant's flawed articles, while some are the fault of the member states policies. This paper will outline some of the mistakes made and the events which happened because of those mistakes.

It is important to understand the way the League was formed as well as to understand the condition of the world at the time of its existence to fully understand the reasons for its failure. Below a brief history of the formation of the League will be presented.

The League was presented in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, which was presented to the Central Powers in the form of the Treaty of Versailles to end World War I in 1919. The League was created to keep the peace achieved after the end of the extremely bloody war. Hopes were high among the victorious Allied nations. Tragically, as will be shown later, after ushering in the formation of the League, the U.S. did not enter into it; the treaty was not approved by the senate.

The League was setup similarly to the United Nations. It was composed of two main parts, the Council and the Assembly. The Council would be composed of four permanent members; England, France, Italy, and Japan. All other member states would be included in the Assembly. Furthermore, a Secretariat was created to head the League.

The first and possibly the most crucial failure of the League was its lack of universality. The United States exclusion was a major setback to the League. Also, at least at the onset, Russia remained out. During the course of the League's existence many other nations would withdraw, but the most notable would be Japan, Italy, and Germany. However, some argue that even with universality, League may have still been doomed. "It is quite impossible for the United States, after its losses in the First World War and its disillusionment with the peace treaties, to send its forces all over the world in defence of those treaties."

The need for unanimity within the Council virtually crippled any action the League could have taken. Although the permanent members did not have veto power, the burden of unanimity would prove to be a constant barrier.

M. Beelaerts van Blokland of Holland, at the last League Assembly April 10, 1946, said in his speech "Ð'...I would mention as a defect in organization the exaggerated equality between great and small Powers." He believed that the Great Powers were not given a position or responsibility that corresponded with there dominance over the other member states. He added that this was not the fault of the Covenant, but rather the Assembly's adding of more new non-permanent members to the Council "Ð'...distorted that body and prevented it from playing the political part assigned to it by the Covenant."

In that same speech, he says another blow to the League was "Ð'... the lack of solidarity among its Members. Any international organization is bound to fail if it is not sustained by a common spirit, a common ideology and mutual confidence between the parties composing itÐ'.... We can only pray God that this may show itself in the new Organisation with much greater force than in the League."

"The League,Ð'..., had been designed as an investigative agency, which would probe into dangerous disputes and reveal the identity of the guilty party or partiesÐ'....The emphasis was on the separate member-state's responsibility rather than on collective action centrally directed." The assumption of the League was that once the guilty party was exposed, popular opinion in that said state would be enough to persuade the government to cease the criminal activity. This didn't suffice in cases with the amount of force and aggression of modern aggression.2

Finally, the League's inability to enforce its decisions encompasses many of the above mentioned problems. The League's only effective members were Britain and France, who between them differed much in policy. Britain wanted "Ð'...to use the League to revise the excesses of the peace treaties of 1919Ð'..." while France wanted to "Ð'...use it to defend and enforce them." Regardless, without the membership of all the nations, especially the United States, the League lacked any military strength. Coupled with a world depression, most countries were unwilling to commit troop and resources to defend positions that were not directly affecting their interests. This seems like a step back into the days of regional alliances, not collective defense. Furthermore the population of the status quo of the League were unwilling to fight, while the fascist populous seemed ready, "Ð'...in the inter-war period, young men in the fascist states marched and paraded their arms as though they could not wait to enter the battlefields, whereas, in democratic states, nothing was more chilling than suggestions of a return to the trenches."3

All the above mentioned failures in policy resulted in a steady decent into the next World War. With every flaw becoming more apparent, it emboldened nations hungry for territory to take it, while eroding the confidence of member states of the ability of the League to assure their safety. These are some of the events which occurred as a result.

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931 was the first step toward the League's death. The Japanese thoughts on Manchuria could be summarized as such, "Ð'...the frustration of Japanese demands of an increasing population and a rising standard of living; pride in the nation's military and naval power, its firm discipline and unequalled courage, together with the natural sentiment that these possessions meant nothing unless they were used; and the conviction, vague in its formulation but deeply rooted in the national mind, that Manchuria was foreordained to provide the solution of her problems and that no other solution could exist." The Japanese established a puppet state in Manchuria, called Manchukuo, on March 9, 1932, and by the 15th of September Japan recognized the new nation as independent of China. Although the League denounced the action as a violation of the Covenant, none of the Great Powers were willing to impose economic sanctions or military might. An official commission was sent to Manchuria, but nearly seven months after the incident, at this point it was far too late. This was a clear indication that the countries that could apply pressure to stop war were either unwilling or unable. Soon Japan was not only advancing on Peipin and occupying