The Sicilian Campaign: They Should Have Listened to Pericles

The Sicilian Campaign: They Should Have Listened to Pericles

A city forever in search of new sources of wealth, natural resources, and food supplies, Athens decided to venture out in 415 B.C. on a second campaign of Sicilian conquest. They also sought to deal their Peloponnesian enemies a psychological blow by demonstrating their return to strength following a devastating plague. This campaign proved to be poorly researched, planned, and equipped and its execution was beseeched with poor timing and poor decision making. Most importantly, there were no clearly stated political or strategic goals at the outset of the expedition. The Sicilian Expedition upset the precarious truce set forth in the Peace of Nicias and returned the Aegean poleis back into a world war whose end result ultimately led to the downfall of the Athenian Empire.

Athens had an understandable urge to show the region that they had recovered from the plague and was once again a formidable power. They felt the desire to demonstrate their renewed strength not only to Sparta, but also to all the satellite members of the Athenian empire. There were also economic reasons to pursue the expedition. Since Athens was located on poor farming ground, they relied heavily on trade for sources of food, particularly grain. Conquering Syracuse would alleviate their grain problem, as Sicily was one of the few sources of unlimited grain supply and would further strengthen Athens' position as a major power in the Aegean.

Additionally, the Athenians believed that the current peace with Sparta under the Peace of Nicias eliminated the danger of a Spartan attack on Athens. With the home front secure, they saw no reason not to venture out and attempt to expand their wealth and resources. In addition, Sparta was very wary to venture too far from the homeland, as they feared a helot revolt at home. If the Spartan army was sent to another region for battle, they risked not having an adequate force in Sparta to put down an insurrection. Knowing this, Athens felt secure in their decision to undertake the Sicilian campaign.

In 430 B.C., Pericles gave a speech that contained immense foreshadowing of the Sicilian Campaign. In that speech he notes:

Wait quietly, pay attention to their marine, attempt no new conquests, and do not expose the city to new hazards during the war, and doing this, he promised a favorable result.

The Athenians would have been wise to remember Pericles' words when they began to plan for the Sicilian Expedition.

The catalyst for this campaign came in the form of envoys from the city of Egestas seeking aid in their war against Selinus. They brought with them tales of their great wealth and a warning of Syracuse domination on the island of Sicily. The Egestan envoys offered to pay for the war expenses if Athens came to their aid. The Athenians, while skeptical, were interested in the alleged wealth of Egestas and the possibility of exploiting the grain supplies on the island by conquering Syracuse. Athens decided to send an envoy to Sicily to assess the situation.

The envoys returned armed with confirmation of Egestas' wealth, and an assembly was formed and a decision made to send a fleet to Sicily. This decision was not made purely with the goal of aiding the Egestans, however, but also with the goal of conquering Syracuse. It was at this assembly that many mistakes were made that led to a doomed campaign. First, Athens failed to properly address the geo-political situation on the island and also failed to collect proper intelligence regarding the primary reason for launching the expedition; in a clever dupe, the Egestans had managed to project only an illusion of wealth. Additionally, the envoys failed to collect any evidence that Syracuse was in a position, or had the desire, to dominate the island. Had Athens prepared for the expedition more thoroughly, they might have achieved a much different outcome.

Second, the assembly appointed three generals to lead the campaign. This command structure was a direct reflection on the social structure of Athens, but proved to be a poor leadership hierarchy. As Sun Tzu stated, "A confused army leads to another's victory." This structure led to confusion and ambiguity later in the campaign. One of the generals, Nicias, was an unwilling participant. He argued that it was "imprudent to attack Sicily while affairs nearer home are still precarious." He noted that the current peace, despite its formalities, was still only as stable as the Spartans chose to make it. As Clausewitz pointed out, "even the ultimate outcome of war is not always to be regarded as final." The Spartans still maintained their ultimate goal of eliminating the Athenian Empire. The three chosen generals and their differing strategies would eventually lead to problems in the execution phase of the campaign.

A third mistake by the assembly was in the size of the force chosen for the campaign. Nicias, still hoping to convince the assembly to change its mind, attempted a bit of reverse psychology in his force estimates. He felt that he could persuade the assembly that a much larger force than had already been suggested was needed to wage battle on Sicily. In doing so, he hoped that the assembly would be put off by the cost of such an endeavor. He offered that an allotment of 60 triremes was not enough and that the expedition needed 100 ships at a minimum. His strategy backfired and the assembly decided that the larger fleet was indeed the proper way to carry out the expedition. This larger force would have dramatic strategic and tactical implications for the expedition.

Fourth, the assembly failed to consider the potential reaction of the individual cities on Sicily. Alicibiades, one of the three generals assigned to the voyage, designed a plan of city hopping in which the fleet would go from city to city to obtain supplies, weapons, horses, and food, as well as securing allies to join up in the fight against Syracuse. However, shortly after the fleet's arrival in Sicily, Alicibiades was recalled to Athens to stand trail for sacrilegious conduct. This was arguably the most damaging event to the fleet during the campaign. With Alicibiades is gone, Nicias, the unsure and indecisive general, was left in charge of executing the campaign without the benefit of Alicibiades' negotiating skills and charm. Additionally, the sheer number of ships - dictated to the assembly by Nicias himself Ð'- intimidated the cities and may have cemented their decision not to join up arms with Athens. The cities feared that Athens simply wanted to control the region and that Athens was an expansionist power that desired to extend