The Kurdish Problem in Trkiye

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THE KURDISH PROBLEM IN TÐ"ÑšRKiYE

A DOUBLE EDGED SWORD

The prosperity of the Western cities in TÐ"јrkiye unfortunately is not seen in its Eastern cities where Kurdish minorities used to live. Lack of education and employment, in addition to economical hardships in Southeastern TÐ"јrkiye, force the local young people either to emigrate to the Western TÐ"јrkiye with a hope to find better conditions, or the same conditions force them to be guerrillas in the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) troops. This shows that the Kurdish youth don't have many options: dying of hunger or of a bullet seems to be the unchangeable fate of them unless they can get out of their poor backward region.

In TÐ"јrkiye, it is the duty of military forces to fight against any separatist movement like Kurdish terrorism created by PKK. This has been the most accepted way of keeping state unity since the early days of the young Turkish Republic. Yet, no success in resolving this critical problem could have been achieved in the last two decades through such a brutal approach which costs the government $8 billion annually. Although the Turkish military with its mobilized staff of 1.5 million is the most dissuading and strongest force in the near east region, it has been unable to cope with the Kurdish terrorists' guerrilla tactics. James Brown, director of John G. Tower Center for political Studies, at Southern Methodist University, says that "conflicts such as these are not easily resolved, but they may be contained. In the case of TÐ"јrkiye, the Kurds are not in a position to win. On the other hand [the government in] Ankara will face great costs in containing this conflict politically, economically, and humanistically (128).

The experience of the last 20 years shows that Turkish politicians should seek for a civil method rather than martial means of healing this ever bleeding wound in Southeast TÐ"јrkiye. It is time to decide for the happiness of all Turkish citizens, including both Kurds and Turks as well as other minorities, rather than fighting for a victory of the army.

Because the PKK's Kurdistan (land of the Kurds) dream or a federation of Turks and Kurds in TÐ"јrkiye neither workable nor acceptable for the Turkish government, a new solution becomes inevitable. Under the existent conditions it is wise to assert that instead of using funds to fuel the civil war with more weapons, the Turkish government should divert its means into educating the people of Southeastern TÐ"јrkiye, namely the Kurds, and also investing in the local economy. Doing so will surely help create a stable peace to be established in the region. To understand why this is the best solution, we must look at four undermining issues which explain us the relationship between Turkish government and the Kurds:

TÐ"јrkiye's geopolitical situation and history of the Kurdish problem.

The Reasons for the emergence of PKK

Comparison of Western and Eastern TÐ"јrkiye, and the Kurds' acceptance within the Turkish society.

Separatist Kurds' justification for their direct action, and why it is not valid.

TÐ"јrkiye, known as the bridge between Asia and Europe is one of the near eastern countries, that is surrounded by the Black Sea in the North, the Aegean Sea in the West and the Mediterranean Sea in the South. Being a neighbor to Iran, Iraq, Syria in the East and Southeast, and Greece in the West --all friendly countries!-- makes it very difficult for TÐ"јrkiye to cope with the existent geopolitical problems. One of these problems which has turned out to be the most important one in the last ten years--thanks to the support provided by above mentioned "friendly" countries--is the Kurdish imbroglio emerging from the southeast region of TÐ"јrkiye.

Kurds used to live in that region together with Turks for about eight hundred years during the reign of the Ottomans. When the new Turkish Republic was founded by Mustafa Kemal AtatÐ"јrk in 1923, Kurds were considered Turkish citizens as well as other non Turkic minorities, namely Lazs, GÐ"јrcÐ"јs, Bosnians, etc. The Ottoman Empire was a commonwealth hosting about 47 different ethnic groups, and it had experienced no nationalistic movement until the 19th century. Although the Turkish Republic was founded in an opposition to the Ottoman Empire, it is considered by many as a reflection of the empire. Nur Bilge Criss, a professor in the Department of International Relations of Bilkent University, Ankara, claims that "the [Turkish] Republic, too, from an ethnic viewpoint is a commonwealth. On the basis alone, the state would not opt for a federation on ethnic grounds and do justice to all other ethnic identities" (25). These facts show us that giving Kurds a separate state is not the solution, because such a tolerance will also give the other ethnic groups a right to ask for their own state, and this may create further problems which would eventually break the country into pieces.

Kurds had fought in the troops of AtatÐ"јrk during the Turkish War of Independence against the occupying forces of Anatolia to establish a new state, namely Turkish Republic, over the ruins of the Ottoman Empire right after the World War I. By doing so, they had automatically become a part of this new state, and they were considered so by the central government in Ankara too. Later on however, they started to revolt against the Turkish government. Criss says that "the history of Kurdish rebellions in TÐ"јrkiye in 1924, 1926, and 1936-1938 is colored with religious sentiments against a secular state" (22). So we can accept that those early revolts were based on religious reasons, in other words, they were against the secularism principle adopted by the new state. The government at the time had been able to suppress all these revolts; however, the rising power of the PKK since the late 70s became a major problem for the country. Established as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization in 1978, the PKK started to attack civilians as well as militia forces with hit-and-run operations and killed thousands of innocent individuals majority of whom were their own Kurdish kin who did not support them (Criss 19).

Brown gives a brief background of this renegade--first a communist and then an opportunist--terrorist group