The Tupamaros and Uruguay

The Tupamaros of Uruguay

Uruguay in the 1960Ð'â„-s was distinct among other South American counties for its affluence and sociopolitical stability. Economic prosperity had fostered the growth of a large middle class and a stable welfare-state government that allowed a wider degree of democratic and civil freedoms larger than any other South American government. Because Uruguayan society was so peaceful, the Army and Police were very small. In 1968 there were only about 12,000 men in the armed forces and fewer than 22,000

police to keep order in a population of about 3 million.

A slump in the demand for wool and meat, UruguayÐ'â„-s two principal exports, after the Korean War brought mass unemployment, inflation, and a steep drop in the standard of living. the social tensions this produced, along with the corruption of the overblown state bureaucracy (one in five working Uruguayans was employed by the federal government in some fashion), gave the impulse for an effective urban guerrilla movement to emerge.

This revolutionary groupÐ'â„-s official name was Movimento de Liberacion National but was popularly known as the Tupamaros (from Tupac Amaru, last member of the Inca royal family, murdered by the Spanish in 1571). It was founded in 1963 by Raul Sendic, a law student studying in Montevideo. Because Uruguay was so urbanized (over 80% of Uruguayans lived in large towns or cities) they concentrated almost all their activity in and around the capital, Montevideo, where more than half the entire population of the country lived. As with most other South American guerrilla groups, they started as a political organization that deliberately chose the tactics of Ð'Њarmed struggleÐ'â„- and drew its

membership from young, radical, middle-class people -- mostly students and white-collar workers. Like most urban terrorist groups, they were organized in a cellular structure of 4-5 men called a Ð'Њfiring group,Ð'â„- with the group leader as the only link to other cells. This was done for security reasons, as was their practice of never telling any individual more than he or she needed to know for any particular operation.

From 1963 to early 1968 the Tupamaros concentrated on gathering resources -- mostly by robbing banks, guns shops, and private businesses. Their goal was to make the government look powerless to defend its friends and unnecessarily heavy-handed in its reactions. The main tactics they used to achieve this were political kidnapping, Ð'Њarmed propaganda,Ð'â„- and intimidating the security forces.

The Tupamaros used political kidnapping as an alternative to assassinations and as a way to show the governmentÐ'â„-s impotence. It was a severe psychological shock and embarrassment to those in the government to have their friends and diplomatic figures snatched off the street and held in so-called Ð'ЊpeopleÐ'â„-s prisonsÐ'â„- in Montevideo itself. Meanwhile, the people did not react as they would have against assassinations because the kidnappings (often of unpopular and corrupt people anyway) did not inconvenience them, but the inept police reaction (usually a massive cordon-and-search operation) did.

The worsening state of the economy provoked a wave of student rioting and labour unrest, and a state of national emergency was declared in June 1968 (which was to last until late 1972). It was during this crisis that the Tupamaros staged their first political kidnapping -- Ulises Pereyra, the president of the State Telephone Company, an unpopular figure whose abduction was acclaimed by the public. When the police began to search the campus of the National University in Montevideo, they started a student riot that ended in the death of a student. Ulises Pereyra was released unharmed five days later.

More kidnappings followed. In September 1969 they kidnapped a leading banker and held him for ten weeks, in support of a strike by employees at his bank. In July 1970 Dan Mitrione, an American policeman on loan to the Uruguayan security forces, and Aloisio Gonide, the Brazilian consul in Uruguay, were kidnapped and held for ransom. When the government refused to parley with the Tupamaros, they killed Mitrione, a move that was to cost them considerable public support. In the first half of 1971 the British ambassador to Uruguay, the Uruguayan attorney-general, and a former minister

of agriculture were kidnapped, and Ulises Pereyra was abducted a second time.

The second tactic the Tupamaros used was Ð'Њarmed propaganda. Some of these actions resembled nothing so much as forceful advertising. When the government shut down left-wing papers and forbade the regular news media to refer to the Tupamaros by name, the Tupamaros ran their own mobile radio transmitter in Montevideo, temporarily seized radio stations to broadcast propaganda, and maintained an underground press. Groups of armed terrorists would also occupy meeting halls, cafeterias, and cinemas (real guerrilla theatre!) and make speeches to a literally captive audience. Actions like bank robberies and raids on police stations, besides their logistical benefit, also had a propaganda goal. The Tupamaros conducted several very professional operations in