Turning the Tide of a War

They had no right to win, yet they did, and in doing so they changed the

course of a war. More than that they added a new name-Midway-to that

small list that inspires men by example... Like Marathon, the Armada,

The Marne. Even against the greatest of odds, there is something in

human spirit - a magic blend of skill, faith and valor - that can lift men

from certain defeat to incredible victory." --Walter Lord

Walter Lord's memorable words echo in the world even today, however, many are blind to the true importance of the battle at Midway. The results of Midway contributed nothing to Japan's ultimate fate in World War II. The Empire's failure occurred primarily in the planning process. Japan's doom was set in motion when they attacked Pearl Harbor. A complete victory at Midway for Japan would have only delayed America's certain victory.

In early June of 1942, the Japanese prepared to attack Midway with four of their finest carriers. The Hiryu, Soryu, Kaga, and Akagi, led by Admiral Nagumo, awaited the command to commence attacks from Admiral Yamamoto, who was not far behind on his flagship, the Yamato. However, the United States, having broken the code of the Japanese, learned of the Empire's plans and were ready to launch a daring surprise attack. On the 3rd of June, the Japanese were spotted by an American scout plan. Rear Admiral Fletcher proceeded with Admiral Nimitz's attack plans and ordered an air assault launched from the USS Yorktown, under his own command, as well as from the USS Hornet and USS Enterprise under Rear Admiral Spruance's command. The Japanese suffered from radio failures, delayed scout planes, and delayed submarine scouting. As a result, the American air assault caught the Japanese off balance and annihilated all four of the Japanese carriers while only losing the USS Yorktown. In addition, the Japanese lost 253 aircraft, and 3,500 personnel, while the United States lost only 150 aircraft and 307 personnel.

After a terrible defeat at Midway, the Japanese eastward offensive stopped and the Americans retained one of their most important advanced bases. The Japanese not only lost four of their finest carriers, but also some of their greatest pilots and personnel. The outcome of Midway broke down the momentum of the Japanese, an event from which they were never able to recover. Japanese industry simply could not produce enough carriers and aircraft to make up for such heavy losses. The Empire could no longer hold an aggressive position in the war. The United States, having retained control of Midway, began to conquer island after island using Midway as a launching point.

What if the Japanese had won the battle at Midway? A victory at Midway would have been meaningless. The Japanese would have merely accomplished a goal in a strategy that was destined to fail from the beginning. The Japanese naval doctrine prior to the war of the Pacific relied heavily on traditional concepts that greatly differed from western naval doctrine. The greatest difference being that the Japanese did not believe in the necessity of total sea command. Western nations did. The idea of completely controlling the entire Pacific Ocean seemed impossible to the Japanese because they thought that no nation had enough resources to attain such status. Japan developed this idea through traditional military thought. Scarce large main forces were too valuable to risk in any but the most important objectives. Maintaining strong forces was far more important than destroying the enemy's forces. The Japanese Navy naturally assumed a defensive role as a result, often striving to force the enemy to sue for peace, rather than forcing them to unconditionally surrender.

In applying this defensive approach to its navy, the Empire focused on sea denial rather than sea control in order to protect its land based operations from the enemy. The Japanese considered the Navy to be merely a deterrent force to support the Army in the Empire's continental endeavors throughout Asia. This approach proved to be successful in Japan's wars against China and Russia. Though the Japanese were outnumbered in both wars, the Empire was able to expand its territory and then limit the war. Both China and Russia feared a social revolution more than foreign threats and were willing to sue for peace. In both of these continental wars, Japan's naval supremacy played a supporting role, where the Empire did not require total sea control.

The Empire's approach to the war in the Pacific involved gaining territory at minimal risk while wearing and tearing at the enemy's will to fight. Once again, the ideas of sea control and the destruction of enemy forces were ignored. Japan did not intend to invade or destroy the United States. Japan hoped to expand its territories, to consolidate them, and to force negotiations with the United States in order to retain control of its gains. Japan failed to recognize that the United States was a very different enemy compared to Russia and China and that bombing Pearl Harbor would provoke the democracy of the United States of America that would have absolutely no intention of settling for anything less than an unconditional surrender from Japan. The strategy developed for the taking of the Pacific Ocean left no chance for Japan to come out on top. The flaws of the Empire's strategies emerged from numerous sources:

"'Victory disease' was born of triumph being piled upon triumph with

staggering speed...and from the success the victors developed an

overweening confidence...Undreamed-of success in weeks rather than

months could only bring this confidence to the through

surface with disastrous

results...It was an incentive to persist with offensive action...it encouraged

the belief that the form of initial operations--action across a wide surface

area with its characteristic dispersal of resources--could be continued in the

second phase of operations...it encouraged the Japanese to think that the

enemy, who had been forced to conform to Japanese action s in the first