Too Little, Too Late

"Too, Little, Too Late" (Pimlott 159)

Erich Bancroft

AP LA 6

Mr. Medlock

"Too Little, Too Late" (Pimlott 159)

Despite Adolf Hitler's warmongering genius, he made a few crucial mistakes leading to the eventual fall of the Third Reich during World War II. First was his overconfidence and belief in a short war. Second was the invasion of Russia in the heart of winter. Third was his mistake of thinking that he could occupy and control Western Europe and the British Isles in their entirety. And fourth, the one that is not known, was Hitler's miscalculation of the importance of air superiority in the war. Hitler believed that to achieve victory in Europe he needed massive numbers of troops, powerful tanks and artillery, and fast moving, long range, highly destructive bombers. He had left out a crucial piece of the "war puzzle;" his lack of fighters. Hitler had fighter-bombers in his Luftwaffe, excluding another Messerschmitt invention; the Me Bf 109, but that was it; they were fighter-bombers, not fighters. Before the war had even begun; Will Messerschmitt had thought of the plans and was ready for the testing of the Messerschmitt 262A Sturmvogel, or Storm Bird, "Schwalbe," or swallow; referring to the fastest bird while in a dive (Heppenheimer "Willi Messerschmitt and His Company"). The Me 262 was designed as an air superiority fighter with unmatched speeds. The Me 262 was jet fighter; the first of its kind. No other country in the world was ready to produce this new breed of air superiority fighters. Hitler thought it was a good idea, but he did not think he needed it, but when he learned that he did require the Me 262 it came simply; "too little, too late" (Pimlott 159). If Hitler would have understood the immense capabilities of the Messerschmitt 262A in his Luftwaffe, defensively, during a time of siege, the Allied bomber offensive over Germany would have proved to be diminutively successful in comparison to the damage that was caused as a result of a lack of fighters. Because of the fact that the Me 262 out-sped the Allied chief escorts and interceptors by 150 miles per hour and greatly outmaneuvered any aircraft sent their way; there is little rebuttal as to their effectiveness in the skies. WWII proved that ingenuity and air superiority determined the result of a war; and with German air superiority over the Third Reich there would have been no likelihood of a victorious campaign in Hitler's territory.

Hitler's Blitzkrieg, or "lightning war," was proved a success during the campaign against Europe and thus, he wanted more units to support his unmatched offensive. The offensive used a simple yet effective strategy. As Parada ("Blitzkrieg") put it, the:

1. Airforce attacks enemy front-line and rear positions, main roads, airfields and communication centers. At the same time infantry attacks on the entire frontline (or at least at main places) and engages enemy. This restrains the enemy from knowing where the main force will attack and makes it impossible to prepare any defenses.

2. Concentrated tank units breakthrough main lines of defense and advance deeper into enemy territory, while following mechanized units pursuit and engage defenders preventing them from establishing defensive postions [sic]. Infantry continues to engage enemy to misinform and keep enemy forces from withdrawing and establishing effective defense.

3. Infantry and other support units attack enemy flanks in order to link up with other groups to complete the attack and eventually encircle the enemy and/or capture strategic position.

4. Mechanized groups spearhead deeper into the enemy territory outflanking the enemy positions and paralyzing the rear preventing withdrawing troops and defenders from establishing effective defensive positions.

5. Main force links up with other units encircling and cutting off the enemy.

The fighter was not amongst his "chosen" units.

When Messerschmitt presented his futuristically ingenious creation, the Me 262, Hitler was confused. Hitler thought that the Me 262 was going to be a Jagdbomber, or fighter-bomber. He asked his officers in the first meeting about the Me 262, "I thought that 262 was coming as a high-speed bomber. How many of the 262s already manufactured can carry bombs" (qtd. in Goebel "The Messerschmitt Me-262 Schwalbe / Sturmvogel"). In defense of his company's reputation, Messerschmitt announced that in theory they could, and Hitler was immediately pleased. He wanted to start production of his new Jagdbomber immediately. This halted nearly all production of the Me 262 to install the two pylons required for bombing (Goebel "The Messerschmitt Me-262 Schwalbe / Sturmvogel"). Putting off production was a fatal mistake on Hitler's part because did not allow for any defensive capabilities to protect his other bombers and his airspace. He was hoping for a Jagdbomber to help obstruct the Allied invasions in Italy and Africa. Hitler may not have realized the true importance of fighters in the war effort. He so desperately wanted a victory that it resulted in a lack of defensive capability. Hitler did not want to be defensive because, to him, that was a defeat in itself. Hitler's pride and overconfidence proved deadly to his Third Reich.

In addition to Hitler's misinformation about his "new Jagdbomber," there were some serious political problems within the Reich's Luftfahrt Ministerium (RLM), or in English; the German Air Ministry (Goebel "The Messerschmitt Me-262 Schwalbe / Sturmvogel"). Erhard Milch, head of the RLM, pushed to develop additional fighters without Hitler's permission. Milch's plan seemed to be working well until a meeting to discuss the production of the Me 262. Hitler liked the idea of the Me 262 as a Jagdbomber and ordered the jet to be modified to include bombing abilities. To Milch's delight, Hitler allowed for a fighter version of the Me 262 as long as it did not interfere with the Jagdbomber version. All seemed to be working out with the Me 262, a Jagdbomber version for the German Blitzkrieg, and a fighter version for the defensive and escort role. But all was not well...

Unfortunately for Hitler the Me 262 design was for a fighter, not a Jagdbomber. The Me 262A-1A, the first operational fighter version of the Me 262, proved to be effective, with very few flaws. The Me 262A utilized four, shot barreled, low velocity, MK-108 30 millimeter cannons