The Provocative Matter of Existence

The Provocative Matter of Existence

Rene Descartes, John Locke, and Bertrand Russell all have doubts about our knowledge of the existence of material things. Descartes believes that our senses may be sufficient enough to understand what matter is assuming it's actually there. Locke claims that our senses may make up descriptions of matter, but these are only interpretations and there is no real end to figuring out material bodies in that things can always be broken down further in description. Russell believes that the existence of material bodies can be interpreted through our senses, assuming, of course, that matter actually is in existence. However, the most logical and compelling argument is that made by John Locke in his book, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding because one must experience something in order to understand its purpose and therefore question whether material bodies are answers to questions of description and whether there is an actual way to determine the existence of material things.

In his publication, Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes argues that one's senses ought not to be trusted. This skepticism of the senses roots from the idea that he may very well be trapped within an elaborate concept as a dream or he may be, at the very moment, deceived by either a "malicious demon" or God himself (Descartes, 15). He however goes on to assert the he himself must exist based on the premise that he is able to perceive and foremost think. He then considers the thought of God, which is so extreme as model of perfection, that he himself could not have just conjured up (Descartes, 14-17). This in turn allows him to judge that what he perceives as clear and distinguishable is assured by God, which lays the grounds for arguing the existence of matter. Descartes divides the outlook of matter into two distinct types of characteristics: the primary and the secondary. The primary characteristics are composed of physical qualities whereas secondary characteristics are made up of what we "judge" an object to truly be (Descartes 20-21). According to Descartes, although our senses cannot be trusted, they still allocate some sort of perception, and when combined with thought and thorough regard of the limits of imagination, one can achieve understanding of supposed, or true, matter (Descartes, 54-62).

The theory of the existence of material bodies proposed by John Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding contrasts greatly with Descartes' suppositions on the same subject from Meditations on First Philosophy. First off, Locke argues that there is no such thing as innate knowledge or innate ideas as argued by Descartes, but rather contends that the mind is a blank slate, or "tabula rasa," and that all knowledge is derived by experience (Locke, Book I: Chapter i, Chapter ii). Along with this, Locke claims that just as with innate knowledge, innate ideas do not exist, which contradicts Descartes' claim that one has a thought of a being that is supremely perfect, an idea of God (Locke, Book I: Chapter ii; Descartes, 10-17). On the subject of matter, Locke too has a distinction between primary and secondary characteristics similar to that of Descartes as highlighted in the second meditation (Locke, Book II: Chapter xxiii; Descartes, 20-23). Locke, just as Descartes, defines primary characteristics as the direct physical qualities that compose the body in question, except Locke takes it a little farther in advancing these characteristics as the laws of resemblance from one body to another. Then, Locke's secondary characteristics are based upon doubt of the primary qualities and the absence of resemblance once one figures that there is no absolute certainty that two objects or more can be exactly the same (Locke, Book II: Chapter xxiii; Descartes, 20-23). Locke's secondary characteristics are far more explicit in definition than that of Descartes. In book II of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke goes on to ridicule Descartes' view of substance by claiming it absurd that there are actually conclusions Ð'- as Descartes argues: the soul (actually the mind), of body, and God Ð'- that everyone could agree upon as actually innately having real existence because according to Locke, substances are formed as a result of clusters of ideas that bind together, which, as an argument, relates back to the notion that our minds began as blank slates and we learn, or learn to interpret, from experience (Locke, Book II: Chapter xxiii; Descartes). This runs parallel to Locke's supposition that substance is made up "of" certain features distinguishable and determined by the human and that one does not know or acquire features "off" a substance (as Descartes claims) (Locke, Book II: Chapter xxiii; Descartes, 20-21, 54-57). As can be seen, Locke and Descartes differ immensely in their concerns in doubt of the existence of matter.

Bertrand Russell, a twentieth-century philosopher relates back to both Descartes and Locke yet develops a different theory upon the existence of matter. What Russell believes in his book, The Problems of Philosophy, most closely correlates, between the theories of Descartes and Locke, to Locke's description of how a substance is determined, however has striking suggestions similar to that of Descartes. This is because Russell believes that our knowledge of material bodies is determined by our senses and our ability to interpret them (Russell, 11). Russell begins the book with the example of a table and points out that every individual will have a different view of the table and it is therefore certain that no one is able to see the exact same body the exact same way as another; and "Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing. The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must