The Nuclear Threat During the Berlin Crisis

The Nuclear Threat During the Berlin Crisis

Introduction

On November 10, 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave a speech at a Soviet-Polish meeting in Moscow that would ultimately culminate into one of the most profound crises of the Cold War. The Soviet leader accused the Western Powers of violating the 1945 Potsdam Agreement and sabotaging the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and recommended that the Federal Republic abandon, "the hope that we shall cease to support the German Democratic Republic." (Address by Premier, 1958). Soon after, Khrushchev delivered a speech giving an ultimatum to the allies and gave them six months to demilitarize West Berlin. The Allies' subsequent refusal and the resulting tension put both the U.S.S.R. and the United States in a particularly dangerous situation. Although it is unlikely that full-out thermonuclear war would have resulted from the Berlin Crisis, there was a very real threat of a limited nuclear strike or conventional warfare to both of the superpowers until the tension over Berlin was assuaged.

Although November 1958 marked the official beginning of the crisis, Berlin had been a source of contention between the US and the Soviets from the initial division of Germany after WWII (Tine, 2005). The three territorial zones in Western Germany, controlled by France, Britain, and the US, contrasted greatly with the Soviet-controlled East, which upheld socialism. Berlin itself was divided in a similar fashion. However, when the Soviets severed the connection between West Berlin and non-Soviet zones in June 1948, substantial tension with the allies ensued. In fact, this led to the famous Berlin Airlift, which is when the allies flew supplies to Western Berlin over the Soviet controlled territory in East Germany. In May 1949, the blockade was put to an end, but the rigidity among the powers in Germany remained. (Tine, 2005)

Tension between the Allies and Soviets

For almost a decade, Germany carried on in relative harmony. Of course, the amicability came to an end when Nikita Khrushchev made his speech. So why exactly did Khrushchev become suddenly

disruptive and put an end to the peace? The exact answer is uncertain, but it was likely a mixture of an increase in Soviet confidence and economic pursuits. Sputnik had led to a spike in Soviet self-assurance, and Khrushchev may have felt powerful enough to risk a crisis with the Western Powers. (Barker, 1963) There was a clear Soviet technological lead, which could have made the USSR especially emboldened. Additionally, Eastern Berlin was struggling economically while the allied-occupied German territory was flourishing. (Barker, 1963) Khrushchev probably wanted to put a halt to the transfer of economic resources and the "brain drain" that was occurring from the East into the West. Even though Khrushchev made claims like, "Western Germany is building an army which the German militarists envisage as stronger than the armies of Britain and France," and credited a disregard for the Potsdam Agreement as his reasoning for his demands, it is probable that he was at least partially motivated by these other factors (Speech by Soviet Premier, 1958).

Tensions and the consequent threat of war between the two forces rose dramatically when the allies chose to reject Khrushchev's demands and reasserted their right to have free access to Berlin (Barker, 1963). The situation actually ended up being a blunder for the USSR in the short-term because the brain drain from the East only worsened during the 6-month period and the number of refugees increased (McLaughlin, 1999). The four powers agreed to a summit in early 1959 to find a resolution to the problems, which was followed by direct negotiations between Khrushchev and Eisenhower at Camp David. At this point, President Eisenhower was attempting to use military strength as his primary negotiation tool. It was his policy that it was necessary to accumulate military power in order to make peace with the Soviets, and was recorded saying, "We are arming in order to make it possible for us to achieve disarmament." (Memo of Conversation, March 1960) Although no actual solution was reached, it was decided that no ultimatums should be enforced and that the situation would be resolved in Paris in May 1960. This reduced tension was only temporary, however, and the potential for war never truly disappeared.

Unfortunately, the U-2 incident in 1960 essentially obliterated the potential of the Paris Summit. An American spy plane that was on a reconnaissance mission of the USSR was shot down and publicly

denounced. A Soviet note to the United States even highlights the potent negative affect and the consequent rejuvenated tensions that the U-2 plane had on US-USSR relations:

"One must ask, how is it possible to reconcile this with declarations on the part of leading figures of the United States of America, that the Government of the United States of America, like the Soviet Government, also strives for improvement of relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, for relaxation of international tension, and strengthening of trust between states." (Soviet Note, 1960)

In addition to the U-2 incident, Khrushchev's recognition that the US was serious about defending Berlin caused the Paris Summit to fail, as pointed out by Assistant Secretary Foy Kohler (Memo of Conversation, June 1960). As a result of the lack of a resolution from the Paris Summit, Khrushchev continued his threats to eliminate the access of the United States and its Western allies to Berlin. This meant that the potential for war and even the use of nuclear weapons would not be nullified and would continue to hang over America and the USSR. Khrushchev continued until August 4, 1961, when the United States President John Kennedy received an agreement from NATO to defend Berlin by force, should it be necessary (Genovese, 2013).

On August 13, 1961, the Berlin Wall was constructed. Despite the United States' reaction with a build up of conventional forces in the end of August, this actually marked the beginning of the end of the Berlin Crisis and a general relief of tension (Hershberg, 2013). Although the wall symbolized the distrust between Western and Eastern forces, the wall also exhibited Khrushchev's acceptance that there was not going to be a unified Berlin and that the Allied forces would be staying in the West. The Berlin Wall allowed for for the possibility of a "live and let live" policy, which was less dangerous than Khrushchev attempting to take over. On the other hand, the incident at Checkpoint Charlie in October of 1961 was a tension-filled