The Problem of Evil

Natalie Casas

Professor B. Chung

Phi 2011

2 March 2006

The Problem of Evil

To some evil is necessary for good and to others evil should not logically exist alongside an omnipotent God. As I criticize the sides of both arguments through the works God, Evil, and the Best of All Possible Worlds, by Gottfried Leibniz and Evil and Omnipotence, by J.L. Mackie a conclusion will be made as to which philosophy is logically stronger. Before the arguments of both Leibniz and Mackie are discussed the question of the existence of God, as a result of moral and natural evils, should be addressed first and foremost.

Two types of evils are present in the world as we know it and those include: moral evils and natural evils. While moral evils occurs when people make decisions as to how they will act in certain situations, natural evils such as: Tornadoes, earthquakes, typhoons, tsunamis, and other things of that nature occur all around the world, and these forces of nature strike everywhere with no regard to religion, race, or socio-economic status. Everyday moral decisions are made and people decide whether to steal, cheat, harm others, lie, and behave in a way unacceptable to society. However, natural evils, in contrast, are forces that humans cannot control. So how can there be a God that exists, which is said to be wholly good, omnipotent, and omniscient, allow such natural evils to occur? Gottfried Leibniz would argue that there is a greater good that would outweigh this evil, yet J.L. Mackie claims that this "greater good" only leads to a greater evil. Though many arguments can be made for or against the presence of natural evils, I truly believe that the side of Leibniz is based truly on a faith. Though there is no logical explanation for why God would allow natural evils to exist in the world, theodicists would simply argue that humans, in our finite understanding, could not possibly comprehend the will of a being who is infinite, omniscient, and omnipotent. Therefore, the term faith, which could be said to mean believing without any physical evidence, would be the main hold of the theodicist argument. Anti-theodicists would claim that this argument is invalid and unsubstantiated because a God who is wholly good would not create or allow for any evil (whether moral or natural) to exist. As the sides of both Leibniz and Mackie are presented, these matters will be discussed more thoroughly.

The main point of Leibniz's philosophy is that God, in creating the world, He created the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz denies the premises 1)whoever does not choose the best is lacking in power, knowledge, or goodness 2)God did not choose the best in creating the world 3) Therefore, God has been lacking in power, knowledge, or goodness. Leibniz's argument is one of optimism. He did not argue the perfection of the world or that evil was non-existent, but his argument was merely positively looking at the world created and relating that to God's goodness, omnipotence, and His constant concern with His creation. His argument was optimistically pointing to being able to see God's Divine plan in its totality and not judging by solitary parts. This theory may be attractive to many because it answered a profound philosophical question: if God is all-powerful and compassionate, then why is there so much evil in the world? Leibniz argues that "God has permitted evil in order to bring about good, that is, a greater good."

On the other hand, Mackie argues saying, "In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists." He contends that in order for them to be consistent with each other one of the preceding premises must be false, yet a theologian "must adhere to all three." In addition to Mackie's three main premises he also introduces four "quasi-logical" rules that give further support to his argument. These rules include:

1)Good is opposed to evil in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that 2)there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. From these it follows that 3) a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely and then the proposition that 4) a good omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists, are incompatible.

Mackie also argues against fallacious arguments including:

1)"God cannot exist without evil" or "Evil is a necessary counterpart to good."

2)"Evil is necessary as a means to good."

3)"The universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil."

4) "Evil is due to human free will"

Mackie disproves fallacious argument number one by claiming that evil and good are not necessary counterparts to one another when compared to up and down (or great and small). He also goes on to say, "It sets a limit as to what God can do, saying that God cannot create good without simultaneously creating evil, and this means either that God is not omnipotent or there are some limits as to what God can do." However, Leibniz's argument was not that God could not create good without evil but merely that, "God has permitted evil" so that a greater good may accompany it. In such a case as this, Mackie would argue that since God has chosen to permit evil then God can not be wholly good because it denies the third quasi-logical rule.

Mackie continues with Fallacious statement two by saying that it "implies a severe restriction of God's power," as the first fallacious argument did. Again, by claiming that evil is necessary as a means to good, the argument implies either that 1)an omnipotent being is not