The Objective Basis of Morality Challenged

The Objective Basis of Morality Challenged

The origins of morality and what is defined as "good" or "bad", "unethical" or "moral" can easily boggle the mind. It is a topic that can be debated almost endlessly. There are many factors that must be taken into consideration to provide valid philosophies; yet there will still always be debatable elements. Two concepts of morality that are in direct opposition of each other are moral objectivism and moral relativism. Moral relativism can be subjective, in which morals are particular an individuals own beliefs; or, they can be conventional, in which morals are specific to a society and vary from culture to culture. On the other hand, moral objectivism does not leave room for opinions; it reasons that moral judgments are either true or false absolutely. These conflicting views create much cause for deliberation.

As an objectivist, Thomas Nagel gives reasons in his article, "The Objective Basis of Morality" for why people should care about others. He poses many questions that might have entered our minds before. Why should we care about others? Why should we be moral? Nagel's argument is in opposition to moral relativism because he does not believe moral justification can be replaced by identifying "something else that a person already cares about." He does not believe that ethical obligations can be reduced to religious or legal ones.

In his essay he uses a hypothetical example supposing that you work in a library and your friend wants to smuggle a rare reference work. He uses this example to set up a sequence of questions. What makes this action wrong? "To say it's wrong is not just to say it's against the rules." (Singer, 155) Where does the desire not to help your friend come from? The thoughts come from the effect this action has on others. However, your friend could care less about the effect this action has on others. But where is the wrong in that? Thus reestablishing the golden question: Why should he care? Why should anyone care?

Nagel then explains three objections against religious justifications to answer this question. First, there are an ample amount of people who don't believe in God yet make discernments between right and wrong. Next, what God deems is wrong still isn't what makes it wrong. Rather what is wrong is why God forbids it. And lastly, the fear of punishment or the hope of a reward or even his love does not seem to be the right motives for morality (Singer, 156). I believe these objections to be ambiguous and will be discussed further on.

Nagel continues accordingly, he believes the basis of morality is a direct concern for other people. "But morality is supposed to apply to everyone: and can we assume that everyone has such a concern for others?" (Singer 157) To settle the question of finding a reason for people to not hurt even those they do not know is the common question of, "How would you like it if someone did that to you?" In this case we are to take in our own interests under the supposition that they are threatened by the inconsiderate behavior of others. "When our own interests are threatenedÐ'.... most of us find it easy to appreciate that those others have a reason to be more considerate" (Singer 157-8).

Therefore, the concern must be "a matter of simple consistency." If you are able to admit that a person has no reason to harm you and that it not only applies to you but to everyone in general, then to be consistent you must also admit the same reason applies to your actions now. Although Nagel does address the possibility of someone claiming he wouldn't care, he dismisses this notion as crazy. However, a critic might argue that it is not very effective given that one of the points of the argument was to establish why they should care. I think that Nagel wants to address this issue but in doing so he provides an answer that only seems like a loophole.

According to moral relativism it does not make sense to ask whether a given act is good or bad. There is only good or bad within a specific context. An act may be good for one person but bad for another, or good n one cultural setting but bad in another. There is no fixed ideal of good or bad. So in the case of working in the library, while letting your friend smuggle the rare book would seem wrong because it does not allow other people to have access to this resource and would possibly get you punished; what if your friend was on the verge of discovering a solution to global warming, and the only way for him to sufficiently perform his research is to have access to this book indefinitely, and to do so requires that he must smuggle this invaluable book. Then, this act may be considered good in this context, but not good for a different friend who might only want the book because it is rare and would sell very highly on eBay. In this circumstance morality is very subjective. If this was the case then perhaps Nagel could not argue that stealing the book is wrong because the person's intentions were out of a "direct concern for others." In this circumstance there is no such thing as a moral absolute. There will always be exceptions relative to the situation because a person's intentions or the consequences of their actions will always vary from situation to situation.

From a relativist's standpoint, one could also argue against Nagel and his belief that ethical obligations cannot be restricted to legal