The International Response

The International Response

The problem of conflict diamonds was first made public thanks to the efforts of several international NGOs, who bluntly denounced the links between the diamond trade and the wars in the African continent. NGOs played a major role in denouncing the trade of blood diamonds and ultimately demanding a response from those responsible. Notable about this campaign was its success in uniting unofficial diplomatic channels with a number of official as well as unofficial networks and connections to achieve its goal, thus employing what has been termed as 'multi-track diplomacy'(Grant & Taylor : 2004, 386).

The conflict diamonds campaign was, according to Global Witness, the combined efforts of multiple international NGOs with the purpose of ending the sale of 'diamonds that originate from areas under the control of forces that are in opposition to elected and internationally recognized governments, or are in any way connected to those groups (Grant & Taylor : 2004, 389). The campaign has been especially successful in consolidating the idea that purchasing conflict diamonds is a unacceptable practice. Similarly, it has contributed much to the awareness of western diamond consumers who rarely recognized it as an issue.

The British NGO Global Witness played a major role in the anti-blood diamonds trade campaign. Global Witness was in fact the first to publish, in 1998, A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict, a report that denounced the role that international diamond companies and governments played in purchasing illegal diamonds from Angola at a time when the Angolan rebel group UNITA, led by Savimbi, enjoyed a monopoly of the diamond exports produced by Angola, thus financing its military activity against the Angolan government (Grant & Taylor : 2004, 390). This was the first step towards making conflict diamonds a human rights issue, and demanding a response by those powerful enough to halt the trade of conflict diamonds.

As a response, in June of 1998, the United Nations put in practice Resolution 1173 with prohibited the direct or indirect export of unofficial (i.e. UNITA) diamonds from Angola (Taylor & Mokhawa: 2003, 267). Nevertheless, NGO investigation efforts made public the fact that Angolan illegal diamonds were still being traded through neighbouring countries, especially Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo-Brazzaville. This was made possible largely though corrupt practices and inadequate use of 'certificates of origin' (Taylor & Mokhawa: 2003,267). Thus, UN sanctions had little effect on stopping Angolan conflict-diamonds.

In 1999, a coalition of international NGOs entitled "Fatal Transactions", initiated a powerful awareness campaign which targeted the lack of commitment of the diamond industry in ensuring that it was not financing wars and military action in Africa through its indiscriminatory purchase of diamonds (Grant & Taylor : 2004, 390).

One of the major targets of this campaign was De Beers, perhaps the most important player in the international diamond trade industry (Grant & Taylor : 2004, 389). The coalition of NGOs was especially vocal in denouncing De Beer's collusion in purchasing conflict diamonds from Angola through its extensive network of purchasing offices regardless of the origins of the gems (Grant & Taylor : 2004, 390). It was incredibly successful in coming up with powerful slogans such as "the diamond trade is a lethal dinosaur with profit being placed before the lives of thousands of people'. The campaign was effective in staining the image of De Beers and ultimately 'motivating' it to take action concerning this issue. Pressured by the anti-conflict diamonds campaign and fearing a potential consumer backlash, De Beers finally announced on October 5 1999, that it would be not only closing its office in Angola, but also reviewing its operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea (Taylor & Mokhawa: 2003, 268). This was definitely a major accomplishment for 'Fatal Transactions'.

Amnesty International also joined in the campaign sometime later and put together a list of jewelers who supported the campaign, and consequently denouncing those who did not (Taylor & Mokhawa: 2003, 268). World Vision ran a similar campaign with the powerful slogan of 'Dying for a diamond? So are thousands of innocent children'. These were definitely consciousness-raising campaigns for the consumer in the West (Taylor & Mokhawa: 2003, 268).

In January 2000, Global Witness's report and the campaign by Fatal Transactions were given further relevance with publication of The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security by Partnership Africa Canada (Taylor & Mokhawa: 2003, 268).This report showed that the conflict diamond issue was not limited to Angola, but was in fact a problem that affected Africa as a whole. The combination of this report with NGO pressure and US congressional hearings on the issue ultimately led to what became known as the Kimberley Process.

The Kimberley Process

The Kimberley Process is perhaps the most important effort made by the international community to effectively address the issue of conflict diamonds. The Kimberley Process essentially refers to a series of intergovernmental meetings, the first being held in Kimberley (thus the name), South Africa. According to the United Nations, the Kimberley Process 'was established by Southern African diamond-producing countries in 2000 to stem the flow of rough diamonds used by rebels, which had financed armed conflict aimed at overthrowing legitimate governments (Press Release ?). It began with 35 participants and quickly developed to be a worldwide effort (Grant & Taylor: 2004, 392).

In 2002, at Interlaken in Switzerland, in one of these intergovernmental meetings, 54 governments, the European Union, the worldwide diamond industry and NGOs representing over 100 civil society groups adopted the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a set of politically-binding minimum standards to regulate the international trade with regards to rough diamonds (Taylor & Mokhawa: 203, 271). It should be noted that the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is not a legally-binding treaty between its members but rather, an 'international understanding' of common minimum standards that dictate how each member is to handle the import and export of rough diamonds within its territory, mechanisms to ensure that national trading does not get contaminated with illicit sales as well as levels of transparency and monitoring (Wright: 2004, 699).

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